NEPAL: UN SECY GENERAL'S REP. DISCUSSES NEED FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 003210

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

ROME FOR FODAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR UN IN UK NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: UN SECY GENERAL'S REP. DISCUSSES NEED FOR
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, ROLE OF EX-GURKHAS

REF: KATHMANDU 3207

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

Summary
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1. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador December 11, the UN
Secretary General's personal representative Ian Martin

SIPDIS
welcomed the U.S. plan to provide assistance to Nepal's peace
process in two principal areas: electoral support and local
security and governance. He agreed it would be crucial to
reestablish local government and security in the countryside
if planned Constituent Assembly elections were to be free and
fair. Martin expressed the UN's interest in joining a
U.S.-UK-India meeting on police assistance. The Secretary
General's representative indicated that UN Headquarters was
"distinctly cool" about hiring ex-Gurkhas to work with
regular UN arms monitors, but he thought New York would
accept the idea if the Gurkhas were deployed to separate
People's Liberation Army (PLA) combatants from their weapons.
Martin's political adviser suggested that a two-stage
registration process might be possible. First, PLA would be
separated from their weapons and allowed to enter the camps.
This would allow the political process to move forward.
Rigorous verification would take place later. The Ambassador
argued strongly against this approach. Now was the time to
ensure that only bona fide PLA combatants were registered.

Key Areas of U.S. Assistance to Nepal's Peace Process
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2. (C) The Ambassador took advantage of a meeting December 11
with Ian Martin, the UN Secretary General's personal
representative, to ask for Martin's views on the two areas of
peace process assistance where the United States intended to
focus its aid over the next six to eight months. The first
consisted of support to the election process, including voter
registration, civic education, logistical support and
technical assistance. The second consisted of various ways
of promoting local security and governance. That included
assistance to re-establish local government and police
stations as well as standing up local peace councils, aiding
internally displaced persons, strengthening domestic
institutions such as the National Human Rights Commission and
assisting domestic and international peace monitors. The
Ambassador wanted to know where the U.S. could be most
helpful.

UN Welcomes U.S. Priorities
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3. (C) Martin gave his strong support to the U.S. priorities.
On the election issue, he suggested that the U.S. Embassy be
in touch with his senior electoral adviser, Catinca Slavu.
Emboff noted that he and a colleague had met with her on
December 7 (septel) and that we were already coordinating our
assistance in that area with the UN. The Secretary General's
representative agreed that ensuring local security and
governance was crucial if the upcoming Constituent Assembly
elections were to be free and fair. Reestablishing local
government in Nepal's villages was more important, he stated,
than creating local peace councils. If peace councils were
ad hoc bodies, they might be captured by the Maoists. Martin
also questioned whether the Peace Secretariat would have the
capacity to manage local peace councils. The key thing was
to get the village development committees back in place. The
challenge for the parties would be to come up with acceptable
formulas to allocate seats among the parties. The Ambassador
agreed it would not be simple.

Assistance to the Police
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4. (C) The Ambassador mentioned that the U.S. was planning to
hold a meeting with the British and the Indian Embassies to
coordinate our assistance to the Armed Police Force and the

Nepali Police. He also noted that a retired U.S. police
chief had recently arrived at post to work with the Nepalis.
Martin asked if the UN could participate also. He noted that
among the members of the UN technical assessment mission that
arrived in Kathmandu on December 10 was a representative from
the Police Division of the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations. That same officer had also been part of the
special UN peace (de Mistura) mission in August. At that
time, both the Government and the Maoists had been
uncomfortable with a UN role in policing. The Ambassador
ventured that the Government's concern was probably a
reflection of Indian discomfort. India's views, however,
appeared to have changed. (Note: The Indian Ambassador
subsequently welcomed UN participation in the proposed
meeting on assistance to the police.)

Assisting Other Institutions
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5. (C) Martin stressed the need for independent, national
monitoring bodies to help ensure local security by shining a
light on abuses. He voiced regret that the Seven-Party
Alliance and the Maoists had decided to wind up the National
Monitoring Committee for the Cease-fire Code of Conduct
(NMCC) without deciding on its successor organization. It
would have been wiser at least to keep the NMCC's Secretariat
in place to ensure a smooth handover. The problem, the UN
representative stated, was that the parties seemed to think
everything could be done by the parties. They appeared to
think that national bodies were independent if every party
was permitted to nominate a candidate. The Ambassador
responded that we would help in setting up the NMCC's
successor and would continue to assist the National Human
Rights Commission. What we did not want was a repeat of the
situation where monitoring bodies reported abuses but then
could take no action.

