Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU3124
2006-11-29 12:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

ARMS MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT: VAGUE WORDING, BUT

Tags:  PGOV PTER PHUM PREL NP 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 003124 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM PREL NP
SUBJECT: ARMS MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT: VAGUE WORDING, BUT
WEAPONS TO BE SEPARATED

REF: KATHMANDU 3118

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 003124

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM PREL NP
SUBJECT: ARMS MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT: VAGUE WORDING, BUT
WEAPONS TO BE SEPARATED

REF: KATHMANDU 3118

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) On November 28, the Government of Nepal (GON) and the
Maoists signed an arms management agreement, in the presence
of the UN, creating a concrete mechanism for the separation
of Maoist combatants from their weapons. The agreement
provides that all Maoist People's Liberation Army (PLA)
members will be placed into cantonments and separated from
their weapons, although there is no specified timeline for
how soon the Maoists will complete the move into the camps or
for how long they will stay in the cantonments. Maoists will
be allowed to keep a specified number of weapons for camp
security. Maoist PLA soldiers in cantonments will be able to
conduct military training, but not live-fire exercises. The
agreement also sets out criteria for who will be allowed into
the cantonments. It also mentions integration of Maoist
combatants into the Nepal Army (NA),but states that the
specifics will be worked out later. The agreement sets up a
mechanism for monitoring and dispute resolution involving the
(NA),PLA, and the UN. There is no mention of Maoist militia
in the agreement.

Arms Management Agreement Signed
--------------


2. (C) In the early evening of November 28, the GON and the
Maoists signed an arms management agreement which sets out a
mechanism for the separation of Maoist fighters from their
weapons. The agreement was signed in the presence of the UN
negotiation team by Home Minister Krishna Sitaula for the GON
and Krishna Bahadur Mahara for the Maoists. Some 300
journalists jockeyed for position as the agreement was
distributed to the media at the Shangri-La hotel. Earlier on
November 28, John Norris, the UN political advisor to the
negotiations, and Brigadier General (retired) Jan Wilhelmsen,
the UN military advisor to the negotiations, had told the
Ambassador that the negotiations were held up on the issue of
training in the cantonments (reftel).

GON Perspectives
--------------


3. (C) Shortly before the signing, the DCM shared U.S.
concern about military training in the camps with Suresh
Chalise, foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Koirala.
Chalise conveyed U.S. concerns to the Prime Minister and
called the DCM shortly after the signing to say that the
concerns about military training had been covered in the
agreement, including by the clause in the agreement
prohibiting the Maoists from conducting "live-fire
exercises." Chalise said that the largest hang-up in the
process had been that the NA did not want the words "brigade"
or "division" included in the agreement describing the PLA
for fear that this might cause PLA "generals" to be
integrated into the NA ranks later. Shekhar Koirala, Central
Committee Member of the Nepali Congress who was present
during negotiations, told Emboff after the signing that he
had been under the impression that the UN negotiation team
would argue in favor of the GON position during negotiations
but that, in reality, the UN had argued in favor of the
Maoists. He hoped that the U.S. would push the UN to favor
the GON during implementation of the agreement.

Provisions For Arms: But No Timelines
--------------


4. (SBU) The agreement clearly states how Maoist weapons will
be stored within the cantonments. Weapons will only be
stored in the seven main cantonments; none will be kept in
the 21 satellite camps. For each of the main camps, 30
weapons will remain in the hands of the Maoists for perimeter
security of the camps and 15 weapons for each of the

KATHMANDU 00003124 002 OF 003


satellite camps -- a total of 525 weapons outside of the
locked containers. The UN will monitor the arms storage
areas 24 hours a day, and can inspect them at any time.
However, there is no timeline for implementation of the
agreement, nor a timeline for how long Maoists will remain in
the camps. The agreement calls for a four-phase approach to
cantonment and containment of weapons: 1) reporting and
verification; 2) redeployment and concentration of forces; 3)
Maoist army cantonment, NA barracking and arms control; and
4) full compliance with the agreement. The agreement states
that a practical timeline for these phases will be
established by the parties at a future date, in consultation
with the UN.

