Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU2734
2006-10-13 13:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

OCTOBER 15 PEACE AGREEMENT LIKELY

Tags:  PGOV PTER NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 3096
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RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0343
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1996
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002734 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: OCTOBER 15 PEACE AGREEMENT LIKELY

REF: A. KATHMANDU 2732

B. KATHMANDU 2700

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nicholas Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002734

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: OCTOBER 15 PEACE AGREEMENT LIKELY

REF: A. KATHMANDU 2732

B. KATHMANDU 2700

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nicholas Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) It appears that agreement on Maoist entry into the
interim government, arms management and the Constituent
Assembly could be reached at the October 15 Summit Talks.
October 13 discussions with USAID-contracted peace
facilitator Hannes Siebert, the Prime Minister's (PM's)
Defense Advisor Ramesh Jung Thapa and Seven Party Alliance
(SPA) talks team member Nidhi reflected consensus that
agreement on those key issues is close. Siebert reported
that on October 12 the Prime Minster Koirala offered
Prachanda his "Three Point Option," which consisted of the
following consecutive steps: 1) Maoists join an interim
government by November 15 with an agreement to lock up their
arms; 2) Maoists lock up their arms; and 3) the Government of
Nepal (GON) holds Constituent Assembly elections. Siebert
explained that the GON could still claim to have maintained
their arms management red line while the Maoists could assert
they were entering the GON with arms. Bottom line was that
arms management would result. In separate discussion, Thapa
declared agreement "80 percent" likely, emphasizing that the
GON had held firm on arms management. Emboff's discussions
with Bimalendra Nidhi, General Secretary of the Nepal
Congress - Democratic (NC-D) and talks team member, also
indicated that Prachanda had agreed to arms management. End
summary.

THE PM'S NEW "EVERYONE WINS" APPROACH
--------------


2. (C) USAID-contracted peace facilitator Hannes Siebert told
Charge and Acting USAID Director that Prime Minister G.P.
Koirala and Maoist leader Prachanda met on the morning of
October 12 and decided they would carry away an agreed
enthusiastic public message about the current status of the
talks while postponing the decisions initially scheduled for
that afternoon until October 15. This tracked with Siebert's
expectations (ref B). According to Siebert, all of the Seven
Party Alliance leaders were informed of the message and
postponement before scheduled talks began in the afternoon.
The PM chaired the afternoon talks, which only lasted two

hours, and asked Prachanda to explain the joint decision to
the rest of the team, a move Siebert praised as tactically
clever.

PM'S THREE POINT OPTION
--------------


3. (C) The PM had discussed with Prachanda his new "three
point option," which called for sequential Maoist entry into
an interim government by November 15 with an agreement to
lock up their arms, followed by a lock up of Maoist arms, and
then Constituent Assembly elections. Siebert described this
new tactic as a "sly gimmick" by the PM, as it would allow
the GON to achieve arms management without forcing the
Maoists to lose face. According to Siebert, the PM had
successfully twisted Prachanda's arm. While the Maoists
publicly blamed the GON for delaying talks, the Maoist side
actually needed time to assess this new situation. More
importantly, Prachanda needed time to sell the deal to his
cadre. While arms management details had not yet been
finalized, the initial proposal foresaw 20-30 percent of the
Nepal Army's arms "locked up" while the Maoists would
immediately lock up 50 percent and the rest by elections.
Siebert emphasized that he did not expect Nepal Army (NA)
weapons to be locked up, but rather kept in their usual
armories under NA control with some sort of breakable seal.
He welcomed the new-found willingness of the UN team headed
by Ian Martin to immediately engage in tripartite arms
management discussions with the GON and Maoists. UN
expertise would be vital to making any formula work.


4. (C) Charge welcomed this new approach, but questioned how
it could be described as a win-win situation. How could the
government say to the public that it continued to hold the
line on arms management with the Maoists saying they managed
to enter the interim government before disarming? Siebert
explained that the Prime Minster had not taken any of the
government's positions off the table, but only rearranged the
language so that an agreement to manage arms was now the
focal point, rather than simply arms management. According
to Siebert, the PM had created a sequential package that
still required the Maoists to lock up their arms. He noted
that the GON reserved the right to cancel elections should
the Maoists fail to surrender their weapons.

MAOIST ENTRY INTO GON, CANTONMENT
--------------


5. (C) Siebert said an agreement under which the Maoists
would enter government within 30 days of signature, and enter
cantonment three days after signing, would greatly reduce
Maoist extortion, abductions and violence. Siebert
recognized that this construct left a huge time gap in which
the GON itself would have to handle cantonment preparation
and administration until the UN could staff up to monitor the
People Liberation Army (PLA) cantonments. Funding would be a
critical issue, which could perhaps be addressed by GON
borrowing. He suggested that the World Bank or the
Norwegians would be open to funding the cantonments,
including feeding the Maoists.

