Sudan - Operational Constraints Related to

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001149

SIPDIS

AIDAC
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/SP, DCHA
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS
USMISSION UN ROME
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH
NAIROBI FOR SFO
NSC FOR JBRAUSE, NSC/AFRICA FOR SHORTLEY
USUN FOR TMALY
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID ASEC PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT: Sudan - Operational Constraints Related to
Darfur Presence

Ref: A) Khartoum 949, B) Khartoum 852


1. (SBU) Summary: Any U.S. government (USG) initiatives
linked to the support of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)
must take into account the operational realities of the
region. The experience of USAID's humanitarian operation
provides insight into the challenges that will face any
new USG operations in Darfur. USAID's Disaster
Assistance Response Team (DART) for Darfur was set up in
April 2004 and has had continual presence in the region
over the past two years. (Note: The USAID DART was
transformed into the Darfur Field Office. End Note.)
Any plans to augment USG presence in Darfur must consider
the requirements for security and facilities and the
regulatory impediments from the Government of National
Unity (GNU). End summary.


2. (SBU) Security: The lack of security throughout
Darfur remains a major obstacle for humanitarian and
other operations. Over the past several months, United
Nations (U.N.) agencies and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) have found themselves unable to
access many parts of Darfur due to generalized violence
linked to ongoing conflict as well as attacks targeting
aid agencies and their staff. Insecurity has reached a
point in West Darfur where aid agencies are seriously
considering the suspension of humanitarian activities in
order to safeguard their staff and property. Unchecked
violence hampers mobility throughout Darfur. A
government-imposed curfew in all of Darfur's major cities
- El Fasher, El Geneina, and Nyala - indicates the level
of tension related to growing lawlessness. Increased USG
presence in Darfur's major cities and towns would require
that significant security measures be put in place.


3. (SBU) Facilities: The only USG facilities currently
in Darfur are linked to USAID's Darfur Field Office
(DFO). The DFO operates compounds in El Fasher and Nyala
that have office space and living quarters for six
individuals. The USAID humanitarian presence in Darfur
utilizes the entire capacity of these limited facilities.
There is no room for expansion in Nyala and few options
at the El Fasher facility. The DFO currently has three
vehicles in El Fasher and two vehicles in Nyala. (Note:
There is one light armored vehicle at each location. End
note.) All vehicles must be parked inside the compounds
and there is currently no space for additional vehicles
within the current arrangement. It is expected that
capacity of DFO facilities will be stretched even further
by the deployment of additional USAID/DCHA personnel who
would be needed to assist in obligating funds allocated
for Darfur programs in the supplemental funding bill.
The bill recently cleared the Senate and is expected to
be approved by Congress in the coming months. The DFO
offices in Darfur currently have modest communication
facilities designed to support a maximum of six USAID
staff. A V-sat will soon be operational in El Fasher;
however, the office in Nyala operates using B-GAN
technology.


4. (SBU) GNU Obstructionism: Sudan's Government of
National Unity (GNU),like its predecessor, the
Government of Sudan (GoS),has perfected the art of
obstructionism in relation to humanitarian operations in
Darfur. The general lack of government cooperation
significantly retards operations and cripples the
efficiency of the humanitarian response. The laundry
list of government tricks includes: delaying or refusing
the issuance of visas, delaying or refusing travel
permits, interference in the staffing of agencies through
imposition of a labyrinth of hiring practices, arduous
registration requirements, and extreme holdups in
clearing the import of vehicles, communications gear, and
other vital equipment through customs through Port Sudan
(Ref A). Furthermore, the GNU recently signed into law
the Organization of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act
(Ref B) which essentially forbids NGOs and civil society
groups from engaging in overtly political acts under the
threat of being closed down or expelled from the country.
This new law provides the government with greater legal

KHARTOUM 00001149 002 OF 002


authority to restrain groups that involve themselves in
matters that the GNU might find political in nature,
including support for DPA acceptance and implementation.


5. (SBU) Setting Up Shop: Any new office or
organization (international or national) introduced to
facilitate DPA implementation or political party
development in Darfur will be required to register with
the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) at the national
level, as well as local authorities at each operational
location in Darfur. Staff must be hired according to
strict guidelines laid down by the HAC requiring
organizations to vet all positions and candidates through
the HAC and Ministry of Labor before any hiring can
occur. This is a time consuming process that often lasts
months. All program proposals must also be shared with
governmental authorities and must receive approval before
any activities can begin. Once international staff are
in country, they must reapply for work permits every
three months, leaving agencies little certainty that they
will be able to retain staff necessary to carry out
programs over extended periods of time. U.N.
humanitarian agencies are generally not required to abide
by the registration, program, and hiring regulations
imposed by the government. However, the current
disagreement between the GNU and the U.N. over the
extension of the U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) Status of
Forces Agreement (SoFA) to other U.N. agencies greatly
restricts the movement of U.N. humanitarian staff.

HUME