AMBASSADOR SUGGESTS HMGN POSTPONE MUNICIPAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 000199

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM NP
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR SUGGESTS HMGN POSTPONE MUNICIPAL
ELECTIONS, CALL CEASE-FIRE

REF: KATHMANDU 107

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons, 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) In separate meetings on January 18 with Home Minister
Kamal Thapa, Vice-Chairman Tulsi Giri, and Vice-Chairman
Kirti Nidhi Bista, and in a January 19 meeting with Foreign
Minister Ramesh Nath Pandey, the Ambassador pushed for His
Majesty's Government of Nepal (HMGN) to postpone the
municipal elections (scheduled for February 8),announce a
cease-fire, and reach out in a meaningful way to the
political parties. All appeared deeply concerned about the
current situation and receptive to the proposal. All
expressed nervousness about raising concrete proposals with
the King and refused to speculate on how he might react.
Giri said that he planned to travel east to the King's camp
on January 19 and said he would discuss the Ambassador's
proposals with him; the other three also indicated that they
would raise the proposals with the King. That said, Giri and
Thapa both worried that HMGN might lose face and wanted the
Parties to act first. In response to Pandey's opinion that
the King could appeal to the political parties and call for a
cease-fire after the municipal elections, the Ambassador
countered that HMGN should not wait. The Ambassador urged
the government to demonstrate magnanimity, vision, and
statesmanship. The Vice-Chairmen also told the Ambassador
that HMGN would take "aggressive" steps to prevent Maoist
infiltration of the Parties' January 20 demonstration. End
Summary.

Package: Postpone Elections, Call for Cease-Fire
-------------- ---


2. (C) The Ambassador separately advised the three HMGN
officials that the USG would welcome an announcement by HMGN
postponing the municipal elections, calling for dialogue with
the political parties, and seeking negotiations among HMGN,
the Maoists and the Parties for a comprehensive cease-fire
with effective monitoring. The Ambassador explained that
such a package would only do harm to the Maoists - if they
decided against a cease-fire, it would show the domestic and
international community that they had no interest in a
peaceful future, while a genuine cease-fire would lessen the
grip of Maoist terror over the countryside. A dramatic
government announcement could also pressure the political
parties to enter a dialogue. The Ambassador noted that the
government could make clear during its announcement that
municipal elections were not being cancelled but merely
postponed, perhaps for 30-60 days. The Ambassador urged the
government to demonstrate magnanimity, vision, and
statesmanship.

Thapa: Concern about The Parties' Reaction ...
-------------- -


3. (C) Home Minister Kamal Thapa (and new head, although
contested in the Supreme Court by Pashupati Rana, of the
pro-Palace RPP party),said he saw some "positive sides" to
the proposal and would take it up with the King. He added
that he was unsure how the King would interpret the proposal.
However, he remained hesitant and feared that such an
announcement might make HMGN look weak with regard to both
the Parties and the Maoists. He worried that there was no
indication that the political parties would come for
reconciliation. Thapa said that the political parties needed
to provide the government a "basis of understanding," such as
accepting the 1990 Constitution and abandoning talk of a
constituent assembly as well as accepting the King's
"election agenda," before he could urge the King to accept
the proposal. Although the Ambassador pointed out that Thapa
was asking the Parties to give up everything when the
government would offer nothing to the Parties to save face,
Thapa nevertheless maintained that if the Parties took such
actions, then HMGN could postpone the municipal elections.
However, he added that he would raise the proposal with the
King.


... And the Maoists
--------------


4. (C) Thapa also posited that since the Maoists had resumed
violence, the proposed announcement would make it seem as if
the government were going backwards. Thapa stressed that the
timing was not good for such a move, especially given the
political parties' planned January 20 demonstration. He
proposed waiting until after the municipal elections to
pursue a cease-fire with the Maoists and reaching out to the
political parties. In reply, the Ambassador stressed that it
would likely be much more difficult after the elections to
regain the Parties' trust.

