MAOIST LEADERSHIP RATCHETS UP THE PRESSURE; SAYS

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002425

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM MARR UN NP
SUBJECT: MAOIST LEADERSHIP RATCHETS UP THE PRESSURE; SAYS
NO TO UN

REF: A. KATHMANDU 2166


B. KATHMANDU 2253

C. KATHMANDU 2348

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) The leadership of the Communist Party of Nepal
(Maoist) has decided after its recent Central Committee
meeting to increase its pressure on the Government of Nepal.
The most striking result of the August 27-31 meeting was the
leaders' announcements September 2 and 3 that Maoist
combatants would not go into cantonments. Prachanda's
repudiation of this key Maoist commitment from his (and Prime
Minister Koirala's identical) August 9 letter to Secretary
General Annan makes it clear that the Maoists have no
intention of allowing the United Nations to separate them
from their weapons. End Summary.

Maoist Central Committee Ups the Pressure
--------------


2. (C) At a press conference two days after the August 27-31
meeting of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M)
Central Committee concluded, Maoist spokesman Krishna Bahadur
Mahara issued a statement setting forth an aggressive agenda.
The statement, which was signed by CPN-M Chairman Prachanda,
denounced the governing Seven-Party Alliance for having
"conspired with regressive elements (domestic and foreign)"
and for betraying "the spirit of the (April 2006) People's
Movement" by cooperating "with regressive palace elements"
(read: the King) instead of the CPN-M. It condemned efforts
by the Government of Nepal (GON) to focus public attention on
Maoist arms only, rather than "a complete political
solution." In light of these circumstances, the Central
Committee resolved to raise up another people's movement if
the GON did not mend its ways. According to the statement,
the Central Committee had determined that there was an
immediate need "for a broad republican front, which includes
all political powers, civil society, the intellectual class,
and social organizations in favor of a complete republic,
peace, and progress."

Maoists Say No To Cantonments
--------------


3. (C) The headline out of Mahara's September 2 press
conference and a press conference by Maoist supremo Prachanda
on September 3 was the Central Committee's decision that it
would not confine its fighters to camps. Mahara explained
that the CPN-M did not intend to send its combatants to
cantonments or give up its arms until the country's political
issues were completely settled. The Maoists, he said, had no
intention of repeating the mistakes of the Nepali Congress
Party and the Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist
Leninist which gave up their weapons in 1950 and 1971,
respectively. First, the monarchy had to be abolished and
the Nepali Army restructured. Prachanda stated that the
People's Liberation Army would not be confined in cantonments
until the state was completely restructured. Specifically,
the Central Committee resolved that arms management was not
possible without agreement on "a package for a full political
resolution." The Central Committee statement went on to say
that "to concentrate the People's Liberation Army in
temporary camps should not and cannot be done." Prachanda
also announced at his press conference that the insurgents
were abandoning the negotiating process and would instead
insist on a summit meeting between PM Koirala and a 10-person
Maoist team headed by Prachanda.

Request To UN Repudiated
--------------


4. (C) Prachanda's announcement came less than one month
after he and Prime Minister Koirala signed identical letters
to United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan requesting the
UN's assistance in five areas (Refs A, B). The so-called

Five-Point Agreement of August 9 asked the UN to "Deploy
qualified civilian personnel to monitor and verify the
confinement of CPN (Maoist) combatants and their weapons
within designated cantonments." It went on to request the
UN's aid in the management of the arms and armed personnel of
both sides with the modalities to be worked out later by the
Government of Nepal, the Maoists and the UN. Pursuant to the
Five-Point Agreement, Secretary General Annan appointed
senior UN official Ian Martin as his personal representative
for the peace process (Ref C). Martin arrived in Kathmandu
on August 28.

Comment
--------------


5. (C) The Maoist decision to repudiate its commitment to the
UN regarding deploying its combatants to cantonments is
deeply troubling. We never shared the widespread view within
the Government of Nepal (from PM Koirala down) that the UN
would be a panacea. Still, placing their combatants in
cantonments would have deprived the Maoists of some of their
ability to threaten the Nepali public and could perhaps have
led to a staged process separating the Maoists from their
weapons. Those hopes appear now to have been dashed. The
September 2 Central Committee statement makes no mention
whatsoever of the Five-Point Agreement. This may indicate an
across-the-board hardening of the Maoist position against the
UN. That interpretation is consistent with media reports
that described Ian Martin's initial meeting with the Maoists
as rocky. David Johnson, the acting head of the Nepal office
of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which Martin
headed until recently, told us September 7 that the tough
attitude could be posturing. We are not so sure. Rather, by
doing everything possible to ratchet up the pressure on the
GON, the Maoists are making compromise on their part
virtually impossible.
MORIARTY