Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU3023
2006-11-10 10:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

GETTING A SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE FOR NEPAL'S

Tags:  PGOV PTER UN NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 003023 

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USUN FOR PHEE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER UN NP
SUBJECT: GETTING A SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE FOR NEPAL'S
PEACE PROCESS

REF: KATHMANDU 3014

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 003023

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

USUN FOR PHEE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER UN NP
SUBJECT: GETTING A SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE FOR NEPAL'S
PEACE PROCESS

REF: KATHMANDU 3014

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST -- see paras. 7-9.

Summary
--------------


2. (C) In discussions November 9 with Ian Martin, the UN
Secretary General's Personal Representative to Nepal, the

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Ambassador stressed the need for a strong UN Security Council
mandate to enforce the November 8 peace deal between the
Government of Nepal (GON) and Maoists (reftel). Without the
Security Council's authority behind it, the Ambassador said,
the peace deal's broad-stroke commitments alone would not
diminish fear of the Maoists or pave the way for free and
fair constituent assembly elections in June 2007. Martin
described his preference for a "two-phase" process to gaining
Security Council approval. Recognizing the urgent need for
arms management monitors to meet the ambitious November 21
deadline for Maoist fighters and arms to go into camps,
Martin thought the Security Council should be approached
first to mobilize Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO) military experts for arms monitoring. A broader
request, and second potential Security Council resolution,
detailing an expanded UN mission to assist in the lead-up and
conduct of constituent assembly elections next June could
follow later.

Status of UN Role in Arms Management
--------------


3. (C) On November 9, the Secretary General's Personal
Representative in Nepal Ian Martin told the Ambassador his
team recognized the November 8 agreement between the GON and
Maoists addressed the arms management process only in
generalities. However, Martin believed this gave room to his
team, including technical experts on arms management, to
shape necessary details. He mentioned separate consultations
his team had conducted with Maoist Supremo Prachanda and
People's Liberation Army (PLA) Divisional Commanders, the
Ministry of Defense and the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA)
negotiating team. He planned to hold the first "tripartite
discussion" between the UN and the two sides to hammer out
the details of the UN's role on November 10. Martin
emphasized that his team had stressed the importance of

having "satellite" cantonments (three surrounding each of
the seven primary sites) near primary sites so monitors would
have easy access. He had heard some early discussion of
gathering the PLA initially in the seven primary sites and
then setting up the surrounding satellite sites. Martin
added that he intended to use the GON's notional inventory of
Maoists arms as a baseline to estimate the percentages of
arms that the Maoists were storing - and what they might be
holding back.

Towards a Security Council Mandate in Two Phases
-------------- ---


4. (C) Martin stated that discussions at UN Headquarters
were moving quickly toward an enhanced UN mandate to help
implement the November 8 peace deal. Martin favored a
two-phase process to obtain Security Council approval.
Because of the need to move urgently on arms monitoring to
meet an ambitious November 21 deadline for putting Maoist
combatants in camps and their weapons under lock, he felt the
Council should first be approached to approve the arms
monitoring aspect. Council approval would be needed, he
said, to mobilize the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO) to deploy military monitors. The question

of a Security Council resolution detailing the necessary
aspects of a wider UN mission, including broader UN
assistance for the lead-up and conduct of planned Constituent
Assembly elections next June, Martin said, could be deferred
as a second-phase issue. He felt a wider UN mission might
require another assessment mission, further bilateral
discussion in New York, and further political groundwork in
Nepal, all of which could be mentioned in the Security
Council's initial action authorizing monitors for arms
management. Martin was vague on the exact timing for the
two-phase process but thought the arms management UNSC action
could come immediately with the development of a second,
broader resolution taking an additional month.

Phase Two: What Could a Broader UN Mission Include?
-------------- --------------


5. (C) In terms of a broader UN mandate, the Ambassador
raised the notion of counting back from the planned
Constituent Assembly elections in June to determine what
would be needed to ensure the people of Nepal felt safe
enough to vote their consciences. Martin stressed the
importance, as he did in his last meeting with the Ambassador
on November 6, of getting as many international monitors on
the ground as soon as possible, including arms monitors,
cease-fire monitors, election monitors, and even advisory
support for the police and other security institutions. What
was required was a strong international presence in the
countryside.

Ideas on Electoral Assistance
--------------


6. (C) Martin recalled how the August 2006 five-point
GON-Maoist letters to the Secretary General had requested UN
election monitoring as opposed to electoral assistance. He
mentioned that the UN did not typically conduct election
monitoring missions because a range of bilateral partners and
NGOs such as the National Democratic Institute, the Carter
Center, and the European Union often took this on. Martin
said he felt more comfortable with the UN in a coordinating,
advisory role serving as an umbrella body or information hub
for the range of deployed monitors. He also mentioned a
model that was used in East Timor for election verification
called a "certification body." It had included, he said, a
three-member committee of recognized, neutral, foreign
electoral experts that had passed judgment on the legitimacy
of each step of the election process. Martin was unclear,
however, whether such an arrangement would be acceptable to
the GON and the Maoists.

Comment And Action Request
--------------


7. (C) It is vital for the U.S. to push to upgrade Martin's
small Secretary General-authorized mission to one with a full
blown UN Security Council mandate. The strong and explicit
backing of the Security Council will be imperative to ensure
that the Maoists adhere to the provisions of arms management
and other peace agreements and to begin draining the fear of
the Maoists from the people of Nepal. The tight timeframe
stipulated in the November 8 agreement demands a near-term
fix on arms monitoring. For this reason, we strongly urge an
immediate U.S. request to the Security Council to mobilize
DPKO monitors.


8. (C) Martin has overly narrowed UN support in the arms
management process to monitoring compliance by the two sides.
Questions, such as who will set up the camps, who will
manage the camps, and who will provide food for combatants
have gone unanswered. Other donors, especially the EU,

Norway and Japan, will have to be mobilized quickly to fill
in these holes. Following the initial arms monitors request
to the Security Council, we believe the U.S. should work
closely with our key bilateral partners, in Nepal and New
York, European capitals and New Delhi to craft a Security
Council resolution that will delineate a broader and deeper
role for the UN in the lead-up and conduct of Constituent
Assembly elections.


9. (C) We assume that, at a minimum, Security Council action
should:
- Congratulate the people of Nepal on the November 8
agreement.
- Note the August letters to the Secretary General by the
Prime Minister of Nepal and Maoist Supremo Prachanda calling
for UN assistance.
- Authorize immediate deployment of monitors to observe the
arms management process.
- Note that attempts to access the arms would be a matter of
grave concern to the Security Council.
- Authorize the Secretary General to dispatch a team to Nepal
to report back within a month on all aspects of cease-fire
and election monitoring, with a view to helping Nepal prepare
for its mid-June elections.
MORIARTY