DPM OLI WORRIED, BUT WILLING TO STAND UP TO THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002463

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: DPM OLI WORRIED, BUT WILLING TO STAND UP TO THE
MAOISTS

REF: KATHMANDU 2457

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES F. MORIARTY, REASONS 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) After listening to DPM/Foreign Minister Oli's pitch
to the diplomatic community for support for Nepal's bid for a
UNSC rotating seat on September 8 (reftel),I asked for a few
minutes of Oli's time. In a subsequent one-on-one meeting, I
told Oli that the GON was losing the country to the Maoists
through inaction. The Maoists were terrorizing citizens
throughout the entire country, including Kathmandu, and the
GON seemed to be doing little in response. The GON was
allowing the Maoists to create the impression that they were
irreversibly marching toward control of the government. Yet,
the GON had the military and security resources, as well as
the international and domestic support, necessary to control
the Maoists. But the longer the GON refused to exercise its
muscle, the more it would atrophy.

Oli Worried
--------------


2. (C) Oli immediately agreed that the Maoists were
attempting to bully their way into power. The GON had
conceded too much, too quickly, in previous rounds of talks,
and now the Maoists were surprised that the government was
ending the unilateral concessions. PM Koirala understood
that it would be suicidal to allow armed Maoists into an
interim government and was not about to give ground on the
issue. Oli worried, however, that the other two main leaders
of the Seven Party Alliance, MK Nepal of Oli's UML and Sher
Bahadur Deuba of the Nepali Congress (Democratic) were weak
reeds to lean on: MK Nepal would say all the right things in
one-on-one talks with Oli, and then say things to the press a
few hours later that completely muddied the waters. As for
Deuba, he was so concerned with partisan advantage that his
support for any given position could shift at a moment's
notice. Oli added that, if the GON were to stand up to the
Maoists, PM Koirala would need to stay in relatively good
health, and MK Nepal and Deuba had to make it clear that they
would support Koirala if he moved against the insurgents.

Next on the List
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3. (C) I expressed concern that the GON might be running out
of time to address the Maoists. I noted that, if they did
not gain victory at the negotiating table, the Maoists would
almost certainly start a people's movement at some point
during the month of October. If that people's movement
failed, the Maoists would likely turn to violence to
intimidate the GON into giving them what they wanted. Oli
concurred with my analysis and noted that the Maoists would
likely put him near the top of their hit list if they decided
to attempt to kidnap or assassinate a senior government
official. Despite that, Oli said he would continue to urge
the Prime Minister to take action and would continue to speak
out against Maoist violations of their commitments.

Comment
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4. (C) Oli was as good as his word: Before departing for
the NAM meeting in Havana, he publicly condemned the Maoist
refusal to separate from their weapons, accusing the
insurgents of derailing the peace process. He also noted
with respect to Maoist objections to the appointment of
General Katawal as Chief of Army Staff that the insurgents
had never sought GON approval for their personnel
appointments. Oli's aggressiveness is all the more
impressive, given that he understands that the more he speaks
out, the more the Maoists are likely to target him in the
future. A press report over the weekend in a pro-Maoist
weekly listed Oli and Finance Minister Mahat at the top of
the list for Maoist surveillance.
MORIARTY