Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU2573
2006-09-21 11:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

PM TELLS AMBASSADOR: GIVE PEACE A CHANCE

Tags:  PGOV PTER NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002573 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: PM TELLS AMBASSADOR: GIVE PEACE A CHANCE

REF: A. KATHMANDU 2556


B. KATHMANDU 2538

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002573

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: PM TELLS AMBASSADOR: GIVE PEACE A CHANCE

REF: A. KATHMANDU 2556


B. KATHMANDU 2538

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Prime Minister Koirala and Foreign Policy Advisor Dr.
Chalise told the Ambassador September 21 that the Government
of Nepal had to give the Maoists every chance to make peace.
Maoist Supremo Prachanda had accepted the PM's demand in a
meeting September 17 that Maoist arms management would have
to precede a political deal (Ref A). Under the
circumstances, Chalise stated, it made sense to defer a
crackdown on Maoist violence and extortion for a while
longer. The Ambassador warned in stark terms that the
Government of Nepal's failure to enforce law and order was
undermining the GON's authority and emboldening the Maoists.
By every indication, they were playing the GON for time until
they were ready to launch another people's movement.
Violence would follow if they did not get what they wanted.
Chalise claimed the GON would be ready.

Some Good News On the Maoists
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador opened his September 21 meeting with
Prime Minister and Nepali Congress Party President GP Koirala
and his Foreign Policy Advisor Dr. Suresh Chalise by noting
that he had some good news from his trip the previous week to
the far West of Nepal. The Maoists continued to be the real
threat to peace, but, fortunately, their threats and
intimidation were mostly a bluff. They had little public
support and few cadre, he stated. In the case of
Mahendranagar, several dozen Communist Party of Nepal
(Maoist) (CPN-M) members were being allowed to terrorize the
entire city. The Ambassador stressed that he recognized the
Government of Nepal (GON) was at a sensitive point in the
peace negotiations with the Maoists. Still, he had to ask,
when did the GON plan to crack down on rampant Maoist abuses?

Maoist Arms Management First
--------------


3. (C) The Prime Minister told the Ambassador that he had
insisted in his September 17 session with Maoist Supremo
Prachanda that arms management had to come first. Only then
could the GON proceed on the political issues. At first,
according, to Chalise, the CPN-M leader had been reluctant,

but after a while he had accepted the PM's demand for the
Maoists to give up their arms. The Ambassador expressed his
pleasure at that news, but cautioned Koirala and Chalise to
be careful. In response, both men emphasized that they were
going to test the Maoist promise. The foreign policy advisor
added that government leaders were not fools. They were not
about to agree to hand over a large share of power, such as a
majority of seats in an interim parliament, to the Maoists.
The Maoists would have to prove their good faith. PM Koirala
cited the return of confiscated property by the Maoists as
another step he was going to insist on.

Crackdown After Combatants In Camps
--------------


4. (C) Chalise, speaking with the evident agreement of the
Prime Minister, stressed that there would be a phased
process. First, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) would go
into cantonments. Then they would be separated from their
arms in a process worked out between the GON, the Maoists and
the United Nations. Once the Maoist combatants were in the
camps, the Nepali Government would provide them with food,
shelter and recreation. (Note: The Maoists publicly claim
they need USD 8 million a year for food and clothing for the
PLA.) At that point, the GON would insist on an end to any
and all Maoist extortion and threats. Any Maoist carrying
weapons would be arrested. For each of the steps, there
would be an agreed timetable. The PM noted: "We have yet to
see what will happen. For the time being, they (the Maoists)
have made promises."
Maoists Playing for Time
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador voiced the concern that the Maoists
were playing for time. All the reports from the recent CPN-M
Central Committee meeting indicated they were preparing to
launch a new people's movement soon. It would probably lead,
he said, to Maoist violence. The police were scared of the
Maoists' weapons and scared to act against a party that might
soon be in government. The longer the GON waited, the
Ambassador warned, the less likely the police would be there
when the GON needed them. The Maoists, the Ambassador
maintained, need to give you a date when they will move into
the camps.

Give Peace A Chance
--------------


6. (C) The PM's advisor responded saying, "Let's give the
Maoists a few more weeks." He conceded that the PM had told
the Ambassador he planned to name a new Home Minister, but
now a new potential for peace had developed. We have to give
peace a chance, Chalise said. It was important to wait as
long as possible before acting against the CPN-M in order to
convince every segment of society that the GON had done all
it could. Nepalis are worried about law and order, the
foreign policy advisor admitted, but they also fear more
conflict. In time, the people would start to speak out
against Maoist extortion. Chalise complained that the lack
of support for a strong law and order policy from the other
two major parties in the Seven-Party Alliance government --
the Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (UML)
and the Nepali Congress (Democratic) Party -- and the UML's
recent threat to leave the governing coalition had made the
PM's task more difficult.

Maoist Blackmail
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador informed the PM and Chalise that he had
done what Koirala had requested in one of their recent
meetings: he had stressed to UML General Secretary Nepal and
NC-D President Deuba the importance of coalition unity (Ref
B). Partisan differences aside, the Ambassador stated, he
was convinced they would both support the PM on enforcing law
and order. Meanwhile, the GON was letting the Maoists
blackmail them. In effect, the government was saying that it
was so worried the Maoists would walk away from the peace
talks that it would ignore Maoist threats and abuses. The
Ambassador cited the case of the head of the Hyatt Regency
Hotel in Kathmandu who was leaving the country because
Maoists had made it impossible for her to run the hotel. In
spite of appeals to the Prime Minister, some two dozen
Maoists had occupied hotel facilities and were insisting on
the use of hotel rooms. Nothing had been done. Common
people were scared to speak out. The Ambassador emphasized
that he could not remain silent when there was a real risk of
Nepal becoming a People's Republic, with all the horrors that
entailed. He mentioned he had told the Norwegian Ambassador
the same thing.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Post was pleased to hear the PM and Chalise repeat
what Chalise had told the DCM a few days ago: that the PM had
stuck to his guns and gotten Maoist Supremo Prachanda to
agree to deal with Maoist arms first. Koirala gave no
indication that he was prepared to relent on this condition.
That said, we worry weaker members of his negotiating team --
first and foremost chief negotiator and Home Minister Sitaula
-- will undermine the PM's strong stand. Although not
unexpected, it was discouraging to hear that Sitaula and the
Maoists have been given a reprieve for a few more weeks.
Despite the Ambassador's reiteration of the grave dangers
involved, the PM seems determined to wait to appoint a new
Home Minister and to enforce law and order. Chalise told us
that the security forces will be ready to take on the Maoists
if it proves necessary. We hope he is right.
MORIARTY