Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU2284
2006-08-23 11:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: PUSHING BACK THE MAOIST TIDE

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER IN NP 
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RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 4930
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0054
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4328
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0131
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1904
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002284 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IN NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: PUSHING BACK THE MAOIST TIDE


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES F. MORIARTY, REASONS 1.4 (B/D).

Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002284

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IN NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: PUSHING BACK THE MAOIST TIDE


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES F. MORIARTY, REASONS 1.4 (B/D).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) We are reaching the crunch point in Nepal. Four
months after Nepal's people's movement uprising, the Maoists
appear intent on intimidating their way into power. Till now,
the Seven Party Alliance government appears to have been more
worried about alienating the Maoists than about preserving
law and order or blocking a Maoist takeover. With a UN team
due in shortly to provide assistance to Nepal's peace
process, the GON appears to have finally drawn a line in the
sand: it is proclaiming that the Maoists will not be allowed
into any interim government until they are separated from
their weapons. This is the core issue. If the Maoists enter
an interim government while retaining their weapons, they
fully expect to bully their partners into handing over power.
Conversely, if the Maoists agree to be separated from their
weapons, all other issues, including the new constitution and
demobilization, disarmament and rehabilitation of
ex-combatants, become relatively easy to resolve.


2. (C) The United States, we hope working closely with
India, must take all possible steps to bolster the GON's
resolve and keep it from caving in to the Maoist demands. We
need to reiterate our support for the GON's bottom line both
publicly and privately. We also need to work closely with
the GON to design a process that makes it increasingly
difficult for the Maoists to engage in violence. And
finally, we need to engage the GON to the maximum extent
possible to enhance civilian control over the military,
support law enforcement training to reestablish rule of law,
and backstop a robust UN role with a clear mandate in
promoting a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Nepal.

Maoists on the Move
--------------


3. (C) Since helping the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) topple
the King's government in April, the Maoists have pursued
peace talks with the SPA government, while doing everything
possible to undercut that government's influence and replace
it with their own. Optimists (a declining breed in Nepal)

hope that the Maoists genuinely want to enter the political
mainstream and are merely trying to strengthen their hands
for the negotiations with the government. The totality of
Maoist actions since they entered into a ceasefire in late
April suggests, however, that such hopes are misplaced.
Since the Maoists began coming above ground, they have
massively increased extortion, forced the closure of scores
of industries, continued recruitment of soldiers, ordered the
closure of government office, and have attempted to build
parallel government structures. Threats and intimidation
against SPA politicians, business people, and the average
Nepali who has borne the brunt of the ten-year insurgency
have soared.

The Government Remains Passive
--------------


4. (C) In the face of continuing Maoist provocations, the
GON has remained largely passive. In contrast to the
Maoists, the GON appears to be making a good faith effort to
adhere to the cease-fire code of conduct. As a result, the
Nepali Army has been confined to its barracks. More
important, the police have done virtually nothing to respond
to Maoist breaches of the law. In part, this reflects a
belief by many in the police that the Maoists will soon come
into the government and might engage in retribution against
police who are too active. Perhaps even more important, Home
Minister Krishna Prashad Sitaula, the minister in charge of
the police, also happens to be the government's chief
negotiator with the Maoists. He appears to worry that using
the police against the Maoists will inevitably make his
negotiations with the Maoists more difficult. He also
appears to believe that unilateral concessions on the part of
the GON are the best way to win the goodwill of the Maoists
in those negotiations.

Is the Negotiating Can Coming to a Halt?
--------------

5. (C) A series of bilateral talks between the Maoists and
the government led to seemingly significant concessions on
the part of the government, including commitments to dissolve
the Parliament, promulgate an interim constitution, and form
an interim governmentcontaining the Maoists. Eventually,
however, the government dug in on the ultimate bottom line:
the Maoists had to be separated from their weapons, and they
would not be allowed to join an interim government until
after such separation occurred. The Maoists refused to agree
to this proposition in bilateral discussions. Instead,
Maoist supremo Prachanda and Prime Minister Koirala sent
identical letters to Kofi Anan asking that the UN help Nepal
with a variety of peace-related issues. Significantly,
however, the letters mentioned neither separation of Maoists
from their weapons, nor formation of an interim government.