CHAOTIC TALKS PROCESS
--------------


6. (C) Siebert lamented that the Summit Talks completely fell
into free-for-all chaos whenever the PM left the room,
because none of the Party or Maoist leaders would support
each other's leadership. To improve the situation and
initiate some house cleaning of the many points now on the
table, the peace facilitation team had provided procedural
mechanisms and points of order that they hoped to get on the
October 15 agenda. If successful, Siebert expected
subsequent meetings of technical working groups to follow.

NEPAL ARMY INTERFERENCE?
--------------


7. (C) Siebert warned Charge that NA officials had intimated
that the NA was considering a statement conveying its support
for the monarchy. Siebert reported that he strongly advised
the NA officials to stay out of the political arena, abide by
Army Chief of Staff General Katawal's public support for
civilian rule, and focus on the technical implementation of
any agreements. He described the rumored statement as
potentially very damaging to the peace process.

PM DEFENSE ADVISOR OPTIMISTIC
--------------


8. (C) Prime Minister Koirala's Defense Advisor Ramesh Jung
Thapa welcomed Charge's reiteration of strong U.S. support
for the Seven Party Alliance GON in high-pressure talks with
the Maoists, especially its strong stance insisting on
separation of Maoists from their arms. Thapa declared that
he was 80 percent confident that an agreement would be
reached with the Maoists on arms management on October 15.
The PM's Defense Advisor credited the hard line taken by the
United States, and to a lesser extent India, with a critical
role in this positive development. Thapa noted that in
discussions with Prime Minister Koirala, Maoist Supremo
Prachanda had agreed with the PM that the terms of Maoist
arms management had to be acceptable to the international
community. Thapa underscored his view that implementation of
arms management would be complex and difficult and require
expertise from the NA as well as international support from
the UN. He emphasized the NA's acceptance of civilian
control and its divorce from the monarchy. Thapa noted that
he had heard of the rumored pro-royal statement. He
insisted, however, that the NA was loyal and that the GON and
COAS Katawal, whom he trusted implicitly, would prevent any
missteps.

SPA TALKS TEAM MEMBER CONFIDENT
--------------


9. (C) Emboff's separate discussions with Bimalendra Nidhi,
General Secretary of the Nepal Congress - Democratic (NC-D)
and member of the talks team, further suggested that the
entire gamut of agreements, including separating the Maoists
from their arms vis-a-vis establishing an interim government
and a Constituent Assembly could result from the October 15
Summit meeting. Nidhi told Emboff that on October 12
Prachanda and the Communist Party Nepal - United
Marxist-Leninst (CPN-UML) boss Madhar Kumar Nepal had agreed
to NC and NC-D proposals postponing the issue of the monarchy
until the Constituent Assembly polls, rather insisting on an
immediate stand alone referendum on the monarchy. According
to Nidhi, in October 12 meetings with Prachanda, both the PM
and NC-D President Deuba continued to insist that any
fruitful resolution required the Maoists to first agree to
separate themselves from their arms. They reportedly said
that neither an interim parliament could be formed nor a
Constituent Assembly poll date set without arms management
being settled.


10. (C) Nidhi reported that Prachanda had emphasized that
separation of arms was a sensitive issue and needed to be
handled in a phased manner, in particular to gain the
acceptance of the Maoist rank and file. Prachanda reportedly
further agreed to confine the Maoist PLA into cantonments in
the first phase, lock up arms under UN supervision in the
second phase, and then separate the Maoist PLA from their
arms. However, Nidhi said Prachanda had warned that his own
agreement to arms separation did not indicate that the PLA
Commanders would also agree. Much persuasion would be
required.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Indications are that a GON-Maoist peace agreement
sequentially laying out each step of arms management, interim
government formation and a constituent assembly could be
reached at the October 15 Summit Talks. While far from a
panacea, such an agreement would be a further step towards
peace in Nepal, accelerating a long-stalled peace process
towards a lasting peace. The exact terms of the deal remain
unclear, and the devil is very much in the detail in this
case. Any agreement would be at the political level and in
principle, and would require meticulous follow-on
negotiations to implement. Should an agreement be reached,
the United States should be prepared to move quickly to
welcome the development as a step forward in the peace
process while reserving judgment on the details, in
particular of Maoist arms management. What happens next will
require close scrutiny, careful attention and continued
support for the GON by the United States. The prospect of
imminent Maoist entry into government raises a host of other
issues partially addressed in ref A. Embassy will report
significant developments as they occur.
DEAN