NEPAL: U.S. AND INDIA READING FROM THE SAME PAGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002097

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2016
TAGS: PTER PREL PREF IN NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: U.S. AND INDIA READING FROM THE SAME PAGE

REF: KATHMANDU 2028

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
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1. (C) In an August 2 conversation with the Ambassador,
Indian Ambassador Shiv Shankar Mukherjee indicated that the
Government of India (GOI) was moving in unison with the U.S.
on Nepal policy, insisting that the Maoists give up their
weapons before entering an interim government. Mukherjee
also agreed with the Ambassador that the GON needed to start
acting like a real government and working harder to enforce
the rule of law. Mukherjee worried that no one was
controlling Nepal's security forces, and that this could
cause problems in the future. The GOI was not impressed by
the UN team visiting Nepal and was concerned about the
Maoists' intentions. Mukherjee told the Ambassador that the
GOI saw a "window of opportunity" on Bhutanese refugee
issues, but worried that the window could close. The recent
visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister did not seem to overly
worry Ambassador Mukherjee. End Summary.

GON Needs To Stand Firm On Arms Management
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2. (C) Ambassador Moriarty met with Indian Ambassador Shiv
Shankar Mukherjee on August 2 to discuss the current
political environment in Nepal. Mukherjee began by stressing
that the GOI shared the U.S. position that the Maoists should
not be allowed to join an interim government before giving up
their weapons. Mukherjee was firm that their arms must be
"decommissioned." His definition of "decommissioning" was
that the Maoists would be physically separated from their
weapons and no longer able to use those weapons to threaten
the people of Nepal. Mukherjee said that during Indian
Foreign Minister Shyam Saran's recent visit to Nepal, Saran
had stressed to his Nepali interlocutors that this was the
GOI's position. Mukherjee also said that Saran made clear
that if the Maoists did enter an interim government without
decommissioning their weapons, India, like the U.S., would be
forced to "reconsider" its economic assistance to Nepal.

GON Needs To Act Like A Real Government
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador and Mukherjee agreed that the GON
needed to start acting like a real government by asserting
control and enforcing law and order. Mukherjee emphasized
that the GON needed to show it can govern effectively, as the
Maoists would view weakness on the part of the GON as
indicating that a military push might succeed in overthrowing
the government. Mukherjee was concerned about the
aggressiveness of the Maoists in recent days and the lack of
response from the GON. The GOI continued to let the GON know
that it supported Nepal's transition to democracy and
recognized the GON as the legitimate, democratically elected
government of Nepal. Mukherjee hoped that international
pressure on the Maoists to give up their weapons coupled with
international pressure on the GON to hold the line could
force the Maoists to blink first and give in on arms
management. Mukherjee remained concerned that Maoist
activity indicated a desire to push for total power; he told
the Ambassador that the Maoists had offices in 63 towns and
cities in Nepal.

GON Needs To Assert Control Over Security Forces
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4. (C) Mukherjee said that, after meeting with Home Minister
Krishna Sitaula, he was concerned about the relationship
between the GON and the police. The acting Inspector General
of the Nepal Police wanted to start having regular meetings
with the Home Minister to help chart a course for the Police,
but Sitaula himself was not interested in such meetings.
Mukherjee was concerned that no one is telling the security
forces in the country what to do, and this could cause
problems in the future.

GOI Not Impressed By UN Team

--------------


5. (C) Mukherjee stated that the UN observation team, led by
Staffan de Mistura, did not seem to be moving forward
effectively. Mukherjee doubted whether the UN team would be
able to convince the Maoists and the GON to reach consensus
on arms management. The Ambassador and Mukherjee agreed that
it appeared the Maoists did not want to be the party to
torpedo the peace process while the UN was here, but both
were concerned that they may move toward this after the UN
team leaves.

"Window Of Opportunity" on Bhutanese Refugee Issues
-------------- --------------


6. (C) The Ambassador raised the possibility of GOI assurance
to the GON not to allow future expulsions of Bhutanese
refugees across India. The Ambassador explained to Mukherjee
that this perhaps could be in the form of a quiet assurance
to the GON. Mukherjee said he had discussed the issue of
Bhutanese refugees extensively with Foreign Minister Saran.
Mukherjee said that both he and Saran worried about the
growth of Maoist infiltration in the camps and the security
implications this could have for India. The Indian envoy
seemed increasingly worried that the camps could pose a real
security threat to India in the future, and thought that with
third countries currently willing to resettle large numbers
of refugees there might now be a "window of opportunity" to
move on the Bhutanese refugee issue. He promised a readout
of the late July visit to New Delhi by the Bhutanese King,
during which Saran had intended to raise the refugee issue.

Chinese Visit Not A Concern To GOI
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7. (C) Mukherjee did not see the recent visit of Chinese
Foreign Minister Wu Tawei (reftel) as a major change in PRC
policy toward the Maoists. Mukherjee speculated that the
recent visit to Nepal of a Chinese academic who had met with
the Maoists indicated a desire by Beijing to establish some
contact with the Maoists now that they were above ground.
Mukherjee was concerned about reports of importation of
weapons from China by the Maoists, but noted that the Indians
were not clear whether Beijing had approved these sales.

Comment
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8. (C) The Indians are playing a helpful role in reinforcing
our message to the Government and people of Nepal on the
absolute necessity of management of Maoist weapons before the
Maoists enter the government. They also share our concern
about the need for PM Koirala to enforce the rule of law.
Whether Ambassador Mukherjee's pessimism about the
effectiveness of the UN team will prove warranted should be
clear very soon. De Mistura is scheduled to leave tomorrow,
agreement or no agreement.
MORIARTY