PEACE AGREEMENT STICKING POINT: MILITARY TRAINING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 003118

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL NP
SUBJECT: PEACE AGREEMENT STICKING POINT: MILITARY TRAINING
IN CANTONMENTS


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
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1. (C) In a meeting on November 28, the lead UN negotiators
told the Ambassador that an agreement on arms management
between the Government of Nepal (GON) and the Maoists was
stalled over the Maoist desire to conduct military training
for their combatants in the cantonments. The Ambassador
pushed the UN team hard on why military training was
preferred over technical and vocational training, but John
Norris, the UN political advisor to the negotiations,
insisted that military training would be needed to keep up
the morale of the Maoist troops and to maintain discipline
and command and control in the cantonments. The Ambassador
stressed to Norris that an argument like that would be easier
to accept if the Maoists had not been systematically engaged
in a huge recruitment drive over the last three weeks,
specifically targeting youth. The Ambassador said it would
be hard to explain the UN's apparent endorsement of military
training for these obviously new recruits. The UN team
responded that the verification process as the Maoist
combatants entered the cantonments would screen out most new
recruits from entering the camps. General Jan Wilhelmsen,
the UN military advisor in the talks, worried that the UN
would move too slowly and bureaucratically to effectively
implement of an agreement. The UN team blamed the Nepal Army
(NA) for holding up the agreement over what it termed "small
issues."

Caught Up On Training
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2. (C) On November 28, John Norris and General Wilhelmsen
told the Ambassador that an agreement between the GON and the
Maoists on arms management was coming together, and that it
was, "on balance, good, practical, and implementable."
However, Norris stated that the big sticking point was the
proposed military training of Maoist cadre within the
cantonments. The NA objected to the idea of any military
training within the camps, as the Maoists wanted to be
allowed to conduct all types of training short of live-fire
exercises. Norris said that the UN was concerned about what
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers would do in the
camps if they were not allowed to conduct military training.
Norris stressed that it would be harder to integrate Maoist
combatants into the NA if they could not keep up their
military skills.


3. (C) The Ambassador strongly stated his disagreement with
the UN team on the issue of military training. The
Ambassador said that the Maoists had been recruiting
thousands of new combatants, many of them children, over the
last three weeks and that it was clear the Maoists intended
to fill the camps with these new recruits and keep their
seasoned fighters out of the cantonments. Why, the
Ambassador asked, was the UN pushing for the Maoists to be
able to provide military training to new recruits and bulk-up
their forces? Norris responded that the ability to integrate
into the NA would be an impetus for genuine Maoist combatants
to enter the camps, since they wouldn't want those NA
positions to go to new recruits. Norris said that there were
likely around 20,000 PLA soldiers who would enter into
cantonments, instead of the originally claimed 35,000. Of
those, he said, around 4,000-6,000 would be eligible for
integration into the NA. The desire to get positions in the
national army would convince the majority of Maoist
combatants to enter the camps. The Ambassador pointed out
that since there were only 10,000-12,000 PLA soldiers, even
if only 20,000 entered the camps the majority would be new
recruits. Norris and Wilhelmsen stressed that without
military training in the camps, it would be very difficult
for commanders to maintain the discipline needed to keep
their cadre from leaving or causing trouble.

Verification Will Be Strict

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4. (C) Norris and Wilhelmsen told the Ambassador that the
verification process would be strict and comprehensive, and
would ensure that only genuine PLA combatants were allowed
into the cantonments. Norris said that registration would
only be allowed of combatants who were at least 18 years old
by May 25, 2006 and who were recruited before May 25, 2006.
Identification would be verified through PLA identification
cards that were, in turn, verified by the UN. Norris said
that both sides had agreed on a long list of questions that
could be asked to prove that someone was legitimately a
member of the PLA. The Ambassador said that the UN team
would face a lot of problems with registration since they
would need to say no to a lot of people. He stated that it
would be impossible to keep all the new recruits out of the
camps. Norris said that would not be a problem, and they
were committed to registering only genuine PLA combatants.

Why Not Alternative Training?
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5. (C) The Ambassador asked again why the UN was arguing in
favor of the Maoists being able to train new recruits to be
in their army instead of arguing for alternative technical
and vocational training or jobs such as road building for the
combatants. Norris responded that the alternative training
would also be there, but that a lack of military training
would hurt camp management, undermine Maoist morale, and lead
the Maoists to conclude that the GON and NA were out to see
them "rot."

