UN MOVING AHEAD ON CANTONMENT OF MAOIST COMBATANTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 003148

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR UN NP
SUBJECT: UN MOVING AHEAD ON CANTONMENT OF MAOIST COMBATANTS


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

Summary
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1. (C) Key staff of the Office of Personal Representative of
the UN Secretary General briefed members of the diplomatic
corps and the donor community December 1 on the status of
cantonment of Maoist combatants. Ian Martin's security
advisor Dan Huntington, political advisor John Norris and
military advisor Gen. Jan Erick Wilhelmsen gave an overview
of the seven Maoist "People's Liberation Army" "divisional"
sites and described how the UN planned to monitor them after
the combatants were registered. Norris also provided the
Political/Economic Chief with a rough timeline on next steps.

Briefing Embassies and Donors on "Divisional" Sites
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2. (C) In Ian Martin's absence, key members of his team in
the Office of the Personal Representative gave a briefing
December 1 for the diplomatic corps, the donor community and
others on the status of the cantonment of Maoist combatants.
The briefing, which Political/Economic Chief and DATT
attended, began with a summary of the seven "People's
Liberation Army" (PLA) "divisional" sites. According to
Martin's security advisor, Dan Huntington, a long-time Nepal
resident who is a former British Army Ghurka officer and
British foreign assistance (DFID) employee, Martin's mission
is satisfied that the seven divisional sites agreed upon will
be workable. The 5th PLA Division site in Rolpa District is
the most remote and highest elevation camp, but if the road
is improved, even that should be acceptable. He reported
that Martin's military advisor Gen. Jan Erick Wilhelmsen,
hopes to visit the proposed 21 satellite camp sites the week
of December 4 with Government and Maoist teams to finalize
those sites. Post has faxed a summary and a map of the
divisional sites to SCA/INS. In response to a question, Gen.
Wilhelmsen said all the sites were on Government or community
land.

How the Camps Will Function
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3. (C) Huntington noted that the Maoist PLA commanders would
manage the camps. Ian Martin's political advisor John Norris
emphasized that this included providing security to the
so-called "UN quadrangle" within each of the divisional
cantonments where weapons and ammunition would be stored
under lock and alarm. It was important to remember that the
system depended on voluntary compliance with the terms of the
November 28 monitoring agreement, Norris added. The UN
Mission was not in a position to compel compliance or provide
armed monitors to guard the weapons. That would take
thousands of UN peacekeepers, which neither of the parties
nor Nepal's neighbors (i.e., India) wanted. Gen. Wilhelmsen
maintained that the best way to ensure the successful
functioning of the camps was to make use of the existing PLA
command and control system, not substitute something new.

Role of the UN
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4. (C) Norris did say that the UN had three interests that
might require it to take a direct role in camp management.
First, he noted that if the management of the camps
deteriorated to the point where the combatants began to
become agitated and unhappy because of problems with food,
sanitation, etc., the UN would intervene to try to remedy the
problem. Second, the UN had a special interest in the proper
functioning of the UN quadrangles inside the divisional-level
camps where UN observers would reside. There were certain UN
guidelines that would need to be followed in setting up those
areas. Third, the UN had a special interest in the security
of its unarmed personnel who would be living among these
combatants. In terms of personnel, Norris stated that the
eventual goal was to have three international staff around
the clock at each divisional cantonment (a supervisor, a
deputy, a security officer) and four local staff. He also
spoke of having 10-15 three-person Joint Monitoring Teams of

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UN, Nepal Army and People's Liberation Army personnel who
would rove from site to site and conduct spot inspections.
Inside the camps themselves, two-person teams of UN and PLA
personnel would inspect. Likewise, under the terms of the
November 28 agreement, the two-person teams of UN and Nepal
Army would inspect Nepal Army sites.

Registration of Combatants
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5. (C) Norris also spoke about the UN's responsibility to
oversee the process for registration of combatants. As
agreed, no one who was born after May 25, 1988 (18 years on
the date of the signing of the GON-Maoist Cease-fire Code of
Conduct on May 25, 2006) would be registered. Minors would
be turned over, he said, to UNICEF and arrangements made to
return them to their families. Before registering others,
the UN would ask a series of probing questions to determine
whether those applying were in fact actual PLA combatants.
They would also have to present a PLA identity card. While
the Maoists continued to use the 35,000 number when
discussing their combatants, Norris did not expect there to
be anywhere near that number. One difficulty in setting up a
proper registration process was that the combatants were
already crowding at the sites, but that difficulty could be
overcome. Wilhelmsen also said the PLA would be registering
as units, not individuals, and would required to present PLA
ID cards.