Working with Civic Organizations
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6. (C) Martin's political adviser John Norris said that he
was glad to see that cantonment management was not on the
list of U.S. priorities. There were plenty of other donors
addressing that issue. It was entirely logical that
government had to be stood up in the countryside. Martin
pointed out that there was, as of yet, little indication that
civil society was organizing itself for the coming elections,
but it would need to play a strong role. He mentioned that
there were a number of good Asian networks of NGOs working on
elections who could provide observers. The Secretary General
stated that he expected the Election Commission would be
soliciting their involvement closer to the elections. The
Ambassador noted that getting a large contingent of domestic
and international observers in the villages well in advance
of the election was also on our agenda.

Use of Ex-Gurkhas as Arms Monitors
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7. (C) The Secretary General's representative stated that UN
Headquarters was "distinctly cool" to the idea of hiring
ex-Gurkha soldiers, even as a complement to regular UN arms
monitors. Martin was hopeful, however, that he could
persuade New York to accept the idea if the Gurkas' role was
narrowly defined. They could be used, he said, to help with
the process of separating the People's Liberation Army (PLA)
combatants from their weapons and could then stay next to the
weapons containers. In other words, they could provide
24-hour security in the short term until the full 200-person
contingent of arms monitors could be deployed. (Note:
According to press reports, 70 Indian-supplied arms
containers have arrived at the Nepali border and will be
dispatched to the seven main cantonment sites and the Nepal
Army after they are painted white. End Note.) Martin and
Norris both mentioned that the Nepal Army (NA) had concerns
about the use of Gurkhas and the Ambassador shared that
Nepali Congress-Democratic leader Sher Bahadur Deuba had

shared those concerns as well in a meeting earlier on
December 11 (reftel). Nevertheless, the Ambassador
characterized NA fears about Gurkha disloyalty as exaggerated
and stated Gurkhas as force multipliers, but not as
substitutes for UN observers, still merited serious
consideration.

Two-Stage Registration Process?
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8. (C) Norris suggested that a two-stage registration process
might be possible. With the help of the Gurkhas, the Maoist
combatants could be separated from their weapons and
registered provisionally in the camps. As Norris said, every
PLA combatant with a weapon would be considered a combatant.
Once all the UN arms monitors were present, a more thorough
verification process could take place. This would allow the
political process -- e.g., adoption of the interim
constitution, etc. -- to move forward. He also downplayed
the possibility of Gurkhas assisting with verification. The
Ambassador strongly objected to this approach. While it was
probably fair to treat every Maoist with a weapon as a
combatant, what about everyone else? He asked how it would
be possible for the UN to separate the "wheat from the chaff"
later once combatants had been registered. How would the new
recruits be weeded out? And why not use the ex-Gurkhas in
the verification process to assist international observers?
The Ambassador emphasized that what was essential was a
strong verification process at the outset.

Feeding the Combatants
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9. (C) In a subsequent conversation on December 11, Ian
Martin told the Ambassador that he was in discussions with
Richard Ragan, the World Food Program (WFP) representative in
Nepal, about the possibility of WFP handling feeding the
Maoist combatants at the cantonment sites. Ragan was under
the impression that it could move ahead once Martin signed a
technical agreement. The Government of Nepal (GON) had
already invited WFP to assume this responsibility, but it had
failed to consult with the Maoists. Now, Martin said, the
GON had to get the Maoists on board.

Comment
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10.(C) According to Martin, the technical assessment mission,
which arrived in Kathmandu on December 10, should have a good
idea of its recommendations by the end of the week. This
will include such issues as police advisors and the use of
ex-Gurkhas. The plan is for the Secretary General to submit
his report to the Security Council by the end of December.
How early the Council would take up the report, he did not
know, but he was hoping for action in early January. In the
meantime, the Government -- and the UN -- are under pressure
from the Maoists to bring the Maoists into government before
the Maoist combatants are in camps and their weapons
separated under UN monitoring. We will continue our efforts
to encourage the GON to hold the line. There will be a
delay, probably at least until mid-January, before arms
monitoring can begin, but the answer is not to give in to
Maoist pressure. Effective assistance to the election
process and local security and governance will depend on
credible arms management.
MORIARTY