Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM1151
2006-05-15 15:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

DEMARCHE TO VP TAHA ON FM LAM AKOL'S STATEMENT TO

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0008
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #1151 1351551
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151551Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 0117
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2817
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001151 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR D AND A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO VP TAHA ON FM LAM AKOL'S STATEMENT TO
AU


Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume for Reasons:
Section 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001151

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR D AND A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO VP TAHA ON FM LAM AKOL'S STATEMENT TO
AU


Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume for Reasons:
Section 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) On May 15 CDA Hume called VP Taha concerning the
statement earlier in the day by FM Lam Akol to the AU Peace
and Security Council. Hume said that the USG is committed to
the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and
was troubled by Lam Akol's attempt to deny or minimize any UN
role in implementing the DPA. The USG position was that a
UN peace-keeping force was needed to implement the provisions
of the DPA; that lack of an early, positive decision to
authorize a full UN role would risk blowing up the program to
implement the DPA; and, that the USG had committed itself to
support the DPA based on its well-known position that without
a strong UN role peace would not be possible. If the
government of Sudan had now decided to deny support for a
strong UN role, it was sending a clear signal that it was not
committed to peace in Darfur.


2. (C) VP Taha said he was not aware of the statement by FM
Akol and would inform himself of the specifics. He told the
CDA that to his knowledge nothing had changed since the two
had discussed this issue on May 13. Sudan was ready to
discuss the question with the UN, and to the best of his
knowledge the issue remained under consideration by the
government.


3. (C) Hume recalled that on May 13 Taha had said that a
letter from President Bashir to President Bush was on its way
to Washington. In fact the MFA had summoned him to a meeting
May 16 to receive the letter. Taha said he would follow up
and that it was important to stay in contact on this subject.


4. (C) Comment: Taha was on a cellphone at a social event
and not talkative. In the earlier conversation Taha had said
that Sudan would accept strengthening of the AU force,
support by NATO for the AU force, and would make an early
decision on transition to a UN force. The embassy
understands that Taha and Minister of Intelligence Salah Gosh
have advised that transition to a UN force is inevitable, if
not welcome. President Bashir's letter (perhaps held back
until after the May 15 AU meeting) can be expected to address
this issue with more authority. End comment.
HUME