Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM1158
2006-05-16 07:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

VICE PRESIDENT MACHAR ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE

Tags:  PGOV PINS PHUM MOPS PTER PEL SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5739
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1158/01 1360757
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 160757Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2833
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001158 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS PHUM MOPS PTER PEL SU
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT MACHAR ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
LORD,S RESISTANCE ARMY, CONFLICT IN JONGLEI STATE

REF: KHARTOUM 1116

Classified By: P/E Chief Eric Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001158

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS PHUM MOPS PTER PEL SU
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT MACHAR ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
LORD,S RESISTANCE ARMY, CONFLICT IN JONGLEI STATE

REF: KHARTOUM 1116

Classified By: P/E Chief Eric Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) The following is an action request - see para 3.


2. (C) Summary: CG met with Government of Southern Sudan
(GoSS) Vice President Riek Machar and Minster for
Parliamentary Affairs Gabriel Changson on May 12 to discuss
the security climate in Southern Sudan. Machar spoke at
length on his contacts with Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
leaders and justified his actions as being in the
self-interest of the GoSS (reftel). Because of these talks,
Machar confirmed that Sudan will not renew the mandate of the
Ugandan Popular Defense Force (UPDF) to operate on Sudanese
territory. The discussion also covered ongoing clashes
between the Lou Nuer and the Sudan People's Liberation Army
(SPLA) in Jonglei State. Machar explaine why the SPLA had
resorted to force, but said that he hoped to return to
negotiations with the White Army militia (septel). Other
sources indicate that the SPLA units involved have been
ordered to remain in their current positions. End Summary.


3. (C) ACTION REQUEST: AF/SPG is requested to advise on the
background and legal ramifications of contacts with the LRA
that we can share with senior GoSS officials.

--------------
Cutting Deals with the Devil
--------------


4. (C) Machar was very forthcoming in providing details
regarding his talks with the LRA. Following GoSS President
Kiir's January 9 speech in which he offered the LRA three
options -- GoSS mediation between the LRA and Government of
Uganda (GOU),voluntary LRA withdrawal from Sudan, or an
offensive against the LRA by the SPLA - a Dutch NGO named Pax
Christi contacted the GoSS Presidency and offered to set up a
meeting between GoSS representatives and the LRA. Dr. Simon,
Dr. Leonard Anab, and Professor Safa, an American of
Ethiopian descent, spearheaded this initiative. Machar said
that the trio had been involved in earlier attempts to

negotiate with the LRA.


5. (C) Machar said that he used the hubbub surrounding the
February visit of Sudanese President Bashir to spirit LRA
representatives through Juba airport. They offered to
arrange a meeting between Machar and LRA Deputy Commander
Vincent Otti, and on March 11 Machar traveled to Western
Equatoria State for the meeting. This led to a second
meeting on May 3 that included GoSS Security Minister Daniel
Awet, an SPLA general, Otti, LRA leader Joseph Kony, and LRA
General Odiambo.


6. (C) Machar said that Kony, who was dressed in the uniform
of a general, was articulate and to the point. To Machar's
surprise, several LRA advisors who also attended the meeting
were "well learned" Ugandans who had studied in Europe.
Machar repeated Kiir's offer to mediate or allow the LRA to
withdraw peacefully from Sudan, but he warned that continued
attacks on the Sudanese population would provoke a strong
military reaction from the SPLA, and they would employ
whatever force necessary to evict the LRA. He also told Kony
that the LRA should desist from further attacks on UNMIS
forces.


7. (C) Kony responded that he was interested in peaceful
negotiation with Uganda, but said that he believed Museveni's
goal was to kill him, rather than talk. He agreed to cease
all offensive operations on Sudanese soil and told Machar
that there was not a single LRA soldier remaining in Sudan
east of the Nile.


8. (C) Machar pointed out that there had been no LRA attacks
since May 1, although he deflected questions from the CG on
what the GoSS offered in return for these assurances -- there
are rumors the GoSS provided food aid to the LRA. Machar
said that he had briefed Kiir on the meeting before Kiir's
May 4 departure for Khartoum, with scheduled onward travel to
Kampala for Museveni's May 12 inauguration. Machar said that
Kiir would return with Museveni's response, which would be
delivered to Kony.


