Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU2735
2006-10-16 08:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:
PEACE FACILITATORS BRIEF ON STATE OF PLAY
VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHKT #2735/01 2890834 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 160834Z OCT 06 FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3452 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4866 RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 5105 RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0256 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 3099 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4495 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0346 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1999 RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002735
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: PEACE FACILITATORS BRIEF ON STATE OF PLAY
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nicholas Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002735
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: PEACE FACILITATORS BRIEF ON STATE OF PLAY
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nicholas Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) USAID-contracted peace facilitator Hannes Siebert
(please protect) told SCA PDAS Steven Mann and USAID Mission
Director Don Clark on October 5 that the Seven-Party Alliance
(SPA) and the Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M) had
narrowed their differences on key issues in the peace
process. The National Peace Accord was starting to come
together. Siebert pointed out, however, that there were
still considerable differences between the two sides.
Handling the Maoist People's Liberation Army (PLA) and
militia was going to be tricky. Ultimately, Siebert
admitted, we do not know the Maoists' intentions. He voiced
the hope that putting the Maoist combatants in cantonments,
if funds could be found, would bring about a big change in
Maoist behavior. PDAS Mann was skeptical of the hopeful
assumptions offered and stressed that the Government of
Nepal's (GON) failure to enforce the rule of law made the
GON's position in the negotiations particularly difficult.
National Peace Accord
--------------
2. (C) On October 5 USAID-contracted peace facilitator Hannes
Siebert (please protect) explained to visiting South and
Central Asian Affairs (SCA) Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary (PDAS) Steven Mann that the outlines of an
SIPDIS
overarching agreement were starting to take shape between the
Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) Government and the Maoists.
Siebert said that his team from the Academy for Educational
Development's Nepal Transition to Peace (NTTP) project had
been working with the Peace Secretariat in the Prime
Minister's Office to put together a seven-page "National
Peace Accord." The latest, sixth draft, dated September 25,
which had been shared with both sides, incorporated
provisions from all of the key documents agreed to by the SPA
and the Maoists as well as language from the draft Interim
Constitution. The idea was to attach the Interim
Constitution, the Ceasefire Agreement, the Human Rights
Accord and an arms management agreement as addenda to the
Peace Accord. The Peace Accord itself, as currently drafted,
Siebert revealed, also mandated the creation of certain
structures. They included: a National Peace Committee,
consisting of representatives of all 10 parliamentary
political parties, the Maoists and civil society; local Peace
Councils; a Joint Nepal Army (NA),People's Liberation Army
(PLA) (Maoist) and UN Task Group for Arms Management; and a
Joint Constituent Assembly and Constitution-Making
Commission. PDAS Mann received a copy of the draft accord
before departure.
Side-by-Side of Open Issues
--------------
3. (C) Peace facilitator Siebert (please protect) also shared
with PDAS Mann a summary from late September of the existing
proposals by the GON and the CPN-M regarding key open issues
including arms management, the interim legislature, executive
and judiciary, the monarchy, the constituent assembly, and
restructuring of the state and citizenship. On its face, the
document (which PDAS Mann received before departure) showed
that considerable differences remained between the two sides.
On arms management, for example, the Maoist proposal
envisioned restructuring of the PLA after constituent
assembly elections and the formation of a joint Nepal Police
and Maoist militia security force in the interim period. The
Armed Police Force was to be abolished. Regarding the
interim parliament, the Maoists proposed that 45 percent be
nominated by the SPA, 35 percent by the Maoists and 20
percent from civil society. They argued for the continuation
of people's courts at the local level. The CPN-M wanted the
monarchy suspended, while the SPA wanted the issue of the
monarchy decided by a referendum or by the constituent
assembly. The SPA called for a mixed direct-proportional
vote for the constituent assembly, the Maoists for
proportional only. The two sides also disagreed about the
structure of the state: the SPA left the decision to the
constituent assembly; the Maoists wanted a federal state
adopted immediately.
Long Way to Go
--------------
4. (C) Siebert commented that, in spite of the peace summit
scheduled for October 8, the two sides still had a long way
to go. On arms management, for example, the NTTP team had
tried to facilitate contacts between the NA and the PLA. The
goal was to raise their mutual comfort level. The UN, he
said, had also generated a number of helpful proposals.
