Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU2636
2006-09-28 13:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

JAPANESE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTS UNGA RESOLUTION ON

Tags:  PGOV PTER JP NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4835
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 5064
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0215
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 3062
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4458
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0297
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0990
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1979
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002636 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER JP NP
SUBJECT: JAPANESE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTS UNGA RESOLUTION ON
ARMS MANAGEMENT

REF: KATHMANDU 2587

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002636

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER JP NP
SUBJECT: JAPANESE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTS UNGA RESOLUTION ON
ARMS MANAGEMENT

REF: KATHMANDU 2587

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a September 27 meeting with the Ambassador,
Japanese Ambassador Tsutomu Hiraoka acknowledged that, while
a resolution from the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
on arms management was an option, the Government of Nepal was
not very interested in the idea. The Ambassador explained
that the Government of India, as well as the Maoists, seemed
to oppose a large UN role in Nepal. The Ambassador told
Hiraoka that all direct USG assistance to GON would have to
cease if armed Maoists were allowed in the government. He
also stressed that, if the Maoists did not get what they
wanted at the negotiating table before the end of October,
they would likely begin fomenting a third people's movement
that could lead to urban violence targeted at the GON.

JAPANESE SUGGEST UNGA RESOLUTION ON ARMS MANAGEMENT
-------------- --------------


2. (C) During a September 27 meeting with the Ambassador,
Japanese Ambassador Tsutomu Hiraoka suggested that an UNGA
resolution on arms management could be an viable option to
solving the arms management impasse between the GON and
Maoists. Hiraoka, however, was quick to add that the GON did
not seem keen on this idea. The Ambassador explained that
the Government of India (GOI) was not in favor of a large UN
role in Nepal. He said the GOI would not favorably view a UN
Security Council resolution and would likely be just as set
against an UNGA resolution. The Ambassador added that the
Maoists also were against a large UN presence here but that
both the GOI and Maoists could agree to a small civilian UN
presence for something like arms management. Ambassador
Hiraoka noted that Nepal's Ambassador to the UN in New York
was against UN Security Council action as well.

CURIOSITY OVER USG POSITION IF ARMED MAOISTS ALLOWED IN GON
-------------- --------------


3. (C) In response to a question from his Japanese
counterpart, the Ambassador explained that he was worried
Nepali Congress (NC) negotiators still had not developed a
concrete plan on arms management. He said he had heard
several people say that the GON might allow the Maoists into
the government without resolving the arms management issue.
The Ambassador stated that, if armed Maoists joined the GON,
the USG would have to cease all direct USG funding to the
GON, which would amount to approximately USD 1 million out of
USD 45 million in total USG assistance to Nepal. Hiraoka was
curious whether the Ambassador would come out with any public
statements should armed Maoists join the GON. The Ambassador
replied that he would seek guidance from Washington in that
event.

MAOIST STRENGTH LARGELY A BLUFF?
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador stressed that the appearance of Maoist
strength was largely a bluff, caused by GON unwillingness to
enforce law and order (reftel). He argued that the longer
the Maoists were allowed to undercut the GON, the longer it
would take for the GON to turn the situation around. The
Ambassador opined that, if the Maoists did not get what they
wanted at the negotiating table between Nepal's Dashain
(September 29 - October 4) and Tihar (October 21 - 24)
holidays, they would likely gear up for a third people's
movement, which could lead to urban fighting targeted
directly at the GON.

COMMENT
--------------


5. (C) The Japanese continue to be curious about the USG
position on providing assistance should armed Maoists join
the GON. They appear to be inclined to adopt a position

similar to ours should armed Maoists join the GON. In the
past, the Government of Japan has helpfully stressed the need
for arms management before the Maoists join an interim
government. We should continue to coordinate closely with
the Government of Japan on Nepal.

MORIARTY