AMBASSADOR UNDERSCORES SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002620

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UK NP
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR UNDERSCORES SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION
FOR BRITISH STATE MINISTER

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1373

B. KATHMANDU 2587

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
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1. (C) During a September 25 meeting with the British
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Dr.
Kim Howells and British Ambassador Dr. Andrew Hall, the
Ambassador strongly reinforced the need for the separation of
Maoists from their weapons. The Ambassador stated that he
thought that continued Maoist atrocities were part of a bluff
aimed at toppling the Government of Nepal (GON) through
political intimidation rather than military might. The
Ambassador stressed the need for the GON to use the security
forces to enforce law and order. Howell initially suggested
that the Maoist issue might be similar to the Northern
Ireland problem, but the Ambassador pointed out that Nepal's
Maoists appeared to believe they were on the verge of
victory, in marked contrast to the situation in Northern
Ireland. The Ambassador stated that the U.S. would need to
reevaluate all assistance to the GON if the Maoists entered
the government before separating from their weapons. Howells
acknowledged the gloomy outlook for the future of the peace
process in Nepal.

Separation of Maoists and Weapons Key
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2. (C) During a September 25 meeting, the Ambassador stressed
to Kim Howells, British Minister of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, and British Ambassador Andrew Hall the
need to separate the Maoists from their weapons before they
entered the government. Howells said that, during a meeting
with Prime Minister Koirala, Koirala kept insisting that arms
management was the most important issue on the table
currently. Howells also shared that, in a meeting with Chief
of Army Staff General Katawal, Katawal seemed pessimistic
about the process of arms management. The Ambassador
disputed the British Ambassador's assertion that the Maoists
might be prepared to enter into a peaceful democratic process
in order to gain international legitimacy, stating that
Maoist actions indicated they were more interested in power
than in gaining international legitimacy. The Ambassador
reiterated his hope that PM Koirala would stick to his guns
about arms separation but feared that Home Minister and chief
GON negotiator Sitaula would attempt to persuade the PM to
give in on the issue, thereby opening the door for the
Maoists to come to power quickly.

Maoist Intimidation Part of a Bluff
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3. (C) The Ambassador told Howells that the current Maoist
atrocities across the country appeared to be part of a bluff
aimed at toppling the GON through intimidation. The
Ambassador noted that, since the Maoists could not beat the
GON security forces in a military battle, they were opting
for a political victory. To this end, the Maoists had
increased threats and extortion against businesspeople and
politicians to pressure the GON to capitulate on every issue
during peace negotiations. The Ambassador informed Howells
that he had been pushing the GON to start using the security
forces to restore law and order country-wide in order to
create an environment conducive to peace. However, thus far,
the GON had been loathe to take this step for fear of pushing
the Maoists away from the negotiating table and collapsing
the peace process.

Maoists Must Be Held Accountable
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4. (C) In response to Howells' suggestion that a possible
solution to the conflict could be found through small,
incremental steps leading to a peace treaty with milestones
and measurements similar to the Northern Ireland peace
process, the Ambassador stated that, unless the Maoists were
separated from their arms, such a process would likely not be

successful. The Ambassador pointed out the importance of
holding the Maoists accountable and responsible for living up
to the milestones already in existence in the 25-point
cease-fire Code of Conduct (Ref A). The Maoists had been
breaking the Code of Conduct continuously and no one had been
holding them accountable. The Ambassador questioned Howells
as to why the Maoists would stick to an agreement when they
did not have to and were so close to grabbing power without
following the rules. Howells agreed that the situation
looked "gloomy" and pessimistic.

U.S. Assistance Would Be Affected by Maoist Takeover
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5. (C) Howells inquired about the potential U.S. response if
the Maoists were to enter the government while still in
possession of their weapons. The Ambassador responded that
the U.S. would likely stop all assistance to the GON and
reevaluate other assistance to Nepal. The Ambassador also
suggested that other countries would likely have problems
with a Maoist-controlled government, such as India. The
Ambassador stressed that a Maoist-dominated government in
Nepal could destabilize South Asia if it chose to support
Naxalite movements in northern India. The Indian government
would then have to decide how to respond, while factoring in
the likely Chinese reaction. Howells agreed that such an
outcome would be very problematic.

Comment
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6. (C) Although Howells seemed well-informed about the
situation in Nepal, it was clear during the meeting that he
had not been briefed fully on the U.S. position and that the
British Embassy's views were different from what the
Ambassador told him. Howells appeared to take the
suggestions and comments of the Ambassador seriously and
seemed somber about the situation in Nepal after the meeting.
Post will continue to buck up the British Embassy here to
take a strong line against inclusion of the Maoists in the
Government of Nepal until separated from their weapons.
MORIARTY