There was still a lack of detail on this and other issues.
The latest Maoist proposal had come as a surprise: they would
lock up 50 percent of their weapons if the NA locked up 30
percent of its weapons. The two sides were also far apart on
the nature and the composition of the interim parliament.
The SPA wanted a large body with 300 plus members. The CPN-M
wanted a small body with 50. To date, they had also failed
to agree on the relative percentages. The peace facilitator
stated that one way to finesse that issue would be to adopt a
system oQconsensus.
What About the Militia and PLA?
--------------
5. (C) PDAS Mann asked what was going to happen with the
Maoist militia, to which Siebert replied that it was still
unclear. The Maoists claimed they had 35,000 soldiers in the
PLA. Most observers thought the number was closer to 15,000.
Part of the problem, Siebert said, was that we did not know
exactly who were PLA members and who were militia. At the
UN's insistence, the passage in the Peace Accord on arms
management and UN monitoring, referred to "armed personnel"
in order to avoid that ambiguity. USAID Mission Director
Clark noted the Maoists feared retaliation by the public if
they gave up all their weapons. As long as they had weapons,
however, they could intimidate people. Siebert said that the
PLA was terrified it would be wiped out by the NA. The
Maoists also feared armed Maoist splinter groups. Siebert's
NTTP colleague Retief Olivier added that many PLA combatants
wanted to leave the PLA and return home. To some degree,
putting the PLA into cantonments would help the Maoists by
allowing them to exercise control over these unwilling
recruits. It was also possible that people would attempt to
join the PLA because of the prospect that they would be fed
and clothed.
Maoist Intentions
--------------
6. (C) Questioning the facilitators' views, SCA PDAS asked
why we believed the Maoists would meet their commitments
after a peace deal if they were not meeting their commitments
now. What evidence did we have that they had abandoned their
goal of a people's dictatorship? Olivier brought up the
institution of peace councils that would bring both sides
together to resolve differences at the local level when and
where they arose. A USAID officer added that the Maoists had
been able to fulfill many of their movement's goals. They
could claim success. They had the prospect of attaining a
significant share of political power even if it was not the
total control they had desired. If their combatants were now
going to be fed and taken care of, they might be persuaded to
end the extortion and violence and give up their arms.
Siebert speculated that it might depend on the share of power
the CPN-M received. If they got less than 15 percent of the
seats in the interim parliament (and the interim government),
there would be a big problem. If they got a majority, there
would be a big problem. The question, he suspected, was
whether the Maoists would settle for 15-30 percent. Maoist
abuses were bad, but Siebert, a South African, said there
were 5,000 deaths during the months leading up to the peace
deal in South Africa. Since April in Nepal, Maoists had
killed 19. Another positive feature, the USAID officer
noted, was that the CPN-M was sensitive to public opinion,
and the public wanted peace.
Feeding the PLA
--------------
7. (C) Peace facilitator Siebert described the difficulty of
raising the approximately USD 10 million the Maoists wanted
per year to feed and clothe their combatants. The Maoists
had said they were fine with a food for work scheme, but even
that had not elicited much international support. Most
donors, Siebert said, were waiting for a peace agreement
before they would consider donating. The European Union, for
instance, had indicated they would discuss the matter in
December. That meant the money would not be available until
next summer, at the earliest, Siebert complained. Siebert
agreed with the GON that many of the law and order problems
could be solved if the Maoist combatants were in cantonments.
Then people could start to separate what was political and
what was crime. To this, PDAS Mann reiterated there was
still a fundamental asymmetry. As long as the Maoists were
an armed force, as long as they did not unequivocally
renounce violence, they posed a threat to the democratic
system. The government's failure to enforce the rule of law,
and to govern in general, threatened to have devastating
consequences for the negotiations and the country's future.
Comment
--------------
8. (C) It was clear from the meeting on October 5 that even
the USAID-contracted NTTP team, which has worked for months
to assist the Government of Nepal in preparing for peace
talks, is hard pressed to gauge the ultimate intentions of
the Maoists. Their inclination, however, is to believe that
an equitable outcome will emerge. They have played a crucial
role up until now in helping the often fractious SPA
government form a coherent position in the face of constant
Maoist gamesmanship and threats. The Nepalis will make the
final decisions about the Maoists' future role and the nature
of the state of Nepal themselves, but this is one case where
U.S. cooperation is playing a key role.
