Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU2495
2006-09-14 04:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

UN REP MARTIN WAITING FOR COALITION TO AGREE ON

Tags:  PGOV PTER PHUM UN NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002495 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM UN NP
SUBJECT: UN REP MARTIN WAITING FOR COALITION TO AGREE ON
PEACE PACKAGE OFFER

REF: A. KATHMANDU 2348


B. KATHMANDU 2491

Classified By: DCM Nicholas Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002495

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM UN NP
SUBJECT: UN REP MARTIN WAITING FOR COALITION TO AGREE ON
PEACE PACKAGE OFFER

REF: A. KATHMANDU 2348


B. KATHMANDU 2491

Classified By: DCM Nicholas Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Ian Martin, UN Secretary General Annan's personal
representative for the peace process, told the DCM September
11 that in spite of their rhetoric, the Maoists were prepared
to move ahead. He remarked that they had recently hammered
out a unified position and had taken steps to ensure their
various constituencies would accept any eventual result.
They were even prepared, Martin claimed, to address
management of their arms as long as they saw progress
happening on the political side. A major problem he faced,
Martin said, was that the Seven-Party Alliance coalition
Government of Nepal (GON) had yet to decide what its position
was. Ultimately, he could only act when both sides were
ready.

Maoists Still On Board with the UN
--------------


2. (C) In a meeting on September 11, UN Secretary General
Annan's personal representative in Nepal (Ref A) told the DCM
that the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) had not
abandoned its willingness to work with the United Nations on
the peace process, including on the issue of arms management.
Ian Martin denied that his initial meeting with them, which
he described as "preliminary," had been rocky. In spite of
critical rhetoric, the Maoists had no intention, in his
opinion, to go back on the commitments they had made to the
UN (de Mistura) mission that proceeded Martin's arrival. It
was unfortunate, he said, from an operational perspective
that the Government of Nepal had publicly defined the
principal role of the UN as a means to pressure the Maoists
on arms, but that problem could be overcome.

Maoist Position Prepared
--------------


3. (C) The Secretary General's personal representative stated
that the Maoists had used their recent Central Committee
meeting outside Kathmandu to hammer out a unified position.
They had also taken steps to ensure that their various
organizations -- People's Liberation Army (PLA),militia,
women, students -- were in agreement. Maoist Supremo

Prachanda's insistence on September 3 that Prime Minister
Koirala should immediately hold high-level talks with him and
nine of the other top Maoist leaders, in Martin's view,
revealed Prachanda's awareness that any deal would have to
enjoy broad support within the CPN-M.

A Deal on Arms Management Still Possible
--------------


4. (C) Martin also maintained that there was still a
possibility of brokering a deal on Maoist arms management.
The Maoists, he said, were even willing to deploy the PLA in
cantonments under UN supervision -- under the right
circumstances. He argued that the Maoist's demand since the
Central Committee meeting on a package deal before deployment
in camps was not really something new. It was wrong to look
at the identical letters PM Koirala and Prachanda had sent to
Secretary General Annan in August (the so-called Five-Point

SIPDIS
Agreement) in isolation from the Eight-Point Agreement with
its political agreements to which the preamble of the
Five-Point agreement specifically referred. The Maoists had
always been calling, he stated, for agreement on political
issues before arms management. The governing Seven-Party
Alliance (SPA),on the other hand, insisted on arms
management before a political deal. Martin told the DCM that
the answer was simultaneous talks on all points.

Seven-Party Alliance Unable to Formulate A Position
-------------- --------------


5. (C) The UN representative identified the lack of a unified
SPA position on what it was prepared to offer the Maoists as
one of the biggest stumbling blocks to progress in the peace
process. Martin reported that Indian Ambassador Mukherjee
had recently told PM Koirala the GON had to put a package on
the table. It was frustrating, Martin said, that the
government seemed to lack a sense of urgency. This was
particularly true of the Communist Party of Nepal - United
Marxist Leninist and the Nepali Congress Party (Democratic)
leaders, but the PM's own Nepali Congress Party was also
internally divided and unable to agree. Working out the
differences within the coalition was much harder than the
parties claimed, yet it was a necessity. Given the inability
of the GON negotiating team to develop a coherent position,
it was tempting, Martin admitted, for the international
community to go around the team in the hopes of advancing the
peace process. The difficulty with that approach was that it
undermined the very bodies that should be in charge.

UN Mostly in Waiting Mode
--------------


6. (C) The reality, Martin stressed, was that he could
provide some assistance to the two sides, but that
ultimately, his team had to wait until the Maoists and the
GON were ready. He said he hoped to have an electoral expert
join his team soon and he also mentioned that UN headquarters
had already identified a potential candidate to serve as his
military liaison officer. Martin also expressed the hope
that he would soon be able to relocate from his current
office in the building housing the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal to the building the UN
Development Program occupied. He had to wait, however, on UN
headquarters budget approval.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) Martin's critique of the Government of Nepal's failure
to formulate a negotiating position for the peace process
talks is on the mark, but we do not share his perceived
inability to do much at present. Without overstating his
role, Martin can help move the process forward, if only
incrementally. With respect to the Maoists, we share his
assessment of their preparation. They have a program and are
prepared to carry it out. Where we differ is in our
assessment of their ultimate intentions. While we cannot
rule out the possibility that they are prepared for peace and
that they desire to join the democratic political mainstream,
the preponderance of evidence indicates they are preparing
instead to use all means, including violence and force, to
seize power. We will continue encouraging the UN to engage
more proactively while pushing the SPA to maintain a united
front. Martin's active role in helping defuse the September
13 Maoist general strike by facilitating inspection of
alleged Nepal Army weapons (Ref B) suggests that, when push
comes to shove, the UN may be more appropriately proactive.
MORIARTY