Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM1015
2006-04-28 11:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

DARFUR: WHO WILL APOLOGIZE?

Tags:  PREL KPKO KAWC UN AU SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8058
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1015/01 1181114
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281114Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2545
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001015 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO KAWC UN AU SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: WHO WILL APOLOGIZE?

Classified By: Political Officer Ron Capps for reasons 1.4 b and d.

------------
Introduction
------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001015

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO KAWC UN AU SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: WHO WILL APOLOGIZE?

Classified By: Political Officer Ron Capps for reasons 1.4 b and d.

--------------
Introduction
--------------


1. (C) Introduction by Cameron R. Hume, CDA Embassy Khartoum.
Everyone with an interest in Darfur should read this
message. It is written by Ron Capps, the Foreign Service
Officer who has the most comprehensive knowledge of Darfur.
He is now completing with great distinction a tour as the
deputy chief of the political /economic section in Embassy
Khartoum. Previously he served as a U.S. military officer
advising the African Union peace-keeping force in Darfur as
well as with NATO forces and diplomatic missions in the
Balkans, Rwanda, Afghanistan and Iraq. I have benefited
greatly from his knowledge and analysis, even if I might not
endorse his conclusions. At my urging he agreed to send this
message in an open channel so that it would be available to a
wider readership.

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Three Years On
--------------


2. (C) This week marked the third anniversary of the start of
a large-scale armed rebellion in Darfur. Peace talks in
Abuja are moving incrementally towards what may be a peace
accord, and the United Nations has begun planning to supplant
the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Meanwhile, all
sides ignore a two year old Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement
(HCA); the war has spread across the border into Chad and now
clearly constitutes a threat to international peace and
security. If there is an Abuja peace accord, and this is by
no means certain, it will not be an end in itself. It will
be the beginning of the hardest part of stopping the violence
in Darfur. If there is no peace accord, things can only get
worse.


3. (C) United Nations officials have described their
worst-case scenario in assuming the AMIS mission in Darfur as
one where the warring factions ignore the peace accord just
as they have ignored the HCA. Unfortunately, that is also
the most likely scenario.

--------------
Insufficient Levels of Control
--------------


4. (C) An Abuja peace accord is unlikely to stop the violence
in Darfur. There are several reasons why: (1) rebel field

commanders have lost faith in the leadership of their
movements. Nineteen SLA/Wahid commanders have publicly
broken with Wahid. SLA/Minawi has splintered with open
breaks by Sulieman Jamooz, Sharif Harir, Sulieman Marajan,
Khamis Abdullah and 17 other commanders. Other commanders
have defected to Wahid. At least one has joined the
Government in fighting the SLA. Khalil comes to Abuja when
it suits him and many of his fighters are in Chad acting as
mercenaries. In short, rebel leaders do not have a
sufficient level of control over rebel commanders to
guarantee their compliance; (2) Government of Sudan
negotiators do not represent the Arab tribal militias or the
Janjaweit leaders, nor does the government have a sufficient
level of control over those militias to guarantee their
compliance; (3) fighting between the SLA factions will
continue and could degrade into a tribal war which would
eventually draw in the Arab tribes.


5. (C) A weak international force with a limited mandate will
be powerless to stop the violence. In this scenario IDPs and
refugees will be unable to return home, rebels and militias
will continue to kill with impunity and all our work in Abuja
will have been futile.

--------------
Complex and Thorny Missions Ahead...
--------------


6. (C) AMIS has been a stop-gap. It was put in place in
haste and because at the time it was the best solution. Seen
in this light, AMIS has done well. But it has not met its
mandate. Coalition task force operations of the type that
are required in Darfur are complex beyond the experience of
AMIS. I many cases the troops want to perform but simply do
not have the experience to conduct a successful peace support
operation in an area larger than Iraq. And neither the force
as a whole nor many of the troops and units that make up the
mission are capable of conducting the militarily complex and
politically thorny missions that will face a post-Abuja
international security force.


7. (C) Regardless of whether Abuja produces an enhanced

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cease-fire agreement or a complete peace accord -- or even if
the talks ultimately collapse -- rebel forces and militias
will have to be mapped, counted, cantoned and disarmed.
Given the lack of cohesion among the rebels and the lack of
government control over the militias, it seems likely that
the groups will resist these steps, particularly disarmament.
In this event, the international peace support force will be
required to militarily defeat them. This is not a Chapter VI
mission. The force will require the combat power and prowess
to enforce a peace accord if it is to provide a secure
environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid and the
return of IDPs and refugees. It will also require the right
mandate. Seven UN Security Council resolutions on Darfur
have been issued under Chapter VII. This must be the
starting point for the follow-on force.

--------------
... Require a First-World Response
--------------


8. (C) Stopping the violence in Darfur will require a
military force with first-world leadership, first-world
assets and first-world experience. U.S. and coalition
experience in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq are relevant
here. Putting together such a coalition and getting it into
place to do its work will require that the United States
government and our military take on the lead role, at least
initially. Our NATO and other first-world military partners
will not be keen to step forward without our participation,
and many of the traditional UN troop contributing countries
lack the military capability to successfully complete the
mission.

--------------
It Is Our responsibility
--------------


9. (C) We alone have called the atrocities in Darfur
Genocide. We must lead the coalition that will stop it. We
must demonstrate our resolve and determination to stop this
Genocide and to never again let Genocide happen. We already
lead the world in the provision of humanitarian aid to
Darfur. We must not cede our leadership at the crucial
moment.


10. (C) During the Rwandan Genocide the United States and
others in the international community failed the Tutsis and
moderate Hutus who were killed by the hundreds of thousands
at the hands of the Interahamwe. In 1998 President Clinton
went to Rwanda to apologize and said, "We must never again be
shy in the face of evidence." In Darfur the evidence of
Genocide is clear. The President of the United States has
said so; two Secretaries of State have said so.

--------------
Or Who Will Apologize?
--------------


11. (C) Some will say that the steps outlined here are
impossible, but they are not. Certainly the Government of
Sudan will resist. This will be a challenge to the nation's
sovereignty and perhaps even to the survival of the
government. Security Council members will resist. But if we
fail to construct and mandate this force correctly, we will
fail to stop the Genocide and more people will needlessly
die. Yes, it will be hard. But being hard should not deter
us from doing what is right. Otherwise, which American
president will be the one to apologize for failing the dead
of Darfur?
STEINFELD