SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ASSERTS MINISTRY'S CONTROL OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002589

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2016
TAGS: MARR MASS PGOV PHUM PINS NP
SUBJECT: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ASSERTS MINISTRY'S CONTROL OF
ARMY

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1376


B. KATHMANDU 2491

C. KATHMANDU 2104

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Ministry of Defense Secretary Upreti invited Office of
Defense Cooperation (ODC) Chief to a meeting on September 18
to learn more about U.S.- Nepal security assistance and
agreements. ODC Chief emphasized U.S. security assistance
hinged on the promotion of human rights. He asked if the
Ministry planned to respond to the UN report on the alleged
gross human rights violations in 2003 at the NA's Maharajgunj
Barracks (Ref A). He also asked if Upreti planned to respond
to allegations regarding new Chief of Army Staff General
Katawal's use of excessive force during the people's movement
in April 2006. Upreti stated that the Ministry had prepared
a report on the Maharajgunj Barracks, which he would discuss
with Parliament before its public release. He said he had no
plans to respond to criticism of Katawal's appointment.
Regarding the delivery of Excessive Defense Articles (EDA),
Upreti indicated that he would have the Prime Minister sign
the delivery contract first before returning it to the
Embassy (Refs B,C).

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE SECRETARY EAGER TO LEARN ABOUT NA
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2. (C) Secretary Bishnu Dutta Upreti told Office of Defense
Cooperation (ODC) Chief in an office meeting on September 18
that he intended to learn all there is to know about the NA,
"from the grassroots to the top," because the Ministry of
Defense was now responsible for NA management. He lamented
that, when the King was in control of the Royal Nepalese
Army, the Ministry had little access to information and a
limited mandate, due to weak communication between the
Ministry and the Palace Secretariat. He was determined to
change that situation to ensure the Ministry could fulfill
its new responsibilities. He expressed a strong interest in
participating in an upcoming visitors conference on civilian
- military relations that the Public Affairs Section has
organized. He also questioned ODC Chief about a written
agreement between the U.S. Army and the Royal Nepalese Army
or the former Government of Prime Minster Deuba expressing
unity in the fight against terrorism. (N.B.: Post has no
record of any such agreement.)

MINISTRY'S RESPONSE TO HUMAN RIGHTS ALLEGATIONS
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3. (C) ODC Chief inquired if the Ministry planned to issue a
public statement on the UN Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights June 2006 report regarding the allegations
of torture and the disappearance of 49 people at the NA
Maharagunj Barracks in 2003. Upreti explained that the
Ministry had prepared a high-level investigation report, but
that he needed to present it to the Human Rights Committee of
Parliament before its public release. He expected to do so
in the next few days, before the House went on recess. He
stated that he did not, however, plan to make a public
statement regarding General Katawal's appointment, despite
allegations of his excessive use of force during the people's
movement in April. Upreti explained that General Katawal's
promotion to General and appointment as Chief of Army Staff
had the Prime Minister's and the Cabinet's approval. He
thought it would be inappropriate for the Ministry to now
start answering questions regarding his qualifications.
Further, he stated that much of the criticism was
Maoist-inspired, and he did not want to dignify the insurgent
scheme with a public response.

EDA DELIVERY GETS POLITICAL
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4. (C) Secretary Upreti informed ODC Chief that he intended
to obtain the Prime Minister's signature on the agreement for
the U.S. delivery of non-lethal EDA and would then deliver
the agreement to Post. ODC Chief explained the time

sensitivity of the delivery and the need for it to take place
before the end of September, noting that the agreement did
not require the PM's signature. Upreti recognized that the
signature was not necessary, but explained that he wanted the
PM's approval considering the recent political implications
of any security assistance-related delivery, such as the
Maoist-orchestrated general strike on September 13 in
response to India's alleged delivery of weapons to the NA
(Ref B).

COMMENT
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5. (C) Upreti's eagerness to learn about the Nepal Army and
U.S. security assistance and to assert civilian control is a
positive development. Post will continue its engagement with
the Ministry of Defense to help strengthen the institution
and its personnel. We also intend to look for an opportunity
to send the Defense Secretary to the United States in FY 07.
While Post understands the sensitivity surrounding military
equipment deliveries, Post hopes the Government of Nepal
(GON) does not allow the fear of Maoist objections to
interfere with U.S. EDA delivery. Doing so would only serve
as yet another concession to the Maoists at a time when the
GON should instead be strengthening its security forces and
providing law and order to the people of Nepal.
MORIARTY