Reality Is Difficult
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6. (C) Norris said that the reality of dismantling a
guerrilla force was not easy, and the separation of the
Maoists from their weapons was more important than whether
training was taking place in the camps. Norris suggested
that the international community needed to stress to the
Maoists that this would be the "first test" for the Maoists
in the peace process. The Ambassador said that something
like that would have made sense if it were not for the huge
recruitment drive the Maoists had embarked on in the past
three weeks and their repeated breaking of past commitments.
Norris insisted that separation of weapons had to come first.
Military training in the camps would effectively be only
"busy work" so the combatants had something to fill up their
time.

Where Are The Weapons?
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7. (C) The Ambassador asked the UN team where all the Maoist
weapons were and how they would account for all of them as
they entered cantonments. Wilhelmsen said that they had
lists from the NA, the Nepal Police, and the Armed Police
Force as to which weapons had been captured from them; the UN
could work from those lists. He had been trying to convince
the Maoists that the more weapons they put into their
cantonments, the more the NA would have to lock up as well,
giving them an incentive to lock up more of their own.
Norris said that each PLA soldier who turned in a weapon
would get a mark on their record for preference for
integration into the NA. Wilhelmsen also stated that the
Maoists had agreed to put their socket bombs and other
devices into locked areas in the cantonments as well. The
Ambassador asked if there was any talk of amnesty for those
who turn in such devices, and Wilhelmsen replied that they
were thinking of designing a program for purchase of weapons.
Norris stated that it was clear in the agreement that anyone
carrying weapons outside of the cantonments could be
prosecuted under the law.

UN Bureaucracy Could Be A Problem
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8. (C) General Wilhelmsen expressed concern that the UN
bureaucracy would turn the UN mission into an "administrative
force" instead of a monitoring force with teeth. He worried
that the nature of the UN was to insist upon so much security
for force protection that it would take too long to get
enough people on the ground to effectively monitor the arms
management agreement. "If we don't have many monitors out
here by April, then we have lost," he stated. The Ambassador
agreed and said the U.S. had been working hard in New York to
push things forward as quickly as possible.

Maoists Will Keep Some Weapons For Security
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9. (C) General Wilhelmsen told the Ambassador that both sides
had agreed that the Maoists would keep 30 weapons for
security at the seven division level cantonments and 15
weapons at the 21 satellite camps. This meant a total of 525
weapons that would be outside of the locked up areas in the
cantonments.

The UN Blames The NA
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10. (C) Both Norris and Wilhelmsen blamed the NA for the
holdup on the arms management agreement. Norris said that
the NA comes out of the draft agreement quite well, and that
the Maoists were "swallowing a bitter pill." Norris was
concerned that the NA, a very conservative organization, was
too concerned about integration and still maintained a
certain "pride of place." Wilhelmsen said that the NA
leadership was angry about any changes to the NA and would
"like to see the Maoists rot in the camps without getting any
benefits while there." Norris said it was clear the NA was
holding things up, and claimed that it sent a message that
they were uncomfortable with the civilian leadership. The
Ambassador pointed out that many of the ideas that had been
sticking points thus far had actually come from the civilian
leadership, and not from the NA. He also noted that he was
not aware of anyone in the Seven-Party Alliance leadership
insisting that the Maoists be allowed to conduct military
training in the camps.

Comment
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11. (C) It is troubling that after the large-scale
recruitment drive by the Maoists over the past three weeks,
the UN is arguing in favor of military training for Maoist
combatants in the cantonments. The UN team seemed
particularly hard on the NA and sympathetic to Maoist
concerns in the negotiations. However the NA concerns are
likely justified, given the Maoists past track record on
previous agreements. The Ambassador made clear that the U.S.
wanted to see technical and vocational training of those in
the camps, but believed it was not a good idea for the
Maoists to be allowed to use the cantonments sites as
training grounds for more combatants. On an encouraging
note, both Norris and Wilhelmsen clearly understood the need
for strong mechanisms for verification and registration of
combatants in the camps. It is equally important that the UN
get a large monitoring team on the ground as soon as possible
to give the arms management agreement, once it is signed, the
best possible shot at successful implementation.
MORIARTY