Concerned Giri: King Wants to Talk with NC Leader Koirala
-------------- --------------


5. (C) In response to the Ambassador's outlining of the
package described above, an obviously nervous Giri expressed
his understanding that the legitimate political forces needed
to reconcile. Worrying that the extreme left was beginning
to dominate the seven-party alliance, V-C Giri said he had
asked Nepali Congress (NC) President G.P. Koirala to come in
and talk with the King. Giri noted that, if the NC leader
did so, then the two could then announce the postponement of
elections. He lamented that the NC leader had not yet
responded to his queries. The Ambassador explained that this
option forced Koirala to take a lot of risk for an uncertain
reward. The Ambassador stressed that an announcement by the
King of a package postponing elections to allow time to
discuss with the political parties a way to include them in
elections and calling for negotiations among the HMGN,
Maoists, and Parties on a cease-fire would generate positive
response from domestic and international public opinion. It
would also provide Koirala with cover and allow him to talk
with the King. Giri undertook to convey the Ambassador's
proposal to Gyanendra when he flew east to the King's camp on
January 19. (Note: The King left the capital January 1 for a
three week tour of eastern Nepal. End Note.)


6. (C) Vice-Chairman Bista agreed that there was "no doubt"
the proposal was a good idea. He added that the King was
"not that obstinate" and would listen to reason. However,
Bista doubted that the proposal would lead anywhere. Bista,
who had read Maoist Deputy Baburam Bhattarai's op-ed in Samay
(reftel),asserted that the Maoists would not agree to a
government-proposed cease-fire, but would pursue their goal
of a totalitarian government.

Pandey: Timing Problematic
--------------


7. (C) Although agreeing with the merits of the proposal,
Foreign Minister Pandey first protested that things had moved
too far for HMGN to be able to act at this time. He, too,
argued that HMGN would "lose face" because the King would not
be able to act before the political parties' January 20
demonstration against the elections. The FM proposed that
immediately after the municipal elections, the King could
appeal to the political parties and there would be room to
start negotiations for reconciliation. The Ambassador pushed
back, noting "there was no time like the present," and HMGN
should demonstrate statesmanship and find a way to compromise
with the political parties, not force them to capitulate.
The Ambassador noted that the King could still act after
January 20, as long as it was before the elections.

HMGN Will Prevent Maoist Infiltration on January 20
-------------- --------------


8. (C) The Ambassador encouraged both Vice-Chairmen to
consider the freedoms of peaceful assembly and speech as HMGN
considered how to deal with the legitimate security concerns
arising from the seven-party alliance's demonstration planned
for January 20. V-C Giri responded that, given HMGN's ban on
demonstrations that day, he expected there would be arrests
if the political parties tried to move forward with their
plans. HMGN had tried to avoid a confrontation with the

Parties, but after the Maoists' January 14 attack in
Kathmandu Valley, security concerns had forced them to
institute preventive measures. Bista explained that HMGN
could "not sit idle," but had to be stricter and more
aggressive to respond to the threat of Maoist infiltration.
He added that HMGN knew it had to be careful to avoid a
"mishap" on January 20.

Considering Acting on RCCC
--------------


9. (C) V-C Giri told the Ambassador that HMGN was considering
advising the Supreme Court that it would be acceptable to
rule that the Royal Commission to Control Corruption (RCCC)
was unconstitutional, thereby releasing former PM Sher
Bahadur Deuba. However, Giri added that such a Supreme Court
ruling would allow other challenges to the King's authority
under Article 127 of the Constitution - perhaps making it
"difficult for the King to use Article 127." The Ambassador
emphasized that the USG would welcome a decision that the
RCCC was unconstitutional and a subsequent release of the
former Prime Minister. The Ambassador noted that the Supreme
Court could both issue a narrow ruling that the RCCC was
unconstitutionally formed while preserving the King's Article
127 authority.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) All four interlocutors, presumably shaken by the
bloody Maoist attacks inside the Kathmandu Valley on January
14, were noticeably concerned. They all profess to
understand the need for compromise between the Palace and the
political parties, but, aware that the King has staked his
prestige on holding the elections, seem reluctant to raise
possible alternative solutions with him. On January 19, in
early-morning arrests, the HMGN detained large numbers of
political leaders, temporarily cut off telephone lines and
extended curfew hours (septel).
MORIARTY