Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU2281
2006-08-22 12:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

CLEAR PUBLIC MESSAGE ON ARMS MANAGEMENT FROM PRIME

Tags:  PGOV PTER NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHKT #2281/01 2341230
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221230Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2867
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4691
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 4928
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0129
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2922
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0052
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002281 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: CLEAR PUBLIC MESSAGE ON ARMS MANAGEMENT FROM PRIME
MINISTER NEEDED NOW


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002281

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: CLEAR PUBLIC MESSAGE ON ARMS MANAGEMENT FROM PRIME
MINISTER NEEDED NOW


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty

Summary
--------------


1. (C) On August 21 former Prime Minister and Rastriya
Janashaki Party founder Surya Bahadur Thapa agreed with the
Ambassador that the issue of Maoist arms management "will
decide everything." Thapa stressed that the Prime Minister
needed to publicly and clearly explain why the Maoists could
not join the government with their arms. Without such a
clear statement from the Prime Minister, Thapa feared the UML
would cave to Maoist pressure. Thapa emphasized that the
support of the international community - the United Sates
publicly and India privately - was indispensable in
convincing the Prime Minster to take such a clear stand.
Madhav Kumar Nepal (MK),General Secretary of the Communist
Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML),stressed in
a separate meeting with the Ambassador on August 22 that his
party was committed to separation of the Maoists from their
weapons. End Summary.

All Depends on Prime Minister
--------------


2. (C) Surya Bahadur Thapa told the Ambassador on August 21
that, if the Prime Minister took a strong stand against the
Maoists maintaining their weapons, then "the course of
history will go in a different, proper way." He was
optimistic that the Prime Minister understood what he needed
to do, but feared he was not prepared for upcoming summit
talks between the parties and Maoists. If Koirala took a
strong, public stance, Thapa believed the Maoists would
eventually agree to give up their arms. First, as time went
by with their cadre out of the jungle, it would be more
difficult for the Maoists to convince their forces to return
to armed struggle. Second, the Maoists truly feared the
international community and outside pressure would swell if
they went back on the war path. Third, the Communist Party of
Nepal-United Marxist Leninists (CPN-UML) would support the
government if Koirala delivered a strong statement regarding
arms management. Otherwise, Thapa believed the CPN-UML would
lean to the Maoists.


3. (C) According to Thapa, of the three former elements of
the Nepal government - the monarchy, the constitution and

democracy - the first two had already failed. Democracy would
also fail if the government gave into elections before
disarmament of the Maoists.

Support of International Community
--------------


4. (C) Thapa twice noted that the public support of the
United States and the private support of India were
responsible for the Prime Minister's resolve in taking a firm
stand on arms management. The Prime Minister's advisers,
Home Minister Sitaula and Dr. Shakar, in his opinion, both
tilted toward the Maoists. It was the advice the
international community had provided that had been the PM's
principal source of encouragement for demanding arms
separation before elections. While there were some serious
people in Parliament who could hold discussions with the
Maoists and advise the Prime Minister on how to move forward,
the institutional mechanisms for such discussions were
lacking. When the Ambassador mentioned the Peace Commission
and the Peace Secretariat as possible mechanisms for such
dialogue, Thapa agreed that they were useful for preparing
for talks, but argued that they were ineffective as long as
Sitaula continued to cave to the Maoists at the negotiating
table.


5. (C) Thapa stated that he had asked India's Foreign
Secretary Shyam Saran why India had hesitated to deliver a

SIPDIS
clear public message regarding arms management, and requested
that India do so soon. Saran responded that he would do so
on the right occasion. Saran then delivered a statement
urging arms separation at the Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri
Lanka, Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) meeting in New
Delhi. However, in Thapa's view, this was not enough; a
clear public message from the MEA spokesman was still needed.


Maoists are Confident
--------------


6. (C) Thapa noted that the Maoists are convinced they can
win power at the negotiating table. The Prime Minister's
quick reversal of the petroleum price hike in response to
demonstrations throughout Kathmandu on August 19 and 20 had
likely further fueled the Maoists' conviction that the
government was weak and easily swayed. The weekend's events
also likely strengthened the Maoists' belief that the common
people supported them and that their demonstrations in the
street were succeeding.

CPN-UML Committed to Arms Management
--------------


7. (C) On August 22, MK Nepal told the Ambassador that the
CPN-UML remained committed to separating the Maoists from
their weapons before they enter into any interim government.
MK Nepal lamented that the GON had fouled up negotiations
from the very beginning, giving too much to the Maoists
without making any demands in return. MK Nepal recalled that
Maoist supreme Prachanda had at one point suggested a
three-phase approach for arms management: placement of
Maoists into camps with their weapons, separation of the
Maoists and their weapons, and reintegration of Maoist
fighters back into society. The Maoists had subsequently
backed away from that formulation, however. MK Nepal worried
that some people believed that Maoist weapons were not a big
deal, and that if they continued to intimidate the people,
the public would rise up against them. MK Nepal told the
Ambassador that this was not the position of his party. The
Ambassador encouraged MK Nepal to stand strong on his
position to completely separate the Maoists from their
weapons.

The Third People's Movement
--------------


8. (C) Both Thapa and MK Nepal acknowledged that the Maoists
would likely attempt to organize massive, anti-government
demonstrations in the coming weeks. Neither seemed disturbed
by the prospect, however, arguing that such attempts would
only underscore the lack of popular support for the Maoists.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Thapa has a long history in the Nepal government, and
his pragmatic approach is influential. It is difficult to
argue with his bottom line that if the Prime Minister does
not continue to make clear statements regarding arms
management, elements of the SPA will lean toward further
(perhaps fatal) compromise with the Maoists. If the
government states its position clearly, it will gain more
traction. The recent gas price demonstrations may convince
the Maoists to move toward confrontation in the street sooner
rather than later. While we agree that the Maoists will have
a tough time mobilizing massive public support, they will
likely find creative ways to pressure th GON as much as
possible.
MORIARTY