Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU2634
2006-09-28 13:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR TELLS DANISH AMBASSADOR AND VATICAN

Tags:  PGOV PTER PREF DA VT BT NP 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002634 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

ROME PLEASE PASS TO VATICAN CITY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREF DA VT BT NP
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR TELLS DANISH AMBASSADOR AND VATICAN
ENVOY: BIGGEST CONCERN SHOULD BE PEACE NOT PROCESS


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002634

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

ROME PLEASE PASS TO VATICAN CITY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREF DA VT BT NP
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR TELLS DANISH AMBASSADOR AND VATICAN
ENVOY: BIGGEST CONCERN SHOULD BE PEACE NOT PROCESS


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) In a meeting on September 26 with Danish Ambassador
Thilstead and another on September 28 with Vatican Nuncio
Quintana on September 28, the Ambassador stressed that
Nepal's peace process was important, but most important was
the outcome. Ambassador Thilstead, who had just hosted his
Minister of Development Cooperation, emphasized his
government's differences with U.S. policy. He repeatedly
spoke of the importance of keeping the process going and was
skeptical that the Maoists could take over and establish a
people's republic. The Ambassador disagreed, saying the risk
was a real one. Archbishop Quintana maintained that it was
crucial to have peace, but he agreed with the Ambassador that
peace at any price was no peace at all. He shared the
Ambassador's conviction that the Government of Nepal had to
enforce law and order. Thilstead also took the opportunity
of the September 26 meeting to raise his concern about the
lack of a solution to the problem of the Bhutanese refugees.

For Dane, Process Is Key
--------------


2. (C) After expressing his condolences to the Ambassador
about the September 23 helicopter crash, Ambassador Thilstead
stated outright that the Danish Government did not see
Nepal's peace process the same way the United States and
India saw it. It was extremely important, he said, to keep
the process going. He said that in her meetings with a range
of Nepalis his Minister of Development Cooperation Ulla
Thoraes, who was in Nepal for four days until September 22,
had heard that same message. The momentum, Thilstead said,
needed to be maintained. He was critical of the Seven Party
Alliance (SPA) government for not doing enough to break the
"stalemate" in the peace talks. Efforts needed to be
redoubled to bring the Maoists into the mainstream.

Outcome Is What Matters
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador Thilstead wondered aloud why the Ambassador
seemed so determined to criticize the Communist Party of
Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) and complicate the peace process when
the end was in sight. Was it truly U.S. policy he asked?
The Ambassador was firm in his response. What he was saying
was no different from what every senior USG official had said
in recent months, including Senator Specter and Congressman
Kolbe: before they could enter an interim government, the
Maoists had to give up their arms. Ambassador Thilstead
argued the U.S. was asking too much. How could the U.S. (and
India) expect the Maoists to be completely separated from
their arms before a political deal? The Ambassador said that
the USG was not going to tell the Government of Nepal how in
detail to handle the issue of Maoist arms management. What
mattered was the outcome: would the CPN-M still be able to
threaten and terrorize the population?

Real Threat of a People's Republic
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador pointed out to his Danish counterpart
that many people had ridiculed him two years earlier when he
had first begun drawing attention to the possibility of a
Maoist takeover of Nepal. Now, he stated, Maoist Supremo
Prachanda and his comrades were close to achieving their
goal. It was ridiculous, he said, for people to accuse him
of upsetting the peace process when it was the Maoists who
were the ones threatening, abducting and killing innocent
civilians. Ambassador Thilstead claimed that the situation
was no different than before. The Ambassador sharply
differed. Things were very different: before the CPN-M cadre
were in the countryside, now they were running amok in

Kathmandu, too. The threat of a Maoist takeover was real.
The Maoists were preparing to implement Lenin's tactics of a
short, violent push against a weak, bourgeois government if
it did not give them what they wanted at the negotiating
table.

For Vatican Envoy, Process Important, But Peace Had to Be Real
-------------- --------------


5. (C) In a meeting on September 28, the Ambassador and the
Papal Nuncio, who was visiting Nepal from his post in New
Delhi, found their outlooks to have much in common.
Archbishop Quintana spoke of the people's need for peace
after 10 years of war. He had met, he said, the previous day
with Prachanda and other senior Maoist leaders and had
preached to them about the need for peace. They had, he
stated, promised they wanted to join the political mainstream
and would respect religious freedom if they came to power.
The Papal envoy told the Ambassador that it was important to
try to engage the Maoists, but he wholeheartedly agreed that
the process could not be the end in itself. The parties
should not be so foolish as to commit suicide by allowing the
Maoists to take over completely. The Archbishop said the
Catholic Church had a long experience with the horrors of
Communism -- in Europe and elsewhere in the world. He agreed
with the Ambassador that it was important to look beneath the
Maoists' words to their actions. He voiced distress that the
GON seemed to be turning a blind eye to Maoist threats and
extortion. The Ambassador agreed; it was long since time to
enforce law and order.

Problem of Bhutanese Refugees
--------------


6. (C) Ambassador Thilstead told the Ambassador that the
Danish Government was very concerned about the continuing
stalemate over the Bhutanese refugees. He was convinced, he
said, that the Government of Bhutan had no intention of
accepting back any refugees, ever. The Ambassador agreed.
In response to a request for ideas, the Ambassador noted that
he had attempted to persuade the Government of India to take
some step to reassure the GON that it would not allow any
further expulsions. That might then provide a basis for the
international community to put pressure on the GON to allow
third-country resettlement. The USG was prepared, he said,
to accept large numbers and, with the help of other
countries, the issue could be resolved. If the problem
lingered, Maoist infiltration would eventually destroy any
chance of third-country resettlement.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) The Danish envoy is the most outspoken of those
members of the diplomatic community who are willing to
tolerate Maoist abuses in their desire to see peace. We will
continue our efforts to stress the risks to the country and
the region of a peace that is not based on an end to Maoist
violence.
MORIARTY