Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU600
2006-03-02 13:49:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

ALTERING THE DISCUSSION: EMBASSY PUBLIC

Tags:  OEXC SCUL PREL KMDR OPRC KPAO NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKT #0600/01 0611349
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 021349Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0552
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 9287
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 9327
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 4251
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2237
UNCLAS KATHMANDU 000600 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA (CAMP, DONALD)
DEPT FOR SCA/PPD (SCHWARTZ, LARRY)
DEPT FOR SCA/INS (GOWER, MOLLY)
DEPT FOR PA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OEXC SCUL PREL KMDR OPRC KPAO NP
SUBJECT: ALTERING THE DISCUSSION: EMBASSY PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY SPURS MEDIA INTROSPECTION ABOUT MAOIST
INTENTIONS

REFS: A) KATHMANDU 000552

B) KATHMANDU 000107
C) KATHMANDU 000244
D) KATHMANDU 000379
E) KATHMANDU 000450
F) KATHMANDU 000390

SUMMARY
-------

UNCLAS KATHMANDU 000600

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA (CAMP, DONALD)
DEPT FOR SCA/PPD (SCHWARTZ, LARRY)
DEPT FOR SCA/INS (GOWER, MOLLY)
DEPT FOR PA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OEXC SCUL PREL KMDR OPRC KPAO NP
SUBJECT: ALTERING THE DISCUSSION: EMBASSY PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY SPURS MEDIA INTROSPECTION ABOUT MAOIST
INTENTIONS

REFS: A) KATHMANDU 000552

B) KATHMANDU 000107
C) KATHMANDU 000244
D) KATHMANDU 000379
E) KATHMANDU 000450
F) KATHMANDU 000390

SUMMARY
--------------


1. In a case study of the value of public diplomacy, the
Embassy has recently waged a broad and largely effective
public discussion about the goals and intentions of the
country's Maoist insurgents. Our centerpiece was a
February 15 speech by Ambassador Moriarty that raised
concrete questions about Maoist intentions and warned
that the Parties' partnership with the insurgents was
"wrongheaded" and even dangerous for the major political
parties. The address ignited a wave of media coverage,
commentary, and news articles in Nepal that has yet to
abate. To keep the argument going, the Embassy sent
letters under the Ambassador's name to editors of major
newspapers critical of the speech, and the Ambassador
conducted lengthy interviews with two major broadcast
media outlets. Our efforts followed several weeks of
media statements and interviews of top Maoist leaders,
(Refs B, C, D, E) who touted their desire for peace and
democracy (but also made some chilling statements that
Nepal media commentators often overlooked).


2. The Ambassador's speech caused media and public
attention to refocus on Maoist intentions, reviving "a
sort of introspection everywhere," as one commentator put
it. The address also spurred the Maoist second-in-
command to publish two lengthy op-eds in response. While
much media commentary attacked the Ambassador and U.S.
policy for allegedly hindering the parties' attempt to
bring the insurgents into the political mainstream and
ending Nepal's 10-year insurgency, the speech and ensuing
media interventions clearly have caused media opinion
makers to re-examine and question the sincerity and goals
of the Maoist insurgents. This soul-searching has
intensified as Maoist violence in the countryside has

mounted. END SUMMARY.

A Speech that Questions Maoist Intentions.
--------------


3. Ambassador Moriarty's speech on February 15, "Nepal's
Political Crisis: A Look Back, A Look Forward," ignited
a continuing chain of news articles, editorials, letters
to editors, and commentaries - including at least two by
a senior Maoist leader - in Nepal's media. The
Ambassador's speech, coming one week after Nepal's failed
nationwide municipal elections (Ref F) and two weeks
after the first anniversary of King Gyanendra's seizure
of power, was much anticipated by Nepal media. This was
the Ambassador's first policy address in six months, and
coming as it did so soon after the February 8 municipal
elections, the media no doubt expected strong criticism
of the King, his failed rule, and his failure to
reconcile with the political parties. The speech
included all of that, but the news for reporters and
editors was the strong questioning of Maoist intentions
and the warning to the parties that, instead of leading
the insurgents back to the political mainstream, the
parties themselves were in danger of being co-opted by
partners committed to using violence to topple Nepal's
government. The speech urged the King to reach out to
the parties to find a way to return to democracy and also
effectively address the Maoist insurgency.

. And Conventional Wisdom
--------------


4. The questioning of Maoist intentions and the
cautionary note about the insurgents-parties
understanding went against conventional editorial wisdom
of most independent media. Editors had embraced the 12-
point understanding signed between the seven major
political parties and the Maoists in November, which
promised to establish "absolute democracy by ending
autocratic monarchy." Editors, exhausted by the bloody


10-year Maoist insurgency and incensed at the King's
authoritarian rule (and harassment and pressure on
independent media),had touted the understanding as
Nepal's best chance for peace and democracy. They
harshly criticized the Ambassador for warning against
Maoist intentions and for arguing that the insurgents
seek to bring the parties closer to their violent orbit.
To keep the debate going in days after the speech, PAS
sent letters under the Ambassador's signature to three
leading newspapers - Kantipur (Nepali language,
circulation 150,000); The Kathmandu Post (English
language, circ. 30,000); and The Himalayan Times,
(English language, circulation 40,000). All were
published. In still wider interventions, the Ambassador
gave an interview to BBC's popular Nepali Service, which
aired across the county on the February 18-19 weekend.
And, on February 26 in prime time, popular Kantipur TV's
"Frontline" political talk show aired a 40-minute
interview with the Ambassador, focusing largely on points
raised in the speech. In short, in the 10-day period
after the speech, the Embassy mounted a public diplomacy
full court press, responding to critics and repeating
points of concern about Maoist intentions.

