NORWEGIAN/DANISH AMBASSADORS FAVOR MAOIST

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002732

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL NP
SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN/DANISH AMBASSADORS FAVOR MAOIST
ENGAGEMENT OVER ALIENATION


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nicholas J. Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) In a luncheon October 12 with SCA/INS Director Marcia
Bernicat and Charge, Ambassador Finn Thilsted of Denmark and
Ambassador Tore Toreng of Norway stressed the need for Maoist
outreach and engagement to ensure a viable peace process,
while Indian Political Counsellor Prabhat Kumar remained
consistent with the U.S. position on the need for arms
management first. Both Ambassadors expressed hope that the
international community could put forth a unified message in
response to whatever peace settlement results from ongoing
summit talks. Danish Ambassador Thilsted challenged the U.S.
on its arms management focus, and all guests were curious as
to the U.S. planned response for potential Maoist entry into
government.

ENGAGING MAOISTS AS MEANS TO ADVANCE A VIABLE PEACE PROCESS
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2. (C) In October 12 discussions, SCA/INS Director Bernicat
asked the Danish and Norwegian Ambassadors and Indian
Political Counsellor Kumar for their reaction to a
recommendation Joint Secretary Battarai had made that the
U.S. should engage the Maoists as a means to influence their
positive participation in the peace process. The Norwegian
and Danish Ambassadors agreed emphatically with this notion
as the viewpoint of their own governments. As long as the
Maoists subscribe to international norms as participants in
the negotiation process, both Ambassadors felt that
engagement and outreach to the Maoists was central to
advancing the peace process.


3. (C) The Norwegian Ambassador said Maoist engagement may
provide an opening to answer many unknowns--e.g. Maoist
political intentions and plans and policies vis-a-vis issues
such as economics and security. He also mentioned that
engagement could assist in reducing the potential of internal
Maoist splits--ensuring that recognized Maoist leadership
would have the clout to negotiate a transition process. The
Danish Ambassador reiterated that, since the Government of
Nepal recognized the Maoists as a negotiating partner, the
international community must do the same. Charge said Maoist
engagement assumed Maoists were responsible participants in
the peace process, and ignored the reality of continued
Maoist intimidation and fear tactics in violation of the
ceasefire code of conduct.

THE DANGEROUS SIDE OF MAOIST ENGAGEMENT: WORTH THE RISK?
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4. (C) Bernicat raised the potential dangerous side of Maoist
engagement, stating that perhaps the Maoists had no intention
of positive participation in a transitional governance
structure but were rather orchestrating the full realization
of their power-holding agenda. Bernicat said the Maoists,
despite recent rhetoric, may remain tied to an ideologue
agenda rather than genuinely wish to engage as political
pragmatists as the Norwegian and Danish Ambassadors assumed.
The Danish Ambassador said that in meetings he held with
Maoist Chairman Prachanda, he felt the leadership had a
genuine interest in peaceful and democratic solutions and in
joining the political mainstream. He also emphasized that
the Maoists did not have the capacity (arms, personnel) nor
the influence over the Nepali population to turn Nepal into a
Maoist state.


5. (C) The Norwegian Ambassador said the international
community could not be sure of Maoist intentions without
letting the peace process unfold. He reiterated the need to
"trust the process" and if there were indeed a "negative
outcome" the international community could then provide the
needed oversight and influence to check Maoist aggression.

CHALLENGING THE U.S. ON ARMS MANAGEMENT FOCUS
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6. (C) Danish Ambassador Thilsted questioned the U.S. focus
and repetitive public pronouncements on the arms management

issue, asserting that it put the U.S. in a sticky situation
if the Maoists do come into government and that the Nepali
population was increasingly frustrated at what they perceived
as U.S. meddling in a Nepali-owned process. Ambassador
Thilsted thought U.S. statements were perceived as a
one-issue agenda rather than reflecting wider U.S. interest
in a legitimate transition process leading to multi-party
democracy. He expressed little concern over Maoists
retaining arms, emphasizing that the Maoists' entry into
government would force their accountability.


7. (C) Charge responded that the U.S. was speaking up where
the GON could not due to Maoist intimidation. He reiterated
the danger to the peace process and to any transitional
governance scheme if the Maoists were accepted with arms.
Indian Political Counsellor Kumar seconded this sentiment.

MAOISTS IN GOVERNMENT: WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?
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8. (C) All three diplomats were interested in U.S. plans for
a possible Maoist entry into government. The Norwegian
Ambassador urged a unified donor response to any agreement as
a powerful oversight mechanism for the implementation
process. He mentioned that the EU was already devising a
joint approach and both the Norwegian and Danish Ambassadors
referenced ongoing planning within their offices and
development agencies regarding Maoist entry into government.


9. (C) Charge and Bernicat emphasized the particular U.S.
policy and legislative contraints present in regard to Maoist
entry into government. Charge mentioned U.S. consideration
of what response would be needed in the event of Maoist
entry, and emphasized that the parameters by which the
Maoists entered government (e.g. with or without arms, in
cantonment sites, etc.) would likely influence U.S. response.

COMMENT
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10. (C) As Bernicat has heard in various consultations, many
believe the only way to force Maoist accountability is
through engagement and their entry into governance
structures. While Ambassador Thilsted brushed off the
assertion that the Europeans may be displaying "naivete" in
accepting that the Maoists had honorable intentions, their
plan to "wait and see" how events unfold and then deal with
any negative consequences leaves something to be desired.


11. (C) With the imminent potential of summit results, the
U.S. dilemma on Maoist engagement necessitates quick
contingency planning regarding Maoist entry into government,
including legislative and policy parameters that would need
to be addressed under various scenarios. If a settlement
does occur, the Danish and Norwegian Ambassadors seem eager
to work with the U.S. on a joint message, underscoring a
shared interest in multi-party democracy in Nepal and shying
away from any diverse viewpoints on the arms management
issue. To respond quickly to summit results and pursue joint
messaging with international partners, the USG will need
policy clarity regarding the U.S. ability to engage a GON
that includes Maoists.


12. (U) SCA/INS Director Bernicat did not have an opportunity
to clear this message.
DEAN