NEPAL: MECHANISMS FOR PEACE SLOW-MOVING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 003136

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MECHANISMS FOR PEACE SLOW-MOVING

REF: KATHMANDU 3091

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
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1. (C) ON November 30, Hannes Siebert and Retief Olivier,
USAID-funded peace facilitators working with Nepal's Peace
Secretariat, told the Ambassador that the primary focus of

SIPDIS
the Secretariat during the past week had been Terms of
Reference for the various mechanisms envisioned in the
November 21 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (reftel).
Siebert and Olivier both stated that the Government of Nepal
(GON) and the Maoists had been working on plans for
implementation separately, but that they were not working
together as of yet. Siebert explained that discussions were
ongoing regarding Local Peace Councils, and that such
decisions would be finally decided by the Interim Government.
The Ambassador once again worried that the councils could
become a tool for the Maoists unless sufficient safeguards
were in place.

Terms Of Reference: The Job Of The Day
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2. (C) In a November 30 meeting with the Ambassador,
USAID-funded peace facilitator Hannes Siebert said that the
Peace Secretariat had been primarily focused during the past
week on creating Terms of Reference (TOR) for the various
commissions envisioned in the CPA: the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, the National Peace and
Rehabilitation Commission, and the High-Level State
Restructuring Recommendation Commission. Siebert complained
that the UN wanted to advise the GON on the TORs but that the
UN felt it was unable to tell the GON what to do and still
maintain its role as an unbiased observer. Siebert explained
that the High-Level State Restructuring Recommendation
Commission would be a think-tank for ideas on restructuring
and reform of the various ministries that would feed
information into the Constituent Assembly once it was formed.

High-Level Joint Monitoring Committee
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3. (C) Siebert stated that the High-Level Joint Monitoring
Committee would be formed with five observersnot affiliated
with political parties. He explained that other bodies (such
as the Peace Secretariat) would be responsible for the
implementation of suggestions from the Joint Monitoring
Committee, but it was still unclear under what authority the
Committee would work or who it would report to.

GON and Maoists Not Playing Well Together
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4. (C) Siebert told the Ambassador that the GON and the
Maoists were working on parallel plans for most of the
commissions, but had not worked well together to this point.
Siebert gave the example of the management and operation of
Maoist cantonments. He said that both the GON and the
Maoists had created separate plans for the management of the
cantonments, but that they still had not worked together to
create a working plan. Siebert hoped the two sides would
work on the cantonment issue on the afternoon of November 30.
Siebert stressed that the working habits of the GON and the
Maoists would have to change before successful implementation
of the agreements.

Local Peace Councils: Can They Happen?
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5. (C) Both Siebert and Retief Olivier stated that local
Peace Councils were the best hope for creating a lasting
peace in the countryside. Olivier said that the councils
would likely be created as a function of local government
once the local governments were reinstated by the Interim
Council of Ministers. Olivier said it was clear that the

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Maoists were "not very keen" on the idea of local councils
and restored local governments, but that the Seven-Party
Alliance (SPA) viewed these as key to getting the non-Maoist
parties back into the countryside. Olivier worried that if
each Peace Council was simply part of a local government,
then it would be too politicized to play an effective role in
monitoring and implementation of the CPA.


6. (C) Olivier suggested a type of "hybrid" approach to the
Peace Councils: district-level Peace Councils could be formed
with authority over the local Councils, thus giving the local
Councils a certain degree of independence from political
pressures. The Ambassador worried that whoever controlled
local government might try and control the local Peace
Councils as well, and they could simply become a tool for the
Maoists to use to bully their way forward in elections.

Worried About Continuance Of Funding
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7. (C) Siebert and Olivier worried that as soon as the
Maoists entered into the Interim Government, their work with
the Peace Secretariat would have to stop. The Ambassador
assured them that the Embassy was looking at getting an
Overseas Foreign Assistance Control (OFAC) license to ensure
that programs like theirs at the Peace Secretariat, which may
have the best potential for effecting a positive outcome in
the peace process, continue.

Comment
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8. (C) Local peace councils are likely the best opportunity
for the U.S. to have an effect on the outcome of the peace
process in Nepal. That said, it is possible that the Maoists
could try and use those councils to maintain their effective
control over much of the countryside. We will continue to
work through Siebert and Olivier in the Peace Secretariat and
with the GON to press for strong mechanisms to hold the
Maoists accountable for their actions, including the creation
of independent local councils with the ability to sanction
violations of the CPA.
MORIARTY