Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU1689
2006-06-27 10:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:
AMBASSADOR CAUTIONS HOME MINISTER/CHIEF NEGOTIATOR
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001689
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR CAUTIONS HOME MINISTER/CHIEF NEGOTIATOR
SITAULA THAT U.S. ASSISTANCE COULD BE AT RISK
REF: KATHMANDU 1678
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons, 1.4 (b/d).
Warning Against Maoists Entering Government Before Giving Up
Violence
--------------------------------------------- ------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001689
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR CAUTIONS HOME MINISTER/CHIEF NEGOTIATOR
SITAULA THAT U.S. ASSISTANCE COULD BE AT RISK
REF: KATHMANDU 1678
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons, 1.4 (b/d).
Warning Against Maoists Entering Government Before Giving Up
Violence
-------------- --------------
1. (C) In a June 27 meeting, the Ambassador cautioned
Government of Nepal (GON) chief negotiator and Home Minister
Krishna Prasad Sitaula that if the Maoists came into
government without committing to give up violence irrevocably
and permanently giving up their weapons, the USG would have
to cut off assistance to the GON. The Ambassador further
warned Sitaula that, if the Maoists entered the government
without having given up their weapons, they would almost
certainly take over the GON sooner rather than later. The
Ambassador suggested that the GON should make it clear that
the Maoists could not keep their weapons and enter
government. He stressed to Sitaula that the GON had the
support of the international community and the Nepali people.
Managing Maoist Weapons
--------------
2. (C) Sitaula emphasized that if the United Nations
monitored Maoist arms and soldiers, the issue would be
settled. Defining "management" of arms was critical, he
said. The Ambassador recommended the GON focus on reaching
an agreement about management of weapons that eliminated
people's fear that the Maoists would use violence against
them. Sitaula stated that the seven parties were discussing
arms management and were looking at confining all Maoist
cadre to different places around the country (not one central
place). Subsequently, the UN should monitor the weapons and
armies. He noted that the GON would be able to record the
Maoists' biographical data. The Ambassador reiterated that
the GON needed to assure people that the Maoists would not
get their weapons back.
3. The GON's negotiator admitted that it was "very hard" to
convince the Maoists to give up violence, but the GON was
trying to bring them into the political process. Sitaula
added that he remained hopeful because he believed most
Maoists were trying to enter the political mainstream. He
said that there were splits among the Maoists that were
making it difficult for the top leadership to convince
lower-level cadre to abandon violence. The Ambassador
cautioned him that Maoist leaders could be using purported
difficulties within the party merely as an excuse to justify
continuing extortion, threats, and intimidation. Home
Secretary Umesh Prasad Mainali noted that the cease-fire
SIPDIS
monitoring committee would start work June 27 and hoped that
monitoring would lead to a decrease in objectionable activity
by the Maoists.
Comment
--------------
4. (C) The Ambassador made clear to the GON's chief
negotiator the potential price the GON would have to pay if
it allowed the rebels to enter government before giving up
violence. Sitaula has been all over the map since the June
16 signing of the eight point agreement (reftel). We remain
doubtful that he is the best lead negotiator for the GON.
However, it appears he at least recognizes the critical issue
of managing Maoist arms and that "managing weapons" includes
ending Maoist ability to commit violence.
MORIARTY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR CAUTIONS HOME MINISTER/CHIEF NEGOTIATOR
SITAULA THAT U.S. ASSISTANCE COULD BE AT RISK
REF: KATHMANDU 1678
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons, 1.4 (b/d).
Warning Against Maoists Entering Government Before Giving Up
Violence
-------------- --------------
1. (C) In a June 27 meeting, the Ambassador cautioned
Government of Nepal (GON) chief negotiator and Home Minister
Krishna Prasad Sitaula that if the Maoists came into
government without committing to give up violence irrevocably
and permanently giving up their weapons, the USG would have
to cut off assistance to the GON. The Ambassador further
warned Sitaula that, if the Maoists entered the government
without having given up their weapons, they would almost
certainly take over the GON sooner rather than later. The
Ambassador suggested that the GON should make it clear that
the Maoists could not keep their weapons and enter
government. He stressed to Sitaula that the GON had the
support of the international community and the Nepali people.
Managing Maoist Weapons
--------------
2. (C) Sitaula emphasized that if the United Nations
monitored Maoist arms and soldiers, the issue would be
settled. Defining "management" of arms was critical, he
said. The Ambassador recommended the GON focus on reaching
an agreement about management of weapons that eliminated
people's fear that the Maoists would use violence against
them. Sitaula stated that the seven parties were discussing
arms management and were looking at confining all Maoist
cadre to different places around the country (not one central
place). Subsequently, the UN should monitor the weapons and
armies. He noted that the GON would be able to record the
Maoists' biographical data. The Ambassador reiterated that
the GON needed to assure people that the Maoists would not
get their weapons back.
3. The GON's negotiator admitted that it was "very hard" to
convince the Maoists to give up violence, but the GON was
trying to bring them into the political process. Sitaula
added that he remained hopeful because he believed most
Maoists were trying to enter the political mainstream. He
said that there were splits among the Maoists that were
making it difficult for the top leadership to convince
lower-level cadre to abandon violence. The Ambassador
cautioned him that Maoist leaders could be using purported
difficulties within the party merely as an excuse to justify
continuing extortion, threats, and intimidation. Home
Secretary Umesh Prasad Mainali noted that the cease-fire
SIPDIS
monitoring committee would start work June 27 and hoped that
monitoring would lead to a decrease in objectionable activity
by the Maoists.
Comment
--------------
4. (C) The Ambassador made clear to the GON's chief
negotiator the potential price the GON would have to pay if
it allowed the rebels to enter government before giving up
violence. Sitaula has been all over the map since the June
16 signing of the eight point agreement (reftel). We remain
doubtful that he is the best lead negotiator for the GON.
However, it appears he at least recognizes the critical issue
of managing Maoist arms and that "managing weapons" includes
ending Maoist ability to commit violence.
MORIARTY