Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU1664
2006-06-23 12:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

POLITICAL LEADERS AGREE MAOISTS MUST GIVE UP ARMS

Tags:  PGOV PTER PREL KPKO EAID NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001664 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL KPKO EAID NP
SUBJECT: POLITICAL LEADERS AGREE MAOISTS MUST GIVE UP ARMS
BEFORE JOINING GOVERNMENT


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001664

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL KPKO EAID NP
SUBJECT: POLITICAL LEADERS AGREE MAOISTS MUST GIVE UP ARMS
BEFORE JOINING GOVERNMENT


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) On June 22, the Ambassador met separately with Madhav
Kumar Nepal, General Secretary of the Communist Party of
Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML),and Deputy Prime
Minister Amik Sherchan of People's Front Nepal (PFN) to
stress that the Maoists must give up arms before they could
be allowed to join an interim government. MK Nepal agreed
that the management of Maoist weapons was the most important
issue for the Government of Nepal (GON). He stressed that it
would be "suicidal" to dissolve Parliament before Maoists
were disarmed and the constituent assembly process was
clarified. Sherchan assured the Ambassador that the GON
would move forward with the constituent assembly election
process only after the Maoist arms issue was "resolved." MK
Nepal maintained it was acceptable for the UN to be involved
with both the negotiation of the arms issue and the
implementation of monitoring, despite possible objections
from India. He also noted that he felt the Maoists and
Nepali Congress (NC) were trying to undercut the CPN-UML in
the peace process. We learned from a source that PM Koirala
acknowledged he "messed up" in signing the eight-point
agreement so quickly. End Summary.

AMBASSADOR CAUTIONS MAOISTS IN GOVERNMENT COULD AFFECT USG
ASSISTANCE
-------------- --------------


2. (C) During his separate June 22 meetings with General
Secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal (CPN-UML),and Deputy Prime

SIPDIS
Minister Amik Sherchan (PFN),the Ambassador explained that
the USG would likely have to cease assistance of all types to
Nepal if the Maoists joined the GON without having abandoned
their weapons. The Ambassador explained that the U.S.
Patriot Act appeared to prevent us from providing assistance
under such circumstances; he noted that the Government of
India (GOI) would also look closely at providing assistance
that could be diverted to help armed Maoists. MK Nepal not

only accepted this consequence but asserted that the
international community should be united in its decision not
to provide assistance to Nepal if Maoists joined the GON
without laying down their weapons.

POLITICAL LEADERS AGREE MAOISTS NEED TO LAY DOWN ARMS BEFORE
JOINING GON
-------------- --------------


3. (C) MK Nepal stated that weapons management was the most
important issue for the GON. He said that only after the
arms issue was resolved could the GON continue with its
roadmap, which he outlined in sequence: framing an interim
constitution, establishing an interim government, clarifying
the constituent assembly process, and announcing a date for
constituent assembly elections. MK Nepal said that it would
be "suicidal" to dissolve Parliament before all these steps
were completed. The Ambassador urged MK Nepal to stress that
the GON needed to be unified and discontinue conceding to
Maoist wishes during negotiations. The Ambassador noted that
the people of Nepal supported the GON, not the Maoists.


4. (C) Deputy PM Sherchan conveyed to the Ambassador that the
GON understood that the USG was concerned about the
management of Maoist weapons. He assured the Ambassador that
the GON would go for constituent assembly elections only
after the issue of Maoist arms was "resolved." Sherchan said
he had received a personal message from the Maoists that they
agreed the Code of Conduct should be fully implemented. He
mentioned that the Maoists had accepted multi-party democracy
and opined that the Maoists would join the mainstream without
their weapons within six months. Sherchan agreed with the
Ambassador that extortion was still occurring, but said that
it was happening less often. The Deputy PM blamed the
ongoing extortion on the rank-and-file Maoist cadre. The
Ambassador disagreed, saying that extortion in the Kathmandu
Valley (which was increasing) and Maoist demands for copies
of GON files were the types of actions that would occur only

with the full knowledge and support of the Maoist leadership.


MK NEPAL WANTS UN INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATING MECHANISM TO
MONITOR ARMS
-------------- --------------


5. (C) MK Nepal hoped that the UN could come in immediately
to help determine the terms of reference for UN monitoring.
The Ambassador stressed there was a difference between
negotiations to decide a monitoring mechanism and the
implementation of that mechanism. He noted that the GOI had
said it would only permit the UN to monitor weapons, not to
be involved in negotiations. MK Nepal suggested that the UN
could come in under the guise of technical assistance to help
the GON decide the monitoring mechanism and also implement
it. He added that Maoist guns and intimidation worried him
more than dealing with the Maoists in peace talks.

MK NEPAL: MAOISTS AND NEPALI CONGRESS HAVE SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP
-------------- --------------


6. (C) MK Nepal insisted that the NC was using the Maoists to
undercut the CPN-UML during the ongoing peace process. He
explained how NC Central Committee Member Shekhar Koirala and
Home Minister Sitaula had gone to Pokhara before the June 16
PM and Prachanda talks in the capital, and had cooked up the
agreement on the dissolution of Parliament without consulting
the CPN-UML or other parties in the alliance. He expressed
anger that he and the other leaders of the seven-party
alliance were summoned by G.P. Koirala to the PM's residence
on June 16 for "talks with the Maoists," only to discover
that they would not be involved in the talks, but merely be
observing Koirala and Prachanda sign the eight-point
agreement. MK Nepal said he was the only one who spoke up
and demanded that leaders of all seven parties should sign.
The Ambassador commented that he did not believe the NC had
acted maliciously toward the CPN-UML, but acknowledged that
the NC had poorly negotiated the eight-point agreement. MK
Nepal stated that if the NC wanted to "join together with the
Maoists while they maintained weapons," the CPN-UML would
withdraw from the GON.

KOIRALA ACKNOWLEDGED HE MESSED UP
--------------


7. (C) A source told the Ambassador that PM Koirala had
summoned Speaker of the House Subash Nemwang onto his plane
prior to departing for Bangkok on June 17 and acknowledged
that he had "messed up" by signing the eight-point agreement.
Koirala agreed to try to fix matters upon his return from
Bangkok. (Note: Koirala went to Bangkok to receive medical
care. He had prostate surgery and is expected to return to
Kathmandu on June 26. End Note.)

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) Both leaders understand that managing the Maoists'
weapons before the rebels join the mainstream is in the best
interests of the country. MK Nepal appeared more worried
about the Maoists than he had previously. Sherchan, leader
of a small party with close links to the Maoists,
acknowledged that Maoists were not complying with the Code of
Conduct, but was confident that the Maoists would turn out to
be nice guys. We will continue to stress the urgency of
resolving the Maoist arms issue with the GON and with party
leaders.

MORIARTY