DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OLI CONCERNED ABOUT MAOIST

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002931

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL IN NP
SUBJECT: DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OLI CONCERNED ABOUT MAOIST
INTENTIONS


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
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1. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on November 1,
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister KP Oli shared his
concerns about whether the Maoists intended to enter the
political mainstream peacefully. He explained that the
international community was playing an important role in the
peace process, but ultimately the solution needed to come
from within Nepal. The Ambassador noted that the only
acceptable solution to the current political problem was one
that diminished the Nepali people's fear of the Maoists. Oli
insisted that the Government of Nepal (GON) and the Maoists
could reach a peaceful settlement only if the GON convinced
the Maoists to give up their ideology of violence. Oli was
noncommittal when the Ambassador asked when the GON would
decide to begin to enforce law and order against Maoist
abuses. Oli worried about India's growing recognition of the
Maoist leadership, even though India still formally
considered the Maoists terrorists.

International Community Plays An Important Role
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2. (C) In a November 1 meeting, Deputy Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister KP Oli told the Ambassador that he had been
attempting to explain to the Nepali public through the media
that the entire world wanted peace, democracy, and prosperity
in Nepal. Oli made it clear that the solution to the current
problems needed to come from within Nepal and could not come
from foreign governments. That said, Oli stressed that the
U.S. and other international actors were playing an important
role in the current peace process -- a role he hoped would
continue to pressure the Maoists to give up violence. Oli
doubted whether the Maoists intended to enter into a peaceful
political process.

Solution Must Address Fear
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3. (C) The Ambassador told Oli that any peace deal had to be
a package that diminished the fear of Maoist violence in the
minds of the Nepali public. Oli agreed and stated that he
saw a three-pronged package as necessary to reduce fear. The
Maoists needed to give up their policy and ideology of
violence, their instruments and means of violence, and their
activities and practices of violence. Oli insisted that,
until the Maoists were ready to give up the policy of
violence to achieve their ends, there could not be peace in
Nepal. He asserted that the Maoists were not yet ready to
give up violence, or they would have already done so instead
of continuing to use extortion, violence, and abduction as
political tools across the country.

Government Afraid To Restore Law And Order
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4. (C) When asked by the Ambassador when the GON would
finally begin to restore law and order, Oli was noncommittal.
Oli insisted that he had continuously asked the Prime
Minister to order the Home Ministry to use the police to stop
Maoist abduction and extortion. However, the PM would not
because he feared the Maoists would then walk away from the
peace negotiations. The Ambassador asked what legitimate
basis the Maoists would have to complain if the GON made them
stop their use of violence. Oli implied that he understood
but was outnumbered in the cabinet by others who wanted a
"breakthrough" in the peace talks at any cost. Oli stated
that people who were counting on the Maoists would be
"seriously deceived" in the end. In spite of his personal
opinion to the contrary, Oli still publicly supported the
PM's line that if the GON started doing the "right thing" now
and cracked down on Maoist atrocities, the Maoists might
indeed feel targeted and go back to a violent struggle.

Concern About India's Role
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5. (C) Oli told the Ambassador that he had asked the heads of
foreign missions not to meet formally with the Maoist
leadership during the ongoing negotiations. He complained
about the Indian Ambassador's meeting with Maoist supremo
Prachanda the day before, even though the Government of India
still considered the Maoists terrorists. Oli expressed
concern that the meeting gave the impression that the Maoists
were already an essential part of Nepali politics. Oli
stated that he felt compelled to request India to release the
Maoist leaders held in Indian jails during his upcoming trip
to New Delhi. Oli wondered out loud why India was rushing to
have a relationship with Prachanda when he was not even part
of the government. (Note: Indian Ambassador Mukherjee told
the Ambassador on November 2 that he had met with Prachanda
at the request of the Prime Minister in order to push the
Maoists to accept a GON proposal on arms management --
septel.)

Comment
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6. (C) KP Oli continues to take a strong stand against
allowing the Maoists into the government without effective
arms management. However, his opinion seems to be in the
minority in the Prime Minister's cabinet. Oli's obvious
difficulty in "toeing the line" on the issue of restoring law
and order is refreshing, but for now, however, Oli appears to
be one of a few voices in the cabinet ready to stand up to
Maoist demands.
MORIARTY