AMIS TRANSITION AND DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001117

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D, AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/SPG, AND IO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV PREF EAID AU US UN SU
SUBJECT: AMIS TRANSITION AND DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT
IMPLEMENTATION: A DIAGNOSTIC STRATEGY

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Initiating the transition from the African
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to a UN peacekeeping operation
and implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement require well
targeted and bold steps taken in a timely manner. Advancing
this agenda will require strengthening AMIS during the
interim, supporting DPA signatories to sustain popular
support, and expanding USG capacity to oversee and report on
the dynamic situation in Darfur. End summary.

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Laying the Foundation for Darfur's Future
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2. (C) The next 60 days are the most critical phase of the
transition from an African Union force to a UN force in
Darfur and beginning to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement
(DPA). Getting the first steps right will insure the process
goes as smoothly as is possible in a place like Darfur, and
taking the right steps means insuring that we do what only
what is important and actually will help.


3. (C) We see three general areas the USG should focus on:
security - strengthening AMIS in preparation for transition
to a UN peace-keeping operation; political - continuing work
with the DPA signatories; and economic ) fostering an
environmental conducive to long-term economic development.
As well, our focus must address concurrently the need for
enhanced USG oversight and reporting capability.

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Security: Facilitating the AMIS to UN PKO Transition
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4. (C) Strengthening AMIS should take place as part of a
dialogue among the USG, the African Union and AMIS, the UN
and UNMIS, NATO, and the EU. At the same time, we need to
engage the Sudanese Government, stepping up our contacts to
ease the transition process. AMIS has many weaknesses in
leadership, training, and sheer numbers of forces to execute
its mission effectively within the huge area of Darfur.
These weaknesses have been identified by many international
military visitors and duly reported. We are of the opinion
that the international community needs to act quickly before
the post peace accord enthusiasm subsides. The way forward
is:

-- Understand how the UN intends to proceed in terms of
location of troops and requirements for support. We should
initiate no construction or acquisition that does not advance
these requirements;

-- Get logistical support to combatants to ease compliance
with security arrangements;

-- Turn the strengthening of AMIS headquarters over to NATO
with UNMIS direction. UNMIS should start building the
headquarters it needs now; and,

-- Deploy a small &technical team8 to Khartoum and Darfur
to assess and develop plans for the independent monitoring
and verification of the cease-fire and disarmament process.

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Political: Reinforcing the Value of the Peace Agreement
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5. (C) Continuing to work with the signatories, particularly
Minawi, should be our second priority. Minawi will need help
getting his commanders and civil society engaged and fully
supportive. A pubic diplomacy effort will help convince his
faction members ) as well as much of Darfur's non-aligned
populace - of the wisdom of supporting a good peace agreement
rather than waiting for the elusive perfect one. Moving
Minawi and his lieutenants around the region and providing
them with communications and media to get their message out
will help garner support for the signers rather than the
potential spoilers. We should also engage the other rebel
factions to gain their belated support for the peace
agreement.


6. (C) Underscoring the value of the Darfur Peace Agreement
and the importance of signing on would also benefit by
getting others to speak out. Prominent Darfurian opinion
leaders would be useful proponents; these might include:

-- Lt. Gen. (retired) Sedeig M. Ismail, Secretary General of
the Darfur Forum for Dialogue and Peaceful Coexistence, Umma,

KHARTOUM 00001117 002 OF 003


Benihalba;

-- Lt. Gen. (retired) Hussein Abdalla Jebreil, prominent
leader in the Darfur Forum for Peace and Development, NCP,
Rezeigat;

-- Dr, Mohammed Bishara Dossa, Ministry of Justice, NCP,
Zaghawa;

-- Khalil Adam Abdul Karim, ex-Minister of Health for North
Darfur State, Fur;

-- Mohammed Issa Aliyo, Chairman of Shurra Council, Umma,
Rezeigat;

-- Mohammed Abdalla Addouma, Chairman of Darfurian Advocates
Association, Umma, Massalit;

-- Maryam Abdul Rahman Takas, Co-founder of Darfur Forum for
Dialogue and Peaceful Coexistence, Communist, Maalia;

-- Yahya Bolad, Assistant to the Sultan, Gimir;

-- Fatima Alaagib, National Assembly member, NCP, Fellata; and

-- Nasradin Mohamed Omar, National Constitutional Review
Commission, NCP, Benihalba.


7. (C) Another mechanism to anchor the peace agreement might
be to establish working group of interested states. A Sudan
Sextet, for example, could involve Egypt, Libya, the
Netherlands, Norway, and the UK in ongoing consultations on
supporting implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement.

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Economic: Food Aid Deficit, Long-Term Development Key
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8. (C) In order to ensure stability, economic factors must
also be addressed. In the short term, securing sufficient
food supplies is essential to avoid protracted demonstrations
that recently resulted in fatalities and extensive property
damage. The announcement that rations would be halved from
May until October points to several months ahead of hardship.
For the long term, a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) is
important to lay the groundwork for economic stability. As
perceived, the JAM would involve Phase I ) recovery, and
Phase II ) reconstruction and development. The UN would
take the lead in Phase I, conducting a joint assessment of
early recovery needs for the first 18 months following a
donor conference (probably in The Hague in early October).
The World Bank, with the African Development Bank as a junior
partner, would then field sectoral exports for longer-term
economic reconstruction and development efforts.

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Managing USG Support for Stability in Darfur
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9. (S) Finally, managing the U.S. effort will require
additional personnel and equipment assets - particularly
personnel on the ground in Khartoum and Darfur. These
requirements would include:

-- A Contracting Officer's Technical Representative - a COTR
dedicated exclusively to the Darfur PA&E contract would
ensure it has the ongoing supervision and coordination it
requires;

-- A dedicated HUMINT collection capability - Darfur
continues to be a black hole regarding real time
intelligence. Our reporting should come from military
attaches and Foreign Service Officers in Darfur and not MILOB
contractors. We need a permanent reporting presence in
Darfur that reports to the Embassy. The addition of several
HUMINT collectors in Darfur collecting and reporting though
the appropriate embassy offices in Khartoum should be a
priority;

-- Special Equipment - the protection of all U.S. personnel
is paramount, and providing special protective equipment,
survivability equipment, and weapons must also be considered;
and

-- A S/CRS Officer - oversight of process is equally
important. This may be where S/CRS can make its biggest
contribution: by placing one of its staff in the Embassy on
a full-time basis to monitor the implementation of the DPA,
de-bug challenges as they arise, and maintain close liaison

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with other stakeholders.


10. (C) The USG should also begin a deliberate process of
re-engaging with the Sudanese military. Starting with a
General Officer visit, we should begin military cooperation
in order to better understand, and hopefully shape, the
Sudanese Armed Forces' actions during the Darfur peace
agreement implementation period and beyond. This would pay
dividends in other areas, as well as including continued
implementation of the North-South Comprehensive Peace
Agreement and the creation of Joint Integrated Units as a
part of that process.
HUME