NEGOTIATORS FOCUSED ON HOW MANY COMBATANTS WILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 003116

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR UN NP
SUBJECT: NEGOTIATORS FOCUSED ON HOW MANY COMBATANTS WILL
GET GOVERNMENT JOBS


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

Summary
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1. (C) The political adviser to the UN peace team told DCM
November 27 that the Government of Nepal and the Maoists were
arguing over how many combatants would get jobs in the
security forces. John Norris said the issue preventing an
arms management agreement was not who was a combatant. The
political adviser was confident that the "People's Liberation
Army" (PLA) would turn in its weapons. His main concern was
that the Maoist combatants be occupied once they entered the
camps. He expressed regret that neither side seemed
seriously engaged in the issue of the Maoist militia and
welcomed suggestions on how to disarm it. Prime Minister
Koirala's Foreign Policy Adviser, Dr. Suresh Chalise, also
described the core issue under discussion as ultimately a
matter of jobs. He was also confident that Maoist arms would
be managed. He told the DCM that he expected the arms
management agreement would be signed November 27.

Basically A Political Agreement
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2. (C) John Norris, the political adviser to Ian Martin, the
UN Secretary General's personal representative to the peace
process, told the DCM November 27 that the tripartite
technical agreement on arms management was "basically a
political agreement." In response to a question about the
standard that would be applied to determine whether a Maoist
combatant was in fact what he or she claimed to be, he
downplayed the issue. Norris claimed that the Government and
Maoists were focused primarily on how many and which
combatants would be eligible for jobs in the Nepal Army and
the police forces. The Government, Norris said, was trying
to resist being pinned down on the issue because it wanted to
keep leverage over the Maoists. Meanwhile, the United
Nations had been pushing both sides to agree on how many
would be integrated.

Of Combatants and Weapons
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3. (C) Norris stated that the UN had no ready way of
determining whether a person claiming to be a combatant was
one. Furthermore, the Government was no longer insisting on
a one-to-one ratio of combatants to weapons. The current
plan was to list Maoist weapons by unit because that was the
way the Maoists themselves divided them up. When asked what
incentive the Maoist combatants would have to turn in their
weapons, Norris indicated that how many weapons turned in
would be a deciding factor in the Government's final decision
regarding how many Maoist combatants would be permitted to
join the Government security forces.

Crucial to Keep Combatants Occupied
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4. (C) Martin's political adviser expressed concern that the
Maoist combatants be kept occupied in the camps. It was
better for them to be busy inside rather than making mischief
outside. The UN, he said, did not have in mind live fire
exercises by the Maoists, but there was some discussion of
allowing them other military training. DCM emphasized that
the entire point of arms management was to separate Maoists
from their weapons. Norris added that the Nepal Army (NA)
seemed determined to make the conditions inside the
cantonments as poor as possible. That, Norris stressed,
would be a mistake. The secondary effect of the NA's
attitude would be to make the combatants discouraged about
their future prospects if they did join the Army or the other
security forces.

Militia Overlooked
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5. (C) Norris expressed regret that neither the Government
nor the Maoists were seriously engaged on the issue of the
Maoist militia. The Maoists were claiming -- to the UN, at

least -- that the militia would turn in their modern weapons.
The political adviser stated, without explaining, that the
"People's Liberation Army" wanted them. What would happen to
old weapons, rudimentary bombs and the like was still an open
question. He welcomed any U.S. suggestions on how to collect
these arms. The UN could help address the problem by
aggressive monitoring of Maoist behavior, he added.
Ultimately, it would be up to the Nepali police to ensure
that the militia did not use the weapons to intimidate people.

Maoists Want Jobs
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6. (C) Prime Minister Koirala's Foreign Policy Advisor, Dr.
Suresh Chalise remarked to the DCM November 27 that the
Maoists were pushing hard in the negotiations for government
jobs for their people. They were demanding 14,000 slots for
members of the "People's Liberation Army" in the Nepal Army
or the other security forces and 20,000 jobs elsewhere in the
Government. Chalise said that he had argued the PLA should
get 5-7,000 slots and those assigned would have to meet the
standard recruiting criteria.

Weapons Not An Issue
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7. (C) Despite repeated questions from the DCM, Chalise
seemed confident that Maoist weapons would not be an issue in
the future. The Maoists had agreed in the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement that it would be illegal for them to hold or
display arms outside the camps, and the Government intended
to hold them to it. He maintained that Maoist weapons would
become a law enforcement issue. The good news was that
slowly the Government was reestablishing police posts. The
Prime Minister's adviser was optimistic that the technical
agreement would be signed November 27.

Comment
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8. (C) This would not be the first time that the UN Mission
here or Chalise have painted an overly optimistic picture of
the issues at hand. While there is certainly an argument to
be made for an expansive definition of combatant if that
means more Maoist fighters are out of circulation, the value
of such an expansive definition will be lost if the actual
fighters remain outside. Likewise, the Maoists may turn in
weapons, but we would be more comfortable if there were some
sort of minimum level of weapons that they had to turn in
enshrined in the technical agreement. Even the UN's Norris
admits that neither side has adequately addressed the militia
issue. We will work with S/CRS and other donors to develop
ideas on weapons amnesties and other possible mechanisms to
get the militia's weapons under wraps.
MORIARTY