Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU2434
2006-09-08 11:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

PRIME MINISTER PLANS TO APPOINT NEW HOME MINISTER

Tags:  PGOV PTER NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002434 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER PLANS TO APPOINT NEW HOME MINISTER
AS MAOISTS OVERREACH

REF: A. KATHMANDU 2425


B. KATHMANDU 2420

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002434

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER PLANS TO APPOINT NEW HOME MINISTER
AS MAOISTS OVERREACH

REF: A. KATHMANDU 2425


B. KATHMANDU 2420

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) USAID-contracted peace facilitator Hannes Siebert told
the Ambassador September 7 that Prime Minister Koirala is
probably going to appoint a new Home Minister. Siebert
expects incumbent Home Minister Sitaula to keep his position
on the Government of Nepal's (GON) negotiating team with
Koirala perhaps naming a stronger lead negotiator. The peace
facilitator shared the Ambassador's view that it would be
foolish for the PM to agree to the Maoist demand to abandon
the existing peace process in favor of a summit meeting
between Koirala and Prachanda. Siebert characterized the
Maoists' recent decision not to put its combatants into
cantonments under UN monitoring as an example of Maoist
overreach. The Ambassador hoped that the Prime Minister was
reaching his limit and would react soon. The Ambassador and
Siebert also discussed how the Peace Secretariat could be
made more effective. End Summary.

Sitaula On His Way Out As Home Minister?
--------------


2. (C) On September 7, USAID-contracted peace facilitator
Siebert informed the Ambassador that Prime Minister G.P.
Koirala may be preparing to appoint a new Home Minister.
Siebert, who returned days ago to Kathmandu after an absence
of several weeks, said that the PM had finally come around to
the argument that one person could not be both Home Minister
(GON's chief law enforcement officer) and the GON's chief
peace negotiator. His best guess was that Sitaula would step
down as Home Minister. The PM, he stated, was considering as
well whether to bring one or more senior Nepali Congress
leaders into the team to bolster or perhaps supplant Sitaula
as the chief negotiator. Siebert did not know who was on
Koirala's short list to be the new Home Minister or new
negotiating team member.

Sitaula A Disaster As Chief Government Negotiator
-------------- --------------


3. (C) The USAID contractor voiced his regret that Sitaula
was not likely to lose a spot on the GON negotiating team.
He had been an unqualified disaster. As Siebert's colleague

Retief Olivier noted, Sitaula had repeatedly failed to follow
the three cardinal rules for negotiating: (1) know your
brief; (2) have a mandate; and (3) touch base with your
constituencies. Siebert described how the Government had
been close in August to getting the Maoists to sign on to a
stronger Five-Point Agreement, but the opportunity vanished
when Sitaula promised to intervene with the PM to water down
the language. Siebert and the Ambassador agreed that what
had saved Sitaula up until now was his close relationship
with Koirala. As the Ambassador pointed out, the PM trusted
him.

Koirala-Prachanda Summit Talks: Yes or No?
--------------


4. (C) Siebert explained that one of his principal immediate
goals was to prepare the government team for an upcoming
summit meeting between the Prime Minister and Maoist Supremo
Prachanda. Claiming the existing peace process was broken,
the Maoist Chairman had called at a September 3 press
conference for direct talks between the two sides' leaders
(Ref A). Siebert said the talks might be as early as the
week of September 11. At this point, the Ambassador strongly
questioned the utility of a summit. Prachanda had already
indicated he wanted to bring nine members of the CPN-M
leadership, including many hard-liners, to the talks. His
goal, the Ambassador said, would be to browbeat the Prime
Minister into agreeing to the Maoist demands. In the
Ambassador's opinion, if the Maoists wanted to negotiate,
they needed to talk to the Government's negotiating team.
Full stop. Siebert conceded the point.


Maoists Overreach
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador asked Siebert if he saw any signs that
the Maoists were prepared to compromise for peace. All the
signs seemed to be pointing in the opposite direction. The
Ambassador cited as an example the CPN-M Central Committee
announcement over the weekend of September 2-3 not to put its
combatants in cantonments under UN monitoring. This
commitment, in exchange for a GON commitment to put the
Nepali Army in barracks, had been at the core of identical
August 9 letters Prachanda and Koirala had sent to UN
Secretary General Annan. The Maoists had broken their word

SIPDIS
to the UN. There seemed, the Ambassador maintained, no
limits to their audacity. That was exactly the problem,
Siebert replied. The Maoist threats and demands had gotten
increasingly outrageous because the GON was not pushing back.
The Maoists were overreaching, Siebert proclaimed, and they
would eventually push too far.

GON Pushback Imminent?
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador informed Siebert that the Prime
Minister's Foreign Policy Adviser Dr. Chalise had told the
DCM September 7 that Koirala planned to launch a public
response soon sharply criticizing the Maoist Central
Committee's decision to renege on confining the People's
Liberation Army in cantonments (Ref B). Siebert made the
point that the GON had already taken one step to show the
Maoists they meant business by making General Katawal's
appointment as Chief of Army Staff permanent. Chalise, the
Ambassador noted, however, had been very uncomfortable when
the DCM made a strong pitch for a GON crackdown on rampant
Maoist extortion and abuses. The Ambassador speculated that
Chalise's discomfort might have stemmed from a new assignment
he had taken on: Chalise had told the DCM September 7 that
the PM had authorized him to meet with Prachanda one-on-one
to look for common ground; a law and order crackdown at this
juncture might jeopardize Chalise's mission.

Peace Secretariat Struggling
--------------


7. (C) Siebert told the Ambassador that the Peace Secretariat
was in disarray. Vidyadhar Mallik, the former head, who was
transferred to the Finance Ministry in mid-August, was a
civil servant. But Mallik had keen political sensitivity and
was willing to initiate action and delegate responsibility.
These qualities, Siebert stated, had led him to make some
mistakes, but overall his work had been a success. This was
in spite of the fact that he had been forced to report to
three offices -- the Office of the Prime Minister, the
high-level Peace Committee, and Home Minister Sitaula as the
chief government negotiator -- none of which provided
sufficient direction. The new head of the Secretariat, Janak
Joshi, was a completely different type. He was scared to act
and frightened that his subordinates might do something
wrong, so he didn't act but kept all authority to himself.
Joshi also lacked Mallik's political sense. One idea which a
leading Seven-Party Alliance member, the CPN-UML, had
proposed, the USAID peace facilitator noted, was to create a
Peace Ministry. This would ensure that the Secretariat got
the direction it needed, which the Ambassador strongly
endorsed.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Siebert and the others on the USAID-funded Nepal
Transition to Peace project team have their work cut out for
them. While they are providing essential technical
assistance to the Government of Nepal's negotiating team, the
GON bears responsibility for success or failure. Appointing
a new Home Minister would be an excellent start. Appointing
a new chief negotiator as well would be even better. The
time for Koirala to act is now, as we will continue to
emphasize.
MORIARTY