BOUCHER STRESSES PARLIAMENT'S OVERSIGHT ROLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 003097

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER NP
SUBJECT: BOUCHER STRESSES PARLIAMENT'S OVERSIGHT ROLE


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) During November 16 discussions with Speaker of the
House of Representatives Subash Nemwang, Assistant Secretary
for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher,
accompanied by the Ambassador, stressed the important role
Parliament must play in overseeing Nepal's democratic
transition. Nemwang expressed confidence that the Parliament
would be ready for the November 26 deadline for formation of
an Interim Parliament. He said many procedural issues,
including nomination procedures for new members and decisions
on which parties would hold leadership slots in Parliament,
would only be resolved by the Comprehensive Peace Accord.
Nemwang said the Constituent Assembly would, in addition to
drafting the new constitution, handle the day-to-day business
of lawmaking in Nepal.

Nemwang Says Parliament Can Meet November 26 Deadline
-------------- --------------


2. (C) When asked by Assistant Secretary Boucher whether
Parliament would be able to meet the ambitious November 26
deadline for formation of an interim parliament set by the
November 8 Agreement between the Seven-Party Alliance and the
Maoists, Nemwang said the Parliament would be ready to accept
the new members. The challenge, he said, would be whether
the cantonment process for Maoist combatants, a necessary
precursor to formation of an interim legislature, would occur
in time. Progress on arms management, Nemwang said, would
dictate the timeline.

Procedures on Hold for Parliament
--------------


3. (C) Nemwang said the procedures for the Interim
Parliament, including rules for nomination of new members and
choosing parliamentary leadership, had to be defined in the
Comprehensive Peace Accord and the terms of the Interim
Constitution. Boucher asked Nemwang if he would remain
Speaker of the House. Nemwang said that discussion on
leadership of the Interim Parliament had not begun. He said
the Interim Constitution first had to be passed, an Interim
Parliament nominated, and then new procedures would be put in
place for committee membership and parliamentary leadership.


4. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the new nomination
process would empower under-represented groups such as women
and Dalits. Nemwang, one of the most senior ethnic
minorities in a mainstream political party, replied that it
might, but only if the process were defined clearly in the
Accord and Interim Constitution. Otherwise, he thought, the
parties would continue their old ways.

Concern Regarding Maoist Entry into Parliament
-------------- -


5. (C) Nemwang said the Maoists had the advantage in
putting forth representatives for the Interim Parliament.
Because the current House of Representatives and National
Assembly would roll into the Interim Parliament, the
political parties would only nominate a handful of new
members (of the 48 dictated in the November 8 agreement to be
nominated from representatives from civil society and
professional organizations). In contrast, the Maoists would
have 73 of their own new slots to fill in addition to their
share of the 48. Nemwang thought the Maoists would use these
slots to show their continued devotion to their "inclusive"
ideals -- nominating women, Dalits and intellectuals, and
even former People's Liberation Army fighters. Boucher noted
the challenge Maoists would face because they had almost no
parliamentary experience; Nemwang concurred with this
concern.


6. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher asked whether the
Maoists would seek parliamentary leadership -- chairs of the

KATHMANDU 00003097 002 OF 003


nine permanent parliamentary committees. Again, Nemwang
said, rules of procedure had not been determined. However,
he thought Maoists would likely seek a similar number of
chairs as each of the three main parties. Boucher described
the potential check on power that could be achieved if
interim ministerial slots were balanced with the relevant
committee chairmanship (e.g., if the Minister of Education
were a Maoist and the Chairman of the Education Committee
were from the Seven-Party Alliance).

Constituent Assembly Mandate: Not Just the Constitution
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher asked Nemwang who would
be responsible for law-making in Nepal when the Constituent
Assembly was convened. He assumed this body would be focused
only on developing the constitution and its establishment
would result in the dissolution of the Interim Parliament.
Nemwang reported that, in fact, the Constituent Assembly
would also be responsible for the day-to-day activities of a
legislature in addition to drafting the constitution.

Parliament's Role in the Peace Deal
--------------


8. (C) Nemwang mentioned that many members of Parliament
were involved in the current negotiation process and were
assisting in the drafting of some of the peace accord
provisions. When asked by Boucher if Parliament would "pass"
the peace accord as legislation, Nemwang said, "No." The
Prime Minister would sign the peace accord on behalf of the
entire Government of Nepal.

Nemwang Describes Maoist Activity in His District
-------------- --------------


9. (C) In response to Boucher's questions, Nemwang
described as mixed the governance and security situation in
his own Ilam District in Eastern Nepal. Nemwang said that,
while there had been some progress in re-establishing village
offices and police headquarters, many government services did
not exist. He also described a police post that Maoist
militia were occupying.


10. (C) Nemwang expressed concern regarding the cantonment
site configuration within his district. The Maoists had
initially proposed primary division-level cantonment sites
surrounded by two to three nearby satellite, or brigade-level
camps. Nemwang lamented that satellite sites in his district
actually proposed by the Maoists were three to four-days
drive from the main division cantonment. He said that this
did not bode well for Maoist adherence to their arms
management agreements.

Arms Management: Militia vs. People's Liberation Army
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher asked Nemwang whether
the Maoist militia would also go into cantonments under the
current arms management scheme. Nemwang said the language in
the November 8 agreement explicitly used the general term
"combatant," to mean both People's Liberation Army and
militia. (Note: We heard from Ian Martin's political
advisor on November 13 that the militia were not an official
part of the cantonment process but were still expected to
turn in their arms. End Note.) Nemwang said that the armed
militia were still operating freely across the countryside
and posed a threat to the movement and activities of
political parties at the local level. Nemwang said his
optimism about a successful outcome of the peace process
depended on whether the SPA, Maoists, and UN could implement
the arms arrangement strictly, so that the holding of arms
was deemed illegal and punishable.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) While Nemwang seemed optimistic that Parliament

KATHMANDU 00003097 003 OF 003


will be ready to accept new members by November 26, many
details remain to be sorted out. The Comprehensive Peace
Accord was signed on November 21, but cantonment of Maoist
combatants and their weapons must be completed before the
as-yet-unsigned draft Interim Constitution goes into effect
and the Interim Parliament is formed. We have seen no
concrete indicators as to what role the Maoists in the
Interim Parliament (roughly 25 percent of the members) will
play.


13. (U) Assistant Secretary Boucher has cleared this cable.
MORIARTY