Role of the Government
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6. (C) Martin's political advisor explained that the Maoists
had agreed in all of the peace documents that the Government
of Nepal would be responsible for supporting the camps in
terms of infrastructure. On top of the Nepal Rupees 175
million (USD 2.45 million),the Government had already
provided directly to the Maoist leadership, the GON was also
responsible for providing electricity, water,
telecommunication and other services to the sites in order to
make them habitable over the long term. The Government was
in the process of setting up these services, but Norris
complained that they were not always coordinating with the
Maoists. According to Norris, the Peace Secretariat (which
is in the Office of the Prime Minister) and the Home Ministry
had the joint lead on the camps.

Role of the International Community
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7. (C) Norris stressed that it was very important for the
donor community to be aware of some key issues as they
considered aid programs. First, it was crucial to note that
the Maoists did not consider themselves a defeated army, and
would not accept having the usual demobilization,
demilitarization and reintegration program thrust upon them.
That was one reason the Maoists had insisted on the one-key
approach. The Maoists also had clear ideas about when
foreign assistance was appropriate. They did not want to be
perceived as charity cases. It would be a mistake, Norris
maintained, for donors to look at the PLA camps as similar to
refugee camps or internally displaced person camps. They
were not; they were army camps. The Maoists would probably
want some international assistance, but it would have to be
handled carefully and channeled through the UN for prior
approval.

Cantonment Not the Only Issue: Election Key
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8. (C) Martin's political advisor stressed that cantonment
was just one of a range of peace process issues and, in his
view, perhaps not even the most important one. It was
important to keep an eye on the longer term goal which was
that Nepal hold free and fair Constituent Assembly elections
in June 2007. He voiced concern that donors would rush to
assist cantonments and neglect other important issues, such
as human rights and election monitoring. Norris said that
the UN hoped that the GON and the Maoists would soon set up a
small working group to handle the nitty-gritty of

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cantonments. The UN also planned to set one up with a few
members from the UN and the donors which could help
coordinate assistance to the camps.

Timeline
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9. (C) Norris told the Political/Economic Chief after the
meeting that he expected the UN Security Council to issue a
Presidential Statement on Nepal on December 4. (Note: It was
issued on the 1st.) Ian Martin would return from New York on
the 4th or the 5th. UN lawyers were currently reviewing the
November 28 Agreement and if they approved it, which he
anticipated, Ian Martin would then sign that agreement.
Norris thought that the technical assessment mission might
arrive as soon as December 7 or 8. He suspected that
international monitors -- he mentioned Norwegians and Swiss
-- could be on the ground in Nepal as soon as the week of
December 11.

Getting Monitors to the Sites
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10. (C) Norris predicted that the UN Mission's preferred
course of having monitors go immediately to the divisional
sites (after a few days of orientation in the capital) versus
remaining in Kathmandu would prevail. The UN Mission would
probably fudge the issue by having the monitors stay in
quarters near the camp sites. Because it would take weeks to
get the Mission up to its full strength, he also indicated
that the UN Mission would draw in the meantime on existing UN
personnel in country in other UN organizations such as the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN
Development Program to staff the initial work related to
cantonments and possibly even the registering of combatants.

Comment
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11. (C) The United Nations Mission here appears to be doing
its best to move forward as rapidly as possible in nailing
down the details of how the cantonment process will work.
Part of the UN team's difficulty, which both the Government
and Maoists face, is that the same small group of people are
involved in all of the key peace process negotiations and
decisions. The current negotiations concern the Interim
Constitution. Norris told the Pol/Econ Chief December 1 that
the UN had failed to persuade the Government of Nepal and the
Maoists to create separate working groups for the various
open issues. Instead, it is the same cast of increasingly
tired officials who gather each time. We are still seeing
complaints that villagers in the immediate vicinity of the
planned PLA camps are being compelled to feed and house the
Maoist combatants because the camps are not yet constructed.
That said, a positive result of the PLA collecting at their
sites appears to be greater public confidence in the peace
process. We hope that this trend toward a reduction in fear
continues and intensifies.
MORIARTY