Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU2004
2006-07-26 11:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:
GOVERNMENT AND MAOISTS WRANGLE FOR CONTROL OF
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002004
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT AND MAOISTS WRANGLE FOR CONTROL OF
PEACE PROCESS
REF: A. KATHMANDU 1984
B. KATHMANDU 1994
C. KATHMANDU 1865
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
PLOTTING DIRECTION FOR THE PEACE PROCESS
----------------------------------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002004
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT AND MAOISTS WRANGLE FOR CONTROL OF
PEACE PROCESS
REF: A. KATHMANDU 1984
B. KATHMANDU 1994
C. KATHMANDU 1865
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
PLOTTING DIRECTION FOR THE PEACE PROCESS
--------------
1. (C) On July 25, Suresh Chalise, Prime Minister GP
Koirala's foreign relations adviser, told DCM that the
Government of Nepal (GON) was uncertain as to what the
Maoists wanted out of the peace process. He accused Maoist
Chairman Prachanda of objecting to the spirit of the June 16
eight-point agreement and the best interests of the country
in his July 24 letter to the UN (ref A). Chalise stated that
the GON planned to prepare a calendar for the peace process
after the visit of the UN assessment team, which arrives on
July 26. He reported that the GON had already started to
work on the calendar, which would set the date of the
constituent assembly elections and all milestones until then,
including a bilateral cease-fire agreement and interim
constitution.
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING FOR MAOIST DISARMAMENT
--------------
2. (C) DCM observed that the political parties agreed that
Maoists must disarm before joining an interim government.
Chalise replied that the GON, encouraged by this consensus,
was working on confidence-building measures to convince the
Maoists to disarm. He claimed that the GON was ready to do
whatever possible to build confidence with the Maoists. The
PM's adviser promised that the GON would provide personal
security to Maoists once they disarmed. (Note: Deputy PM
Amik Sherchan in a separate meeting had mentioned that Maoist
concern for their own safety was a roadblock (ref B). End
Note.) Chalise told DCM that he would tell us about
additional confidence-building measures at a later date.
MAOISTS WANT CARTER CENTER PARTICIPATION
--------------
3. (C) Chalise enigmatically noted that there had been "no
confusion" regarding the visit of a Carter Center delegation
in mid-July. (Note: On July 14, a Nepali weekly reported
that the Carter Center met with Maoist leaders, and concluded
erroneously that this was a reversal of U.S. policy barring
USG meetings with Maoists. The Carter Center reportedly
offered to monitor constituent assembly elections (ref C).
End Note.) The PM's adviser showed DCM a copy of a letter
that Prachanda had sent to the Carter Center after the
delegation's visit, requesting former President Carter's
assistance as a peace process facilitator. Chalise said the
letter was "off the record" but did not offer additional
perspective.
COMMENT
--------------
4. (C) Chalise, like other interlocutors, showed little
concern about Prachanda's July 24 letter to the UN. The PM's
adviser expressed confidence that the GON could overcome
Maoist obstacles. Prachanda's invitation to the Carter
Center is further evidence of the Maoists' tactical skill,
and the value of additional external mediators in Prachanda's
view. We can expect the Maoists to continue to exploit
similar opportunities to shape the peace process.
MORIARTY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT AND MAOISTS WRANGLE FOR CONTROL OF
PEACE PROCESS
REF: A. KATHMANDU 1984
B. KATHMANDU 1994
C. KATHMANDU 1865
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
PLOTTING DIRECTION FOR THE PEACE PROCESS
--------------
1. (C) On July 25, Suresh Chalise, Prime Minister GP
Koirala's foreign relations adviser, told DCM that the
Government of Nepal (GON) was uncertain as to what the
Maoists wanted out of the peace process. He accused Maoist
Chairman Prachanda of objecting to the spirit of the June 16
eight-point agreement and the best interests of the country
in his July 24 letter to the UN (ref A). Chalise stated that
the GON planned to prepare a calendar for the peace process
after the visit of the UN assessment team, which arrives on
July 26. He reported that the GON had already started to
work on the calendar, which would set the date of the
constituent assembly elections and all milestones until then,
including a bilateral cease-fire agreement and interim
constitution.
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING FOR MAOIST DISARMAMENT
--------------
2. (C) DCM observed that the political parties agreed that
Maoists must disarm before joining an interim government.
Chalise replied that the GON, encouraged by this consensus,
was working on confidence-building measures to convince the
Maoists to disarm. He claimed that the GON was ready to do
whatever possible to build confidence with the Maoists. The
PM's adviser promised that the GON would provide personal
security to Maoists once they disarmed. (Note: Deputy PM
Amik Sherchan in a separate meeting had mentioned that Maoist
concern for their own safety was a roadblock (ref B). End
Note.) Chalise told DCM that he would tell us about
additional confidence-building measures at a later date.
MAOISTS WANT CARTER CENTER PARTICIPATION
--------------
3. (C) Chalise enigmatically noted that there had been "no
confusion" regarding the visit of a Carter Center delegation
in mid-July. (Note: On July 14, a Nepali weekly reported
that the Carter Center met with Maoist leaders, and concluded
erroneously that this was a reversal of U.S. policy barring
USG meetings with Maoists. The Carter Center reportedly
offered to monitor constituent assembly elections (ref C).
End Note.) The PM's adviser showed DCM a copy of a letter
that Prachanda had sent to the Carter Center after the
delegation's visit, requesting former President Carter's
assistance as a peace process facilitator. Chalise said the
letter was "off the record" but did not offer additional
perspective.
COMMENT
--------------
4. (C) Chalise, like other interlocutors, showed little
concern about Prachanda's July 24 letter to the UN. The PM's
adviser expressed confidence that the GON could overcome
Maoist obstacles. Prachanda's invitation to the Carter
Center is further evidence of the Maoists' tactical skill,
and the value of additional external mediators in Prachanda's
view. We can expect the Maoists to continue to exploit
similar opportunities to shape the peace process.
MORIARTY