PRIME MINISTER ANGRY INDIA AND EU COSYING UP TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002962

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR EU IN NP
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER ANGRY INDIA AND EU COSYING UP TO
MAOISTS

REF: NEW DELHI 7532

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

Summary
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1. (C) The Ambassador stressed to Prime Minister Koirala in a
meeting November 3 that any arms management agreement with
the Maoists had to begin to drain the fear and would thus
require substantial domestic and international monitoring.
The Ambassador's third point was that the Government of
Nepal's policy of waiting until the Maoist combatants were in
cantonments to crack down on Maoist extortion and violence
was foolish. It deprived the GON of any negotiating leverage
with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and was leading to
a withering of the state. The PM and his foreign policy
advisor Dr. Chalise gave no indication they planned to change
the policy. PM Koirala and Chalise did express displeasure
that the Indian Ambassador had met with Maoist Supremo
Prachanda three days previously and that Prachanda was being
invited to New Delhi. Koirala and his advisor were also very
unhappy that the European Union had requested a joint meeting
with the PM and the CPN-M leadership during its upcoming
troika visit. PM Koirala said he would have Foreign Minister
Oli call in European Ambassadors to protest.

Arms Deal Must Diminish the Public's Fear
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2. (C) On November 3, the Ambassador took advantage of his
first meeting with Prime Minister GP Koirala since the
Ambassador's consultations in Washington in early October and
visit to New Delhi in late October (reftel) to express the
high level of USG concern about where the peace process was
headed. The Ambassador made three points. First, with
respect to the management of Maoist arms, what mattered mere
the perceptions of the people of Nepal: Did the proposed
formula begin to deprive the Communist Party of Nepal
(Maoist) (CPN-M) cadre of the ability to instill fear. Prime
Minister Koirala and Dr. Chalise agreed that it came down to
psychology. Would Nepalis feel freer to vote as they saw fit
after the deal was struck? Koirala's Foreign Policy Advisor
Dr. Chalise said that the GON planned to launch a media
campaign to explain what its preferred formula meant. The
Ambassador emphasized that the Government had to state
publicly the CPN-M was not going to get its weapons back.
Otherwise, if Maoist Supremo Prachanda had the only key to
the arms, what would keep Maoist cadre from claiming the
contrary?

Arms Management Must Have Teeth
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3. (C) Management of the weapons of the People's Liberation
Army would not be enough to prevent Maoist militia and
political cadre from abusing the people in villages, the
Ambassador continued. In other words, there had to be
effective monitoring in the countryside of any future peace
accord and that meant there had to be a price to pay if the
Maoists violated their commitments. The Ambassador told PM
Koirala that to be credible and effective a monitoring system
would require a significant domestic and international
presence. It was also crucial that the GON obtain Maoist
approval for such an arrangement before the CPN-M joined an
interim government. After the Maoists joined, they would
have zero incentive to agree to either effective arms
management or vigorous monitoring, and the other parties
would have no leverage to compel agreement. In this regard,
it was also necessary for the GON to ensure, the Ambassador
emphasized, that the United Nations had the same
understanding of what the consequences would be in the event
of a violation. The Prime Minister agreed. (Note:

USAID-contracted peace facilitator Retief Olivier told the
Ambassador November 3 that the draft cease-fire agreement
currently under consideration by the two sides did not
contain strong compliance measures.)

The Time To Crack Down On Maoist Abuses Is Now
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4. (C) The Ambassador's final point to the PM was that it
made no sense for the GON to continue to defer a crackdown on
illegal Maoist activities until the Maoist combatants and
arms were in camps under UN monitoring. The GON had in
effect backed itself into a corner in the negotiations. The
Maoists, the Ambassador pointed out, could stick to their
bottom line at no cost: in the face of GON passivity, the
Maoists were getting stronger and the government was getting
weaker. People were afraid to go to the police: no action
would be taken and they might be reported to the Maoists.
The Ambassador stressed that he disagreed sharply with the
GON's assumption that the people of Nepal would be upset if
there was a crackdown on the Maoists. The Maoist actions
were indefensible. Chalise said he agreed that the people
would support the government but he repeated that there might
be negative consequences for the peace process if the GON
took harsh action against the CPN-M. Neither he nor the PM
gave any indication the GON planned to change its policy.

PM Angry With the Indians
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5. (C) The Prime Minister was visibly angry on the subject of
the meeting three days previously between Indian Ambassador
Shiv Shankar Mukherjee and Maoist Supremo Prachanda. Why, he
asked the Ambassador, had Mukherjee met with Prachanda? And
why had Prachanda been invited to New Delhi (for the
Hindustan Times Leadership Summit November 17-18)? Wasn't
the CPN-M still on India's terrorist list? Was the GON
considering sending a diplomatic note to the Government of
India, the Ambassador asked? At that point, the PM and
Chalise explained the note would be leaked and it would
disrupt the peace process. Chalise pointed out that he had
called in the Indian DCM to express the GON's displeasure.
It seemed, Chalise said, that the Government of India (GOI)
was angling for the New Delhi visit to serve as some sort of
coming out party for the Maoists. It would give the GOI a
chance to recognize a GON-Maoist peace deal.

.. And the EU Too
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6. (C) Prime Minister Koirala and Chalise also voiced
frustration about the EU's contact policy with the Maoists.
Specifically, they found it deeply troubling that the Finnish
Embassy had requested a joint meeting with the PM and the
Maoists during the upcoming visit by the EU troika to
Kathmandu. Koirala emphasized that the GON wanted the
international community to put pressure on the Maoists to
compromise. The EU's high-level contacts were doing the
opposite, they were encouraging the CPN-M. The Ambassador
explained that some EU countries thought a Maoist victory was
inevitable, but not all did. Some European Embassies were
not yet meeting with the Maoists. Others were simply taking
their cue from the GON which was meeting with the Maoists in
spite of their misdeeds. The PM welcomed a suggestion by the
Ambassador to have Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
Oli call in European Ambassadors and explain the GON's views.
The PM also reiterated his appreciation for the USG's
consistency in its policy toward the Maoists.

Comment
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7. (C) The meeting was by no means confrontational, but the

PM Koirala looked increasingly uncomfortable as the session
wore on; he appears to understand that the deterioration of
law and order is undermining the GON's credibility. That
said, we take the PM's point that high-level contacts with
the international community are burnishing the Maoists'
legitimacy even while they engage in rampant violence.
MORIARTY