FOREIGN MINISTER OLI PESSIMISTIC ON PROSPECTS FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 003033

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL PREF NP
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER OLI PESSIMISTIC ON PROSPECTS FOR
PEACE

REF: A. KATHMANDU 3014


B. KATHMANDU 2931

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) In a November 10 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister KP Oli expressed strong
personal reservations about the November 8 agreement between
the Government of Nepal (GON) and the Maoists (ref A). Oli
worried that the November 8 agreement set a bad example by
letting the Maoists into government and Parliament without
having taken part in legitimate elections. Oli felt he had
been purposely left out of negotiations during his trip to
New Delhi, and said that Prime Minister Koirala and other
political players were more interested in their own positions
than in creating a sustainable peace in the country. The
Deputy Prime Minister was pessimistic about the prospects for
monitoring or holding the Maoists accountable for any breach
of the November 8 agreement. Oli also discussed the future
of the Bhutanese refugees living in Nepal and his upcoming
talks with the Bhutanese government on the issue.

Personal Opinion: November 8 Peace Agreement Not Good
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2. (C) On November 10, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister KP Oli told the Ambassador that the GON's official
view was that the November 8 agreement between the GON and
the Maoists was a "great achievement, and the GON and the
Maoists should be congratulated for their hard work toward
peace." However, Oli made it clear that his personal opinion
was that the agreement was not a step forward, but merely a
vehicle for the Maoists to continue to pursue their agenda.


3. (C) The Deputy Prime Minister explained that there were
three main risks to the agreement for the GON. First, the
Maoists had not declared an end to their policy and ideology
of violence. Second, the figure of 35,000 soldiers that the
Maoists claimed they would put in the camps was ridiculously
high; the Maoist People's Liberation Army had at most 15,000
soldiers. This, the Maoists would use the movement into
cantonments as an excuse to recruit and train new soldiers.
Finally, the Maoists now had the opportunity to assert
themselves in the interim government and legislature, without
having participated in legitimate elections. Oli stated that
he was sure that Lilamani Pokharel, MP for the United
People's Front, and others from civil society would join a
coalition with the Maoists, giving them the largest party in
the interim legislature. Oli feared that, with Maoists in
the government, if the Maoists decided to cause problems, the
rest of the government would have to capitulate. The Deputy
PM worried that Maoist abuses would continue to occur, and
that the agreement would not stop them.

Everyone Wants To Please The Maoists
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4. (C) Oli told the Ambassador that everyone wanted to please
the Maoists, "but no one seems to see the risks." Oli said
that the GON had continued to give in to the Maoists during
negotiations because of threats and intimidation. He also
said that the Maoists had extorted "billions of rupees" and
were spending them to help get their way. Oli stated that
now that the Maoists were entering into the government
through negotiations, the people will feel more like the
Maoists have won through intimidation. The Deputy PM
reiterated that he felt like the only one in the Cabinet who
opposed the Maoists, and that he had intentionally been
excluded from the negotiations leading up to the November 8
agreement. (Note: Oli was in New Delhi when the negotiations
began, and was in the process of returning when they
concluded. End Note.)

Arms Management Will Be Ineffective
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador asked Oli how the GON could make the

arms management process as effective as possible, in order to
drain the fear of the Maoists in the countryside. Oli stated
that it was impossible in the current situation to do so,
because the Maoists maintained effective control over their
weapons. The November 8 agreement gave them the only key, so
they could get their weapons back at any time. Although Oli
hoped that the November 16 peace agreement might be more
specific in limiting Maoist access to their weapons once they
were locked up, he doubted the Maoists would agree. Oli
worried that, having accepted the Maoist position on an
interim government, an interim legislature, and cantonments,
the GON would continue to accept the Maoist position on other
issues as well.

Where Do Maoist MPs Come From?
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6. (C) Oli wondered where the Maoist MPs would come from in
an interim legislature. The Deputy PM said that the Maoists
did not have people of the "caliber" to sit in Parliament or
run a government and suggested that perhaps Maoist militia
members would be MPs. Oli worried that the Prime Minister
and the leaders of the other Seven-Party Alliance parties
were only looking out for their own best interests and not on
holding the Maoists accountable for their actions. Oli
stated that, "Prime Minister Koirala is just looking for his
Nobel Prize."

Expanded Police Force From Maoists
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7. (C) Oli acknowledged that the police force would be
expanded to enforce law and order during the transitional
period. He feared, however, that many of these new recruits
would come from the Maoist militia. The Ambassador told Oli
that he had been assured that Maoists would not be integrated
into the police force. The Deputy PM responded that it was
impossible to tell a Maoist from a non-Maoist when recruiting
for the police force.

Meeting With Bhutan About Refugees
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8. (C) Oli was convinced that his upcoming meeting with the
Bhutanese Foreign Minister on November 21 would not resolve
the refugee issue. The Deputy PM said he did not believe
Bhutan would agree to repatriate any refugees. He stated
that, if that was the case, he would be ready soon to look at
"other options." The Ambassador repeated the U.S. offer to
take at least 60,000 refugees and thanked Oli for allowing
the UNHCR to conduct a census of the camps. Oli responded
that Nepal had a fear that resettlement in a third country
would encourage Bhutan to expel more refugees. He insisted
that Nepal would not allow more refugees to cross the border
into Nepal in the future. Oli said he had spoken with the
Indian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister when he was in New
Delhi and they had said the Government of India would be
supportive, although Oli did not explain what they meant by
this. Oli stated that he would "stop the bilateral talks" if
the November 21 meeting did not lead to a breakthrough.

Comment
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9. (C) Oli seems more and more like the odd-man out in the
Cabinet as peace talks between the GON and the Maoists move
toward their conclusion. Unfortunately, the Deputy PM is one
of the few voices in the Seven-Party Alliance willing to hold
the Maoists accountable for their past and present actions.
Oli is convinced that the interim government will be filled
with people who are "Maoists or Maoist sympathizers," but he
has increasingly less room to make his case in public. We
will continue our efforts to buck up Oli and a few others
like him (e.g. Finance Minister Ram Sharan Mahat). A
comprehensive peace deal may be signed later this week but it
will be even more important for leaders like Oli to speak
openly about Maoist abuses in the days and weeks ahead.
MORIARTY