9. (U) PDAS Mann has cleared this message.
DEAN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: PEACE FACILITATORS BRIEF ON STATE OF PLAY
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nicholas Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) USAID-contracted peace facilitator Hannes Siebert
(please protect) told SCA PDAS Steven Mann and USAID Mission
Director Don Clark on October 5 that the Seven-Party Alliance
(SPA) and the Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M) had
narrowed their differences on key issues in the peace
process. The National Peace Accord was starting to come
together. Siebert pointed out, however, that there were
still considerable differences between the two sides.
Handling the Maoist People's Liberation Army (PLA) and
militia was going to be tricky. Ultimately, Siebert
admitted, we do not know the Maoists' intentions. He voiced
the hope that putting the Maoist combatants in cantonments,
if funds could be found, would bring about a big change in
Maoist behavior. PDAS Mann was skeptical of the hopeful
assumptions offered and stressed that the Government of
Nepal's (GON) failure to enforce the rule of law made the
GON's position in the negotiations particularly difficult.
National Peace Accord
--------------
2. (C) On October 5 USAID-contracted peace facilitator Hannes
Siebert (please protect) explained to visiting South and
Central Asian Affairs (SCA) Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary (PDAS) Steven Mann that the outlines of an
SIPDIS
overarching agreement were starting to take shape between the
Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) Government and the Maoists.
Siebert said that his team from the Academy for Educational
Development's Nepal Transition to Peace (NTTP) project had
been working with the Peace Secretariat in the Prime
Minister's Office to put together a seven-page "National
Peace Accord." The latest, sixth draft, dated September 25,
which had been shared with both sides, incorporated
provisions from all of the key documents agreed to by the SPA
and the Maoists as well as language from the draft Interim
Constitution. The idea was to attach the Interim
Constitution, the Ceasefire Agreement, the Human Rights
Accord and an arms management agreement as addenda to the
Peace Accord. The Peace Accord itself, as currently drafted,
Siebert revealed, also mandated the creation of certain
structures. They included: a National Peace Committee,
consisting of representatives of all 10 parliamentary
political parties, the Maoists and civil society; local Peace
Councils; a Joint Nepal Army (NA),People's Liberation Army
(PLA) (Maoist) and UN Task Group for Arms Management; and a
Joint Constituent Assembly and Constitution-Making
Commission. PDAS Mann received a copy of the draft accord
before departure.
Side-by-Side of Open Issues
--------------
3. (C) Peace facilitator Siebert (please protect) also shared
with PDAS Mann a summary from late September of the existing
proposals by the GON and the CPN-M regarding key open issues
including arms management, the interim legislature, executive
and judiciary, the monarchy, the constituent assembly, and
restructuring of the state and citizenship. On its face, the
document (which PDAS Mann received before departure) showed
that considerable differences remained between the two sides.
On arms management, for example, the Maoist proposal
envisioned restructuring of the PLA after constituent
assembly elections and the formation of a joint Nepal Police
and Maoist militia security force in the interim period. The
Armed Police Force was to be abolished. Regarding the
interim parliament, the Maoists proposed that 45 percent be
nominated by the SPA, 35 percent by the Maoists and 20
percent from civil society. They argued for the continuation
of people's courts at the local level. The CPN-M wanted the
monarchy suspended, while the SPA wanted the issue of the
monarchy decided by a referendum or by the constituent
assembly. The SPA called for a mixed direct-proportional
vote for the constituent assembly, the Maoists for
proportional only. The two sides also disagreed about the
structure of the state: the SPA left the decision to the
constituent assembly; the Maoists wanted a federal state
adopted immediately.
Long Way to Go
--------------
4. (C) Siebert commented that, in spite of the peace summit
scheduled for October 8, the two sides still had a long way
to go. On arms management, for example, the NTTP team had
tried to facilitate contacts between the NA and the PLA. The
goal was to raise their mutual comfort level. The UN, he
said, had also generated a number of helpful proposals.
There was still a lack of detail on this and other issues.
The latest Maoist proposal had come as a surprise: they would
lock up 50 percent of their weapons if the NA locked up 30
percent of its weapons. The two sides were also far apart on
the nature and the composition of the interim parliament.
