PEACE PROCESS MAKES PROGRESS - SLOWLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002340

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER UN NP
SUBJECT: PEACE PROCESS MAKES PROGRESS - SLOWLY


CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR JAMES F. MORIARTY. REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

Summary
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1. (C) USAID-contracted peace facilitator Olivier told the
Ambassador August 24 that the peace process in Nepal seemed
to be making progress. Nonetheless, Olivier said that the
Maoists continued to exert pressure on the Prime Minister
to dissolve the Parliament. He reported that the Maoists
had submitted a proposal to the Government of Nepal (GON)
to feed Maoist combatants in cantonment. Olivier stressed
that a principal hurdle to the peace process was the GON's
failure to identify the key parts of the process -- such as
a Peace Accord -- and focus on them. He emphasized the GON
needed to forcefully argue its position on arms separation
publicly and create structures limiting the Maoist ability
to commit abuses. Planned local Peace Councils established
on the basis of a national Peace Accord were an important
prospective tool for bringing the Maoists into the
mainstream and expanding GON authority beyond Kathmandu.
Olivier said that the Maoists had not yet formally endorsed
the peace council idea. According to the facilitator,
Maoist approval is not dependent on the arrival of a UN
team August 28. Both sides have high expectations of the
UN role. End Summary

Maoists Trying to Shift Blame to the Government
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2. (C) Retief Olivier, Chief of Party for AED, contractor
for USAID's Nepal Transition Peace Project, told the
Ambassador August 24 that peace negotiations between the
Government of Nepal (GON) and the Maoists were making
progress. However, he noted that Daman Nath Dhugana, one
of the GON's facilitators for the peace talks, had told him
the Maoists continued to try to shift the blame for the
slow pace onto the government. The Maoists' main message
to PM Koirala was: "Stop delaying the process." Dhugana
had also mentioned that the Maoists seemed to be raising
the ante by hinting they could not keep their cadre under
wraps much longer. According to Dhugana, the Maoists
continue to press for the Parliament to be dissolved right
away.

Maoists Requesting Government Food Aid
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3. (C) Olivier reported that the Maoists had recently given
the GON a proposal to feed its forces. He had no other
details but he assumed that the food would be going to
combatants in designated cantonments. The Ambassador
commented that this could be a good sign. It would depend
who was on the feeding list and what the Maoist cadre did
once they started getting a government ration. He
suggested that the GON might want to start small and make
it clear that rations would be tied to Maoist behavior.
Maoists would have to stop all extortion anywhere near any
cantonment receiving rations or the rations should stop.

Government Still Among Its Own Worst Enemies
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4. (C) The AED Chief of Party emphasized that the GON's
failure to identify and then focus on the key parts of the
peace process continued to hamstring its efforts. He cited
the example of the Peace Accord. One day the GON
emphasized its importance; the next day key Government
officials downplayed it. Olivier expressed regret that the
GON's approach was so ad hoc. The problem, Olivier
maintained, was that the Maoists were framing the terms of
the public debate. The GON needed to make its case, on the
need to separate the Maoists from their weapons in
particular, and then it needed to create structures that
would help to curtail Maoist abuses. The cease-fire Code
of Conduct monitoring committee was one such mechanism, but
its reports should be made public.

Peace Councils Another Important Mechanism
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5. (C) Olivier spoke at length about local peace councils
with political party and Maoist representation. They were
important, Olivier said, because they could serve as a
means to bring the Maoists into the mainstream. They were
also key, in his view, because they would allow the central
government to begin to reassert some measure of influence
in the countryside. The peace councils were not intended
as a substitute for local governments or Maoist parallel
governments, but as a "third way" to facilitate a lasting
peace. The AED Chief of Party made the point that in his
experience it was important to tie peace councils to a
national Peace Accord. National-level representatives
could perhaps launch the initial meeting of district-level
peace councils. The Ambassador agreed that it was crucial
to start the peace councils in districts where the Maoists
could not overwhelm the other participants.

Maoist Approval Still Lacking; Upcoming UN Mission Not the
Issue
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6. (C) The Chief of Party informed the Ambassador that the
GON had approved the terms of reference for the peace
councils (e-mailed to SCA/INS). Olivier added that Home
Minister and chief GON peace negotiator Sitaula had
reportedly claimed the Maoists supported the idea. Olivier
insisted, however, that it would be foolish to move ahead
with the idea absent written agreement from the Maoist
leadership. He did not think that Maoist approval was
being held up for the expected arrival the week of August
28 of the follow-up UN mission. There were high
expectations on both sides for the mission, but the peace
councils were not in that mix.

Comment
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7. (C) The Maoists are conveying mixed signals. While
their request for food aid for People's Liberation Army
(PLA) combatants could be a sign they are indeed searching
for a "soft landing", many other signs point in a different
direction. Their complaints that the GON is not fulfilling
its end of the 8-point agreement from June would have a
shred of credibility if the Maoists were meeting even the
basic terms of the cease-fire Code of Conduct. The Maoists
repeated violation of the Code's provision prohibiting
extortion is only the most egregious example. Peace
councils clearly offer some value as mechanisms to
institutionalize the peace process and bind the Maoists
into the mainstream political process. The principal
matter, however, is that the GON, with or without the help
of the upcoming UN mission, must hold firm on the central
issue of Maoist arms management. Unless the Maoists are
separated from their weapons, no process, no matter how
well intended, will lead to a peace that does not amount to
a Maoist takeover of Nepal.

MORIARTY