Training; But No Guns
--------------


5. (C) The agreement states that the NA will be allowed to
continue training its soldiers, with live-fire exercises
allowed after 48-hours notice of the Joint Monitoring
Coordination Committee. The Maoists will also be allowed to
conduct normal training "in the spirit of the Peace Accord,"
without live-fire exercises. Although this verbiage could be
read to imply that Maoists could train with but not fire
weapons, UN military advisor General Wilhelmsen told the DATT
that "normal training" meant "without weapons" and that was
clear to both sides. Wilhelmsen stressed that the
cantonments were too small for unit-level maneuver training
and that any training the Maoists conducted would be routine.
John Norris also confirmed separately to the DCM that all
Maoist PLA weapons would be locked up except for the ones
used to guard the camps.

Registration Criteria Clear
--------------


6. (C) The agreement states that only PLA combatants who were
recruited before May 25, 2006 would be allowed in the camps,
and only if they had reached 18 years of age before that
date. Maoists with or without weapons will be allowed into
the cantonments. Maoists will show their PLA identity card
to the UN teams during registration. Norris and Wilhelmsen
assured the Ambassador in a separate meeting that the parties
had agreed on rigorous questioning to make sure that the
combatants who entered the camps were genuine PLA combatants
and not of raw recruits coming from the ramped-up Maoist
recruitment drive over the past three weeks. The Ambassador
had stated that this would be a very difficult job, and had
expressed concern that large numbers of untrained, new
recruits would be entering the cantonments and receiving
training.

Monitoring Mechanisms: A Good Start
--------------


7. (C) John Norris told the DCM that he felt the UN would be
able to implement the agreement to effectively monitor Maoist
weapons and combatants. The agreement calls for a Joint
Monitoring Coordination Committee (JMCC) to be formed with a
chairman appointed by the UN. The JMCC will have nine
members; three from the NA, three from the PLA, and two from
the UN. There is no civilian representation on the JMCC.
According to the agreement, decisions of the JMCC will be by
consensus, with Ian Martin, the UN Secretary General's
representative, breaking any deadlocks. The JMCC has three
main functions: 1) to assist in implementation of the
agreement, 2) to serve as a dispute resolution mechanism, and
3) to assist in confidence building on all sides.


8. (C) Joint Monitoring Teams (JMTs) will also be formed to
assist the JMCC at the local level. The JMTs will have one
representative from the NA, PLA, and UN. The job of the JMTs
will be to: 1) liaise with the civilian community on the
village level, 2) cooperate with other UN agencies,
international organizations and NGOs, 3) share information
and defuse local tension, 4) assist in conflict management at
a local level, and 5) investigate complaints of possible

KATHMANDU 00003124 003 OF 003


violations of the agreement. However, the agreement does not
give the JMTs, or the JMCC, the authority to sanction any
party for violation of the agreement.

Integration Of Maoists Into The NA
--------------


9. (C) The agreement mentions possible integration of Maoist
combatants into the NA, but does not give specifics as to the
process. John Norris told the DCM that both sides agreed to
set aside the issue of numbers of Maoists to be integrated
for future negotiations, but he thought it would be between
4,000 and 6,000. The agreement states that only Maoists
properly registered at cantonment sites will be eligible for
future integration. The agreement states that the Interim
Government will form a special committee to "supervise,
integrate, and rehabilitate the Maoist army combatants."

What About The Militia?
--------------


10. (SBU) There is no mention of Maoist militia members in
the agreement. It is unclear what will happen to Maoist
militia groups currently extorting, abducting, and playing a
"law enforcement" role across the country. The agreement
calls on the Nepal Police and the Armed Police Force to
"continue the task of maintaining law and order" across the
country. The agreement also states that "holding and
carrying arms is in violation of the law." This, presumably,
is to ban Maoist militia from engaging in violence and
intimidation.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) The arms management agreement is definitely a step
forward on the path toward a peaceful and democratic Nepal.
However, how big a step remains to be seen during the
implementation of the agreement. There is a significant
amount of vagueness in the arms accord, and many of the
issues have been pushed off to future negotiations between
the parties. While we are unhappy with the idea that the
Maoists will likely be able to use the camps to provide some
degree of military training to raw recruits, it is some
comfort that they will not be conducting training with
weapons. It is equally troubling that the issue of Maoist
militia is still not being covered explicitly in the
agreement, leaving open a loophole for continued Maoist
atrocities. We will continue to buck up the GON and the UN
to create a strong mechanism with teeth to monitor the
agreements and hold the parties accountable for violations.
MORIARTY