The SPA wanted a large body with 300 plus members. The CPN-M
wanted a small body with 50. To date, they had also failed
to agree on the relative percentages. The peace facilitator
stated that one way to finesse that issue would be to adopt a
system oQconsensus.
What About the Militia and PLA?
--------------
5. (C) PDAS Mann asked what was going to happen with the
Maoist militia, to which Siebert replied that it was still
unclear. The Maoists claimed they had 35,000 soldiers in the
PLA. Most observers thought the number was closer to 15,000.
Part of the problem, Siebert said, was that we did not know
exactly who were PLA members and who were militia. At the
UN's insistence, the passage in the Peace Accord on arms
management and UN monitoring, referred to "armed personnel"
in order to avoid that ambiguity. USAID Mission Director
Clark noted the Maoists feared retaliation by the public if
they gave up all their weapons. As long as they had weapons,
however, they could intimidate people. Siebert said that the
PLA was terrified it would be wiped out by the NA. The
Maoists also feared armed Maoist splinter groups. Siebert's
NTTP colleague Retief Olivier added that many PLA combatants
wanted to leave the PLA and return home. To some degree,
putting the PLA into cantonments would help the Maoists by
allowing them to exercise control over these unwilling
recruits. It was also possible that people would attempt to
join the PLA because of the prospect that they would be fed
and clothed.
Maoist Intentions
--------------
6. (C) Questioning the facilitators' views, SCA PDAS asked
why we believed the Maoists would meet their commitments
after a peace deal if they were not meeting their commitments
now. What evidence did we have that they had abandoned their
goal of a people's dictatorship? Olivier brought up the
institution of peace councils that would bring both sides
together to resolve differences at the local level when and
where they arose. A USAID officer added that the Maoists had
been able to fulfill many of their movement's goals. They
could claim success. They had the prospect of attaining a
significant share of political power even if it was not the
total control they had desired. If their combatants were now
going to be fed and taken care of, they might be persuaded to
end the extortion and violence and give up their arms.
Siebert speculated that it might depend on the share of power
the CPN-M received. If they got less than 15 percent of the
seats in the interim parliament (and the interim government),
there would be a big problem. If they got a majority, there
would be a big problem. The question, he suspected, was
whether the Maoists would settle for 15-30 percent. Maoist
abuses were bad, but Siebert, a South African, said there
were 5,000 deaths during the months leading up to the peace
deal in South Africa. Since April in Nepal, Maoists had
killed 19. Another positive feature, the USAID officer
noted, was that the CPN-M was sensitive to public opinion,
and the public wanted peace.
Feeding the PLA
--------------
7. (C) Peace facilitator Siebert described the difficulty of
raising the approximately USD 10 million the Maoists wanted
per year to feed and clothe their combatants. The Maoists
had said they were fine with a food for work scheme, but even
that had not elicited much international support. Most
donors, Siebert said, were waiting for a peace agreement
before they would consider donating. The European Union, for
instance, had indicated they would discuss the matter in
December. That meant the money would not be available until
next summer, at the earliest, Siebert complained. Siebert
agreed with the GON that many of the law and order problems
could be solved if the Maoist combatants were in cantonments.
Then people could start to separate what was political and
what was crime. To this, PDAS Mann reiterated there was
still a fundamental asymmetry. As long as the Maoists were
an armed force, as long as they did not unequivocally
renounce violence, they posed a threat to the democratic
system. The government's failure to enforce the rule of law,
and to govern in general, threatened to have devastating
consequences for the negotiations and the country's future.
Comment
--------------
8. (C) It was clear from the meeting on October 5 that even
the USAID-contracted NTTP team, which has worked for months
to assist the Government of Nepal in preparing for peace
talks, is hard pressed to gauge the ultimate intentions of
the Maoists. Their inclination, however, is to believe that
an equitable outcome will emerge. They have played a crucial
role up until now in helping the often fractious SPA
government form a coherent position in the face of constant
Maoist gamesmanship and threats. The Nepalis will make the
final decisions about the Maoists' future role and the nature
of the state of Nepal themselves, but this is one case where
U.S. cooperation is playing a key role.
9. (U) PDAS Mann has cleared this message.
DEAN