Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU2598
2006-09-25 11:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

PARTIAL PEACE DEAL POSSIBLE BEFORE DASHAIN?

Tags:  PGOV PTER NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002598 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: PARTIAL PEACE DEAL POSSIBLE BEFORE DASHAIN?

REF: KATHMANDU 2491

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002598

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: PARTIAL PEACE DEAL POSSIBLE BEFORE DASHAIN?

REF: KATHMANDU 2491

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) On September 22, peace facilitator Hannes Siebert and
UN Secretary General Annan's representative to the peace
process Ian Martin told the Ambassador that the Government of
Nepal and the Maoists were getting closer to agreement on
several of the key peace documents. There were also, they
said, ongoing discussions, about how the peace structures
could be made more effective and resilient and the proper
role for the UN. The peace facilitator expressed frustration
that thus far the other donors had chosen to remain on the
sidelines. In a meeting with the Pol-Econ chief, also on the
22nd, a senior Home Ministry official went so far as to
predict a peace deal the week of September 25, before the
Dashain holiday. Siebert warned, however, that the crucial
issue of Maoist arms management had not yet been resolved.
End Summary.

Government Team Makes Progress
--------------


2. (C) USAID-contracted peace facilitator Hannes Siebert told
the Ambassador September 29 that the Government of Nepal
(GON) had made considerable progress in the previous week in
finalizing its position on several of the key peace progress
documents. Those documents include a Cease-fire Agreement, a
Human Rights Accord and a Peace Accord. (Note: The current
cease-fire is based on unilateral declarations in late April
by both the GON and the Communist Party of Nepal ((Maoist))
((CPN-M)). The only underlying document is the May 26
25-Point Cease-fire Code of Conduct Agreement.) Siebert
stated that the Peace Secretariat, the agency in the Prime
Minister's Office which provides support to the GON
negotiating team, had passed proposed texts to the high-level
Peace Committee. The Peace Committee, which brings together
representatives from all of the parties in the Seven Party
Alliance (SPA) coalition government, was to have approved the
three documents on September 21. According to Siebert, the
CPN-M finalized its position on the three documents some time
ago.

Restructuring of Peace Process Architecture
--------------


3. (C) Siebert also described the ongoing efforts to

strengthen the peace architecture. One of the problems that
had become apparent during the Maoist-declared general strike
on September 13 (reftel) was the lack of a dispute settlement
mechanism in the case of an allegation of a serious breach of
the peace. The GON's chief negotiator -- and Home Minister
-- Sitaula had been compelled to spend hours talking to
Mahara, the CPN-M spokesman and a member of the Maoist
negotiating team, to work out a settlement. Siebert said
that the current plan was to create an overarching joint
national peace committee which would include senior
representatives from the GON side and the Maoist side to
resolve these sorts of disputes. In general, the goal,
according to Siebert, was to create a more robust peace
structure that would be able to survive a major shock to the
peace process.

Working With the National Cease-fire Monitoring Committee
-------------- --------------


4. (C) The USAID-contracted peace facilitator informed the
Ambassador that the Danes and the Norwegians had expressed
interest in combining the National Cease-fire Monitoring
Committee (NMCCC) with the independently chartered National

Human Rights Commission (NHRC). The Ambassador voiced
reservations about this idea, noting that the NHRC needed to
retain its independence and should not amalgamated into a
party-based structure like the NMCCC. In a subsequent
meeting on September 22 with UN Secretary General Annan's
personal representative to the peace process, Ian Martin
agreed that cease-fire monitoring needed to be strengthened
but this was not the way to do it. The two organizations
should, Martin stated, remain separate. What did make sense
was for the NMCCC to take advantage of the NHRC's expertise.
Siebert also took the opportunity to express his extreme
frustration that so-called "like-minded donors," including
the Danes, the Norwegians, and the British, had yet to
provide any assistance to the Peace Secretariat.

Role of the UN
--------------


5. (C) Martin explained during his meeting with the
Ambassador that he continued to be hampered by the absence of
a team, but that he was also hearing positive indications of
progress in the peace process. He stated that he had
obtained a draft of the Cease-fire Agreement and had already
passed it to UN Headquarters in New York for review. In his
meetings with senior GON officials, he had, he said, appealed
to them not to sign the Cease-fire Agreement this week. It
needed to be vetted first. Martin also noted how quickly the
situation seemed to change. The previous week all the talk
had been of a third people's movement. That evening, in
contrast, he said he planned to talk to New York about the
possibility of sending cease-fire monitors on short notice.

Deal Possible This Week?
--------------


6. (C) The most optimistic report post heard late last week
came from a Joint Secretary at the Ministry of Home Affairs
who met with the Pol-Econ chief and two officers from S/CRS
on September 22. Pratap Kumar Prathak, who serves as an ex
officio representative from the Home Ministry to the peace
process, described the chances of a deal the week of
September 25 before the major national (Hindu) holiday of
Dashain began on September 29 as 80 percent. He added that
he was confident that the CPN-M's People's Liberation Army
would go into cantonments in the coming weeks and that the
international community would be willing to provide the funds
for the PLA's food and lodging. Once they were in camps,
Prathak maintained that 80-90 percent of the problems the
country was currently experiencing with Maoist threats and
extortion would end. They extorted, he said, because they
needed money to eat. He conceded, however, that the Maoists
were also using threats to maximize their negotiating power
with the GON.

Potential Roadblocks
--------------


7. (C) In contrast, Siebert admitted to the Ambassador that,
as much as he hoped for peace, he was extremely worried that
the process would break down. He noted, for instance, that
the Maoists had first proposed at the end of June that the
GON feed and house its combatants. The Government did not
appear to have anywhere near the USD 10 million the CPN-M
wanted and, according to his information at least, aside from
a potential contribution from the Norwegians, the
international community had not yet shown great interest. He
also emphasized that he had seen no indication yet that the
GON and the Maoists had been able to come to an agreement on
the crucial issue of Maoist arms management.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Based on what we are hearing, it now appears that
there will be a significant meeting of the GON and the
Maoists on September 28 on the eve of the Dashain holiday.
Intense preparations are already under way. Leaders of the
two other major parties in the Seven-Party Alliance, Madav
Nepal of the Communist Party of Nepal -- United Marxist
Leninist and Sher Bahadur Deuba of the Nepali Congress
(Democratic),met September 23 with Maoist Supremo Prachanda.
It looks as though the Maoists want to move smartly toward a
summit in order to pressure the GON to concede on the arms
issue.
MORIARTY