The Maoist Response
--------------


5. Media reaction to the speech has continued daily, with
editorials, op-eds, and letters to the editors taking
issue with or mentioning points from the Ambassador's
speech, his letters, his BBC interview, or his TV
appearance. In an unusual response, Maoist second-in-
command Baburam Bhattarai published two lengthy responses
to the Ambassador's speech. The first, "On Moriarty's
Pontification," appeared in the February 23 Kathmandu
Post (Ref A). The second, "Why So Excited, Mr.
Ambassador?," appeared in the March 1 editions of Jana
Aashta weekly newspaper (Nepali language, circ.: 10,000).
The Maoist leader called the speech "vitriolic" and the
BBC interview "provocative" and took issue with various
parts of the address. In publishing these rejoinders,
though, the Maoist leader unintentionally appears to have
confirmed the effectiveness of our efforts to effectively
raise questions about the Maoists and their goal to
secure power.

The Message Getting Heard.
--------------


6. To be fair, independent media, particularly the large
Kantipur Group (including Kantipur TV, Kantipur FM, The
Kathmandu Post, and Kantipur newspaper -- the nation's
largest) have provided their audiences ample opportunity
to access the Ambassador's thoughts. On February 16,
Nepali-language Kantipur published the entire text of the
speech, translated by PAS. On February 27, it published
a transcript of the Ambassador's interview on Kantipur
TV. And while The Kathmandu Post and many of its op-eds
have strongly criticized the Ambassador's remarks, the
paper has continued to report Maoist attacks and
atrocities since the insurgents broke their self-imposed
four-month ceasefire on January 2.

. And Understood
--------------


7. Encouragingly, the Post also heard the Ambassador's
message. In a lead editorial on March 1, the newspaper
took note of recent Maoist violence and commented: "When
the international community has been claiming that the
[Maoist] party is more a terrorist outfit than a
political organization, it (the recent Maoist violence)
has only provided credibility to that voice.. When the
Maoists were required to show their humane face, and to
show intention to join the mainstream, they have taken
just the opposite route." It urged the insurgents to
renounce violence "and show their commitment to join the
political mainstream."


8. In a March 2 op-ed in the same newspaper, lawyer-
commentator Bipin Adhikari wrote approvingly of the
Ambassador's speech, noting: "Moriarty's remarks have
revived a sort of introspection everywhere, and many


politicians are already trying to respond [to] him with a
sort of vague denial. He has at once reminded many in
the diplomatic community circle in Kathmandu, and the
international donors, that the United States stands for a
democratic future of this country and does not accept
their vacillating stance vis-...-vis the Maoists and the
political parties."

Winning the Battle of the Polls
--------------


9. One interesting (if unscientific) sign of the impact
of the Embassy's public diplomacy effort has been an
online poll by The Nepali Times, a 15,000 circulation,
English-language, generally respected weekly journal of
news and opinion. The poll has appeared for almost a
week on nepalnews.com, the leading news portal in Nepal.
The poll asks if visitors agree with recent statements by
Ambassador Moriarty on the Maoists. As of late March 1,
the response from 5,880 respondents was: Yes, 50.9
percent; No, 45.6 percent; and Don't Know, 3.5.
Similarly, a Himalayan Times article on February 28
quoted a political party official cautioning against
Maoist figure Bhattarai's comments on "bourgeois
democracy." The Ambassador had raised exactly that issue
in his interview on Kantipur TV on February 26. And a
western wire service reporter based in Kathmandu told the
PAO he had never seen such intense media reaction to an
ambaQadorial speech, and added: "It does really seem to
have hit home."

COMMENT
--------------


10. Our two-week public diplomacy offensive did generate
commentary that initially seemed to focus more on U.S.
intentions in Nepal, and these were frequently dubbed
nefarious. But our efforts clearly pushed the media to
begin to question more seriously the goals and violent
actions of the Maoists. Even as they have blasted U.S.
policy, commentators repeated our questions about the
insurgents or asked new ones. This is positive, as
independent media opinion makers had greeted the parties-
Maoists partnership almost with euphoria and had
willingly overlooked uncomfortable statements and actions
by the Maoists that undercut the insurgents' purported
peace-and-democracy credentials. The mission's public
diplomacy campaign challenged this attitude, forcing
opinion makers to respond to the assertions made in the
Ambassador's speech, letters, and broadcast interviews.
Moreover, our efforts countered a media blitz by the
Maoists, who -- in granting interviews with their
leaders and publishing op-eds by one of them -- had shown
dexterity in the war of ideas. We believe the questions
the Embassy raised publicly about the Maoists and their
intentions will continue to resonate, helping pressure
the parties and their media supporters to question
seriously the intentions of the Maoists.

MORIARTY