CPN-UML PARTY LEADER WORRIED

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 000252

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL NP
SUBJECT: CPN-UML PARTY LEADER WORRIED

REF: A. 05 KATHMANDU 2969


B. KATHMANDU 208

C. KATHMANDU 244

D. KATHMANDU 47

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) UML leader MK Nepal, who remains under house arrest,
welcomed the Ambassador's visit to his home on January 25.
He claimed he had not been in touch with UML party cadre or
Maoists recently. MK Nepal speculated that Maoist
second-in-command Baburam Bhattarai was making strong
statements to prove his loyalty to Maoist chief Prachanda.
MK Nepal remained optimistic that Maoist internal debate
about their ability to prevail militarily was a sign that
Maoists were ready to pursue a political solution. However,
he admitted to being concerned over reports that Maoists were
restricting Party activities in the districts. The UML
leader worried that the people would see the political
parties as weak if they agreed to dialogue with the King, and
explained that the Parties would talk with the King if he
postponed the municipal election, dissolved the Cabinet, and
agreed to hand "total power" to the Parties. Nevertheless,
leaving a door open to the King, MK Nepal noted that the
Parties could not agree to "any sort of active monarchy," but
that the UML could support a role for the monarchy, if an
active Parliament voted on the issue. End Summary.

No Recent Contact with Maoists
--------------


2. (C) In a January 25 meeting with the Ambassador, MK Nepal
explained that he had confirmed with Maoists that their
policy of not targeting American interests or people remained
unchanged as had been requested by the Charge on December 30
(ref A),but claimed that he had not been in contact with the
Maoists since the Ambassador had asked him on January 19
about specific incidents involving Embassy employees (ref B).
MK Nepal explained he was worried about reports from UML
cadre in some districts that Maoists were not allowing party
activities and were targeting Party cadre. He noted that he
had only read about such incidents in the papers and had not
been in direct contact with his party members.

UML Leader Speculates on Internal Maoist Thinking...
-------------- --------------


3. (C) MK Nepal opined that some Maoists were convinced they
could prevail militarily, while others were convinced they
could not and so wanted to work through a political process.
The Ambassador pointed out that the publicly announced Maoist
strategy of using armed struggle, while the Parties used
unarmed struggle, to topple the government, could be a Maoist
internal compromise: the movement would use violence, but
not only violence, to foment a revolution. Noting a Baburam
Bhattarai article from the January 18 weekly Budhabar (ref
C),the Ambassador again warned that the Maoist strategy
seemed completely divorced from the stated goals of the
12-point understanding with the Parties, and cautioned that
the Maoists would dominate any government formed with the
Parties if the plans for revolution succeeded.


4. (C) While admitting that he was not "fully one-hundred
percent sure" about the Maoists' change in attitude, MK Nepal
took as a "good sign" the fact that the Maoists appeared to
be debating the issue of armed and political struggle. MK
Nepal noted that when he met Maoist leaders several years ago
in Lucknow, India, Bhattarai had been more accommodating than
Prachanda. However, recently Bhattarai had appeared more
aggressive than Prachanda, including in public statements and
in negotiations leading to the 12-point understanding. The
UML leader explained that he had advocated for explicit
language in the 12-point understanding binding the Maoists to
accept the outcome of a constituent assembly and not return
to violence. While Prachanda seemed ready to accept this
point, Bhattarai had argued against it. MK Nepal speculated
that Bhattarai was working to show "ferocity" and prove his
loyalty to Prachanda. The Ambassador countered that
Prachanda could be locking Bhattarai into being a public
advocate of violence to diminish the latter's stature
internationally.

...But Not Optimistic King Will Reach Out
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador urged the Parties to respond if the
King reached out. MK Nepal cautioned the Ambassador about
being optimistic that the King would reach out, saying "you
have been hopeful many times," but "all trends show no
results." He feared the people would see the Parties as weak
if they did not speak out strongly against the King. MK
Nepal asserted that if the King postponed the election,
dissolved the Cabinet, and agreed to hand "total power" to
the Parties, then the Parties would talk to the King. He
noted that the Parties could not agree to "any sort of active
monarchy," but that the UML could support a role for the
monarchy if an active Parliament voted on the issue. Saying
"let wisdom prevail in the mind of the King," MK Nepal
explained that "the King should be wise" and "think of the
nation and the monarchy." He lamented the expenses incurred
supporting the King's visits to the districts, pointing out
that the money could have been used to pave roads and do
other development work in the cities. MK Nepal clarified
that the Maoists were only a threat because they had weapons,
and that the best situation for the Parties might be a
"stalemate" between the two armed parties in Nepal's
conflict, the King and the Maoists. That would allow space
for the Parties.

MK Nepal Under House Arrest
--------------


6. (C) MK Nepal welcomed the Ambassador's visit to his home,
noting that security forces had had him under house arrest
since January 20. He reported that security forces had
allowed some visitors (e.g. Danish Ambassador on January 24)
but not others, including party cadre. (Note: Government had
prevented diplomats from visiting political leaders under
house arrest after the King seized power February 1. End
note.) While he did not have exact numbers, MK Nepal
estimated that about 200 political cadre from all parties and
civil society leaders were still in government custody
following the government's recent spate of arrests. (Note:
Ian Martin, UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights
Representative, told Emboff on January 24 that the government
still held in custody about 200 of the 400 party cadre and
civil society activists arrested since January 17. End
note.)

Comment
--------------


7. (C) MK Nepal appeared less confident that the Maoists
would opt to come into the political mainstream than in his
January 4 meeting with the Ambassador. Although more
nervous, he clearly still wants to believe that the
seven-party alliance can cooperate with the Maoists without
ultimately being devoured by them. However, to a greater
degree than in recent meetings, he left the door ajar for
reconciliation with the King.
MORIARTY