IAN MARTIN'S SHOP STAFFED UP AND POISED TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002733

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PARM UN NP
SUBJECT: IAN MARTIN'S SHOP STAFFED UP AND POISED TO
RUN...BUT WHERE?

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nicholas J. Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) In consultations October 12 with Charge and SCA/INS
Director Marcia Bernicat, the UN Secretary General's Personal
Representative to Nepal, Ian Martin, and Tamrat Samuel,
visiting UN Political Advisor expressed measured optimism on
the progress of GON-Maoist summit talks. Martin seemed
poised to engage more substantially in "tripartite
discussions" with the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) and Maoists
on the parameters of possible UN assistance. He said
tripartite talks could provide a way for the UN to offer
expertise and best practices on the details of complex
settlement issues such as arms management and electoral
reform. Martin felt his core team of four, all of whom will
arrive by early next week, may be coming in the nick of time
to provide what may be far-reaching UN assistance.

SEVEN-PARTY ALLIANCE-MAOIST-UN TRIPARTITE DISCUSSION?
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2. (C) Ian Martin, the UN Secretary General's Personal
Representative to Nepal, expressed the UN's willingness to
immediately engage in "tripartite discussions" between the
SPA, Maoists and UN to hammer out the parameters of UN
assistance. Martin said tripartite talks may also offer the
opportunity for the UN to inject worldwide experience and
best practices in arms management, electoral reform and other
complex issues critical to the peace process. Martin said the
SPA is eager for such a dialogue, already reaching out to the
UN on possible models for arms management, but the Maoists
need more time. Martin felt formal tripartite talks will
likely have to wait until at least the outline of a peace
deal is in place.

MARTIN TEAM STAFFING UP; MANDATE QUESTIONS ON HOLD
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3. (U) Martin expressed relief that most of his team had
arrived or would arrive in the next few days to prepare for
possible outcomes of the summit talks. The permanent team
includes Electoral Advisor Ecaterina Salvu (Romanian),who
arrived October 10; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO) Military Advisor Jan Erick Wilhemson (Norway),who
also arrived October 10; Political Advisor John Norris, a
former International Crisis Group (ICG) Analyst for Nepal,
arriving October 15; and Ceasefire Monitoring Expert John
Bevan (U.S.) arriving October 16. Tamrat Samuels is joining
the team on a temporary basis in his capacity as a long-time
Nepal watcher from the UN Department of Political Affairs.


4. (C) Although anticipating the potential for an increased
UN role, Martin said more clarity was needed regarding the
parameters of a peace deal before he re-engaged New York on
the scope of his mandate and possible funding needs. Until
tripartite discussions were held, it would be difficult to
know what would be expected from his team.

UN PERSPECTIVES ON ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS
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5. (C) Martin and Samuels had few additional details on
agreements reached in the day's GON-Maoist summit talks.
However, they referenced a general feeling of "optimism"
among the negotiating parties despite the complex details yet
to be decided. They felt public expectations for a
settlement were providing sufficient pressure on the parties
to produce results. Martin and Samuels said that, while
still chaotic in comparison to their Maoist counterparts, the
SPA had shown improvements in putting forth a coherent and
consensus message based on both internal party consultations
and cross-party communication.

UN ON MAOIST INTENTIONS
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6. (SBU) Bernicat asked Martin and Samuels for any insights
on Maoist intentions and plans. Martin referenced three
tracks in which the UN had engaged the Maoists: 1) the

political track, through Samuels ongoing UN/DPA
consultations; 2) the human rights track through the UN
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights' (OHCHR)
dialogue and efforts to sensitize the Maoists on
international human rights norms; and 3) through UN
humanitarian activities in Nepal, educating the Maoists on
humanitarian principles and Basic Operating Guidelines (BOGs)
to ensure continued humanitarian space for activities. These
three tracks, Martin said, had allowed the UN access to the
Maoists at both the central political and local levels and
provided some opening to inform Maoists of international
standards and expectations vis-a-vis their participation in
the peace process.


7. (C) Martin said he perceived the Maoists to have very
sophisticated political and military leadership. However, he
felt there was a lack of clarity regarding the strength of
the Maoist command-and-control structure, referencing local
Maoist "autonomous" structures that had become a bit "too
autonomous," as well as the rise in localized and
opportunistic criminality, extortion, and abductions. He
questioned the ability of Maoist political and military
leadership to "order down" commands and mentioned that a
settlement may leave Maoist Chairman Prachanda with an
enormous internal management challenge.


8. (C) Martin and Samuels reiterated what Bernicat was told
by many in previous consultations--there are an abundance of
conflicting signs in terms of Maoist intentions. Martin and
Samuels stressed the difficulty of understanding Maoist goals
until they are brought into governance structures under a
peace settlement. Only at this juncture, Martin said, could
the Nepali people and the international community have the
ability to hold Maoists accountable and provide monitoring
and oversight.

UN ON KEY NEGOTIATION ISSUES
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9. (SBU) ON ARMS MANAGEMENT: Martin said he felt the SPA was
hanging tough on the arms management issue, inferring that
U.S. statements may have helped them focus on arms management
as a central issue to a successful settlement. He emphasized
the danger of the parties agreeing on interim steps (i.e.
cantonment) without delineating what the next steps, or a
more holistic and sustainable plan, would entail (e.g.
separation of arms, an eventual plan for Maoist
reintegration, or possible Maoist absorption into future
security forces).


10. (SBU) ON THE CENTER VS. PERIPHERY DIVIDE: Samuels
referenced the importance in the peace process of looking
beyond just capital-centric political solutions to some of
the underlying causes of conflict plaguing the country,
specifically the need for the reassertion of governance and
law-and-order outside of Kathmandu. He also connected the
expansion of governance and security in the countryside to
the feasibility of holding nation-wide free and fair
elections. He raised the notion of mirroring power-sharing
between the Maoists and the SPA in the capital with joint
local administration in the districts that included
international oversight, replacing parallel Maoist systems as
necessary. Samuels emphasized the localized nature of
conflict, stating that district-level structures would have
to be designed to fit diverse local conditions and population
needs.


11. (SBU) ON ELECTORAL REFORM: Martin said that UN electoral
experts had concluded that it would be very difficult, but
not impossible, to have constituent assembly elections before
the beginning of the monsoon in June. Martin said he felt
raising doubts on the timeline at this stage would not be
helpful to the process, as it may undermine trust-building
efforts between the parties. He preferred to let planning
for the elections unfold, and for the UN to insert expertise
as possible on steps necessary for a successful electoral
process.

COMMENT
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12. (C) While Martin seems relieved to have his team in
place, he expressed some discomfort regarding his lack of
control over the UN's imminent role in peace implementation.
Based on the summit talks, a huge and complex set of
responsibilities may land quickly in his lap. His
willingness to initiate tripartite talks immediately may
offer the UN's best chance to shape some of the technical
aspects of a peace deal it will be expected to help
implement. Martin and Samuels seem skeptical of the capacity
of the negotiating teams to independently navigate the
complex details and parallel issues that must be addressed
for settlement. The potential for an increased UN role
raises many funding and mandate questions which will have to
be sorted out quickly.


13. (C) Martin hinted that the U.S. had been successful in
raising arms management as a central issue in the peace
process, but that the international community must now
support the Nepalis through the broader range of difficult
issues required for settlement. Martin inferred that the UN,
as the accepted "popular kids" in town, should be used as the
principal venue for shepherding international support. The
United States should continue to strongly support the UN's
role in Nepal's peace process.


14. (U) SCA/INS Director Marcia Bernicat did not have the
opportunity to clear this message.
DEAN