9. (C) Machar said that he had heard, through various
channels, including the Ugandan CG in Juba, that Kampala
might not be adverse to a peaceful settlement of the LRA
problem. Machar continued that under the present
circumstances, Sudan had decided not to renew the protocol
with Uganda that permitted Kampala to station UPDF forces on
Sudanese territory. UPDF forces currently in Sudan would
withdraw and deploy along the Ugandan border with Sudan.


KHARTOUM 00001158 002 OF 003



10. (C) Machar said that the GoSS had taken these steps not
out of any fondness for the LRA, but rather out of
self-interest. The LRA was a Ugandan problem that had
migrated to Sudan as a facet of the North/South conflict in
Sudan, and now that the war was over, the GoSS wanted the
Ugandan problem to return home. Machar observed that Kony's
willingness to deal may have been influenced by the
withdrawal of SAF forces to the north. When the SAF
abandoned its blocking positions on the roads between Juba
and Torit, and between Juba and Nimule, LRA activities in
those areas ceased.


11. (C) CG replied that he understood why the GoSS wanted the
LRA to go away, but cautioned that dealing with a group on
the U.S. list of designated terrorist organizations, or with
individuals under International Criminal Court indictment in
The Hague, could bear a political and possible legal price.
Machar asked exactly what the latter might entail; CG
responded that he would seek more precise information and
report back.

--------------
The White Army vs. SPLA
--------------


12. (U) Machar said that he had spent 22 days traveling in
Western Equatoria, Jonglei, and Upper Nile States since
fighting broke out between the Lou Nuer militia, the White
Army, and the SPLA in January (septel). He said that in late
February he had invited representatives of all of the
pastoralist (and cattle raiding) tribes, to Pibor to discuss
disarmament and reconciliation. Nuer (including Lou Nuer),
Dinka, Murle, Taposa, Jie, Anuak, and Mundari representatives
all participated. In separate discussions, he had gotten
commitments from the White Army to disarm before beginning
its annual end-of-dry-season migration toward the Toich to
the west, through territories peopled by the Gawar Nuer and
Dinka groups.


13. (U) The agreement was never honored, and a group of Lou
Nuer began almost immediately an armed march toward the
Toich, raising the specter of clashes with the neighboring
groups. The White Army shot two senior Lou chiefs who
protested the forced migration and subsequently clashed with
SPLA units that had been dispatched to protect the March and
prevent inter-tribal conflict. Machar said that the GoSS
could not simply stand by while large armed units marched
about the countryside at will - the SPLA was obliged to
intervene. He confirmed that there had been fighting since
early May, but said that this had died down and that he hoped
to be able to return to negotiations soon.


14. (U) He stressed, however, that ultimately disarmament
must take place. Machar did not think buying back arms or
other soft methods would be effective, since the White Army
was so well-armed that many of its members owned several
guns. Machar said that negotiations would not be easy
because the White Army consisted mostly of young men who had
created a military structure and selected their own leaders.
They no longer respected the authority of traditional
leaders. Machar said that for now the SPLA had ceased
operations against the White Army, which had retreated back
toward its traditional Lou Nuer homeland. CG applauded this
course of action, noting that attempts to pursue and disarm
the retreating militia would only aggravate the situation.


15. (C) Following the Machar meeting, CG tracked down Waat
Constituency MP Gatkouth Kuich. Kuich said that SPLA Chief
of Staff Oyai Deng had indicated that he was the one who
ordered the SPLA to desist from further pursuit of the
retreating White Army. Kuich estimated that there had been
50,000 Lou Nuer in the migrating cattle camps, with as many
as 20,000 of these armed. He said that the most recent
number of Nuer "civilians" killed had reached 210, but
admitted that many of these were armed youths. He did not
know SPLA casualty figures. In addition, the Nuer had lost
some 7,000 head of cattle. Kuich said that Paulino Matiep
stood ready to join him in a visit to northern Jonglei State
to attempt to calm passions as soon as a halt to the
hostilities was confirmed.

--------------
Comment
--------------


16. (C) Machar's comments on the LRA confirmed much of what
we have heard from other sources, including the Governor of
Eastern Equatoria's recent claim to CG that LRA forces had
abandoned positions east of the Nile concurrently with the
pull-out of SAF forces there. The GoSS desire for the LRA
problem to go back where it came from is understandable and
sympathetic, but the GoSS may not be able to continue to buy

KHARTOUM 00001158 003 OF 003


off Kony's depredations, especially if Museveni indicates
that he is unwilling to negotiate.
HUME