UN PREVIEWS GON REQUEST FOR PEACE PROCESS SUPPORT

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001731

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO NP
SUBJECT: UN PREVIEWS GON REQUEST FOR PEACE PROCESS SUPPORT

REF: USUN 1287

Classified By: DCM Nick Dean, Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) UN Resident Representative Matthew Kahane previewed
the eagerly anticipated GON request for support to the United
Nations in a briefing for selected countries June 30. Kahane
insisted that he could not predict when the UN might receive
the letter from the GON, ascribing the delay to dynamics
among the GON and political parties. He expects the UN also
to be asked to provide election monitoring support. The UN
Res Rep recognized the need for urgency to maintain momentum
in Nepal's peace process and address the critical need to
disarm the Maoists. However, he made clear that he expected
a UN response to follow usual procedures, entailing weeks or
even months to deploy.

Five Areas of Assistance
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2. (C) Kahane said that the GON letter would request UN
assistance in five areas:
-- continued human rights monitoring,
-- assistance to the national monitoring committee in
general terms with specifics to be determined,
-- reassurance to the Nepalese public that the Maoists will
not have access to arms,
-- supervision/cantonment of the Peoples Liberation Army,
-- assurance that the Nepalese Army will remain under
control.

UN Election Monitoring
--------------


3. (C) The UN Resident Representative said that the letter
would present these specific requests as elements of UN
support the GON believes would be conducive to free and fair
elections. The GON will also request UN monitoring
assistance for constituent assembly elections.

Letter Slow to Dispatch
--------------


4. (C) Kahane said that recent discussion with DPM and
Foreign Minister Oli had made clear that the much-anticipated
letter would require further vetting within the government
and among the parties. He opined that GON-Seven Party
Alliance dynamics were a principal reason for delay.

UN Processes
--------------


5. (C) The UN Res Rep outlined the standard UN procedures a
GON request for assistance would trigger, culminating in
dispatch of a UN assessment mission. He noted that in terms
of UN agencies that would participate, UN resolutions 1612
(Children in Conflict) and 1325 (Women in Peace Processes)
would play a prominent role. Beyond the central role of the
UN Department for Peace Keeping, he expected UN agencies
associated with post-conflict DDR to figure prominently.

Maintaining Momentum on the Peace Process
--------------


6. (C) Kahane recognized concern among Nepal's political
parties that the UN must maintain momentum and not allow the
peace process in Nepal to founder as a result of the UN's
slow-moving bureaucracy. Kahane observed that the UN faces
many demands for peacekeeping assistance. UN member country
support for a Nepal mission is critical, especially proactive
engagement from countries with special interest in Nepal.

Maoist Support for PKO?
--------------


7. (C) Regarding whether the expected letter of request
would be a joint GON/Maoist letter, the UN official was
equivocal. The UN would in any case have to be confident
that all parties to the conflict requested the assistance, a
circumstance to be confirmed as part of the assessment
mission. In any event, he expected that a letter referencing
the various plans and codes of conduct agreed between the
Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists would reflect
Maoist support for the request.

Don't Rush the UN
--------------


8. (C) Kahane was evasive when repeatedly pressed on how
quickly the UN could respond to a GON request for assistance.
He recognized that extensive UN preparations for engagement
would not provide the surety required should the Maoists join
the government within a matter of weeks. The UN Res Rep
noted the relative speed with which the UN had deployed in
East Timor, which he said had been done in just weeks. He
observed, however, that the scale of the mission in Timor --
with just one million citizens and 600 rebel soldiers -- is
much smaller than the large mission required for Nepal.

Obstacles to PKO
--------------


9. (C) The UN official expounded at length on obstacles
facing a peacekeeping mission in Nepal. These range, he
said, from establishing a single cease fire (rather than the
current parallel GON/Maoist cease fires),technical
cantonment and weapons safeguarding preparation, to UN HQ
planning, member support and financing. Pressed again on the
need for dispatch to send a signal of hope to the Nepalese,
Kahane added the need for trained military observers to the
list. The UN official noted the Maoist vision of
peacekeeping, expressed by recent Maoist interlocutors, who
hoped for a "Peace Corps-like" PKO operation.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) The UN Res Rep's briefing outlined what the UN
expects from the GON, but equally importantly, a disturbing
lack of a sense of urgency on the part of the UN, at least at
the Nepal mission level. Kahane was unresponsive to repeated
prodding by interlocutors on the need for an expedited
response from the UN to the much-anticipated GON request for
support. Clearly, focused anticipation of the GON request
and energetic engagement of the UN by interested member
countries, especially the U.S., will be required to
accelerate expanded UN engagement in Nepal.
MORIARTY