Three Possible Futures - and the U.S. Response
-------------- -


6. (C) With a UN team scheduled to arrive in Kathmandu in
the next week or so, one of three possible futures will
likely play out in Nepal over the coming months:

-- The first, perhaps most unlikely of the three, would see
the Maoists agreeing during the UN-sponsored talks to
separate from their weapons. This obviously would be the
best possible outcome, and we need to do everything possible
to encourage its realization, including by making sure the UN
team understands the indispensability to peace of separating
the Maoists from their weapons. To increase the possibility
of this outcome, we also need to support the infrastructure
of peace (e.g., the cease-fire monitoring committee, the
peace secretariat, and the soon-to-be-formed peace councils),
and by providing technical assistance to government
negotiators. Under this scenario, we would also need to move
quickly to consolidate the incipient peace, including by
working with other donors to come up with packages for
addressing disarmament, demobilization, and reconstruction of
Maoist combatants and surplus security forces. We would also
need to help Nepal move toward a free and fair election to a
constitutional assembly.

-- The second, somewhat more likely, scenario would see the
GON caving to Maoist demands during the negotiations and
allowing the Maoists into an interim government while their
People's Liberation Army continued to bear arms. We believe
that Maoist entry into the GON (since the Maoists would still
be on our terrorist list) would legally require that we end
direct assistance of all sorts to the GON. More important,
the entry of an armed Maoist movement into an interim
government would likely lead quickly to Maoist domination of
the GON and adoption by the Nepal government of policies
inimical to U.S. interests. We would need to coordinate
closely with other interested parties, and particularly
India, to mitigate the impact that a Maoist-dominated
government would have.

-- The third, perhaps most likely scenario would see both the
Maoists and the GON sticking to their bottom lines and the
talks foundering over the Maoist refusal to be separated from
their weapons. This scenario would likely lead to Maoist
attempts to orchestrate massive demonstrations to pressure
the GON to cave; if those demonstrations did not lead to the
desired outcome, the Maoists might well return to open
violence. This scenario suggests that we and other members
of the international community need to encourage the GON to
hang tough: if the government cedes power to the Maoists,
Nepal is guaranteed a bleak future. If the government
refuses to bend, there is a chance the Maoists will. Even if
the Maoists do not compromise at this time, the GON will have
the domestic and external support necessary to convince the
Maoists over time to come in out of the cold. We hope that
Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister K.P. Oli will hear
this message authoritatively during his September visit to
the UNGA. We also need to work closely with Nepal's civilian
leadership to make sure that the GON's Security Services are
as ready as possible if the Maoists make the wrong choice.
And finally, we need to be ready to ship necessary security
assistance as rapidly as possible, if the Maoists return to
the warpath.

Comment/Conclusion
--------------


8. (C) The Maoists see fall 2006 as a decisive juncture in
their ten-year campaign to seize power in Nepal by force of
arms. They recognize the fissures in the fragile Seven Party
Alliance, and are doing everything they can to widen the
cracks and split SPA cohesion. While PM Koirala has held the
line, demanding that the Maoists surrender their weapons
before entering a Government of Nepal, his coalition partners
have not matched the PM's outspoken rhetoric. Encouragement
to hold the line by the international community, especially
the U.S., continues to play a critical role in stiffening the
ailing Koirala's spine. The U.S. must increase its
engagement in Nepal, in terms of bilateral assistance and
diplomatic support for the peace process, but also by
vigorously promoting the international community's and the
UN's role in Nepal. Separating the Maoists from their
weapons remains the critical task in this endeavor, the
success or failure of which will determine whether Nepal will
become a Maoist state.
MORIARTY