Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU1663
2006-06-23 12:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

FORMER PRIME MINISTER SURYA THAPA WORRIED ABOUT THE EIGHT-POINT AGREEMENT AND POSSIBLE MAOIST-LED GOVERNMENT

Tags:  PGOV PTER PINR NP PREF 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001663 

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINR RPREF NP
SUBJECT: FORMER PRIME MINISTER SURYA THAPA WORRIED ABOUT
THE EIGHT-POINT AGREEMENT AND POSSIBLE MAOIST-LED GOVERNMENT

REF: BEIJING 13004

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001663

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINR RPREF NP
SUBJECT: FORMER PRIME MINISTER SURYA THAPA WORRIED ABOUT
THE EIGHT-POINT AGREEMENT AND POSSIBLE MAOIST-LED GOVERNMENT

REF: BEIJING 13004

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a June 22 meeting with the Ambassador, Surya
Bahadur Thapa, chairman of the Rastriya Janashakti Party
(RJP) and five-time Prime Minister, condemned the eight-point
agreement that Prime Minister G. P. Koirala had signed with
Maoist chairman Prachanda on June 16. He stressed that the
political parties must rethink their strategy and suggested
that PM Koirala utilize political party members who could
create and manage a solution. He described the havoc in
Nepal and the region that would occur if the Maoists were in
power. The Ambassador informed Thapa that under the Patriot
Act, the United States would likely have to cease all
assistance to Nepal if the Maoists were to join the
government before laying down their arms. The Ambassador
noted that the government had the people's support to stop
making concessions to the Maoists and said that we would
continue to emphasize that point to the seven parties. End
summary.

THUMBS DOWN FOR EIGHT-POINT AGREEMENT
--------------


2. (C) In a June 22 meeting, Thapa told the Ambassador that
he was apprehensive about what would come from the
eight-point agreement, which he described as a "suicidal
blunder." Thapa said that if the agreement proceeded without
modification, the Maoists would take over the government from
the inside within six months. Thapa, referring to PM
Koirala's regret about the eight-point agreement (septel),
said that the government would be a lost cause if it did not
attempt to make corrections. The unmodified eight-point
agreement would lead to a Nepal bereft of democracy, stripped
of the monarchy, and controlled by terrorists. He noted that
the government had two important institutions at its
advantage--the army and the civil service--and that it should
refrain from disturbing their operations or meddling with
personnel assignments.

THE GOVERNMENT CAN DO BETTER
--------------


3. (C) Thapa insisted that a Maoist government was not

inevitable if Parliament reorganized its strategy. He
suggested that PM Koirala exploit the talents of the many
intelligent, imaginative people in the different political
parties who were capable of managing a Maoist solution and
form a private forum for discussion. Thapa said that a new
democratic front would not have to be a public spectacle but
could take place in a private forum. He judged that King
Gyanendra was no longer a threat to the government and agreed
with the Ambassador that the political parties--once the
weakest corner of the King/Maoist/Parties triangle--needed to
realize that they were now stronger than the Maoists. The
Nepali people were not demanding that the government make
concessions to the Maoists, and doing so only made the GON
look weaker.

MAOISTS IN THE GOVERNMENT BAD FOR REGIONAL AFFAIRS
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Thapa explained that a Maoist-infiltrated government
would have serious regional implications, particularly for
Bangladesh and India (each fighting its own insurgencies),as
well as Bhutan and China (each requiring the cooperation of
the Nepalese government; Bhutan because of the refugee issue
and China because of the issue of Tibetan sovereignty).
Thapa said that the Chinese government was debating its
policy of non-interference in Nepal's affairs; he speculated
that China could be tempted to support Maoist entry into the
government, if the Maoists agreed to honor China's position
on Tibet. Thapa cautioned that a Chinese alliance with
Nepal--which traditionally had been under the influence of
India--would upset the balance of power in the region. He
noted that the government of India (GOI) had always painted

KATHMANDU 00001663 002 OF 002


Nepal's political woes as an internal situation. Now the GOI
had realized that, if they seized power, the Maoists would
support international terrorism, especially in India.

AMBASSADOR CAUTIONS MAOISTS IN GOVERNMENT COULD AFFECT USG
ASSISTANCE
-------------- --------------


5. (C) The Ambassador stated that the United States would
likely have to cease all types of economic and military
assistance to Nepal if the Maoists were to join the
government before disarming; the U.S. Patriot Act prohibits
support of proscribed terrorist organizations, the Ambassador
amplified. Thapa stressed the importance of the roles the
United States and India could play by bolstering support for
PM Koirala and encouraging the Nepalese government to
strengthen its resolve against the Maoists.

COMMENT
--------------


6. (C) Surya Bahadur Thapa is a veteran Nepalese politician.
He understands that the government has placed itself in a
precarious position but could still easily prevail if only it
would use its resources effectively. His comments on the
PRC's being tempted to play with the Maoists in return for
the insurgents' support on Tibet appear to have some
plausibility in light of recent conversations in Beijing
(reftel) and reporting in other channels.

BIO NOTE
--------------


7. (C) Surya Bahadur Thapa has been highly visible on the
Nepali political scene for forty years. As Prime Minister
(1963-64, 1965-69, 1979-83, 1997-98, and 2003-04) he was
known for his statesmanlike approach and his iron-fisted use
of executive power. Intelligent, articulate, and wily, Thapa
is known for his combative and often colorful public
rhetoric, but he is courteous in private conversation,
especially with foreigners.


8. (C) Thapa joined the Nepali Congress Party in 1954 and
since then has repeatedly changed parties, alliances, and
slogans. He formed the Rastriya Prajantantra Party (RPP) in
1990 to integrate the Panchayat-era groups that had joined
the palace to resist the restoration of democracy. During
his tenure as party president (1991-2002),Thapa changed from
champion of the party-less Panchayat system to advocate for
multiparty democracy. In March 2005, Thapa broke away from
the RPP to form the RJP.


9. (C) Thapa was born on March 21, 1928, into an affluent,
land-owning Chhetri (warrior class) family in the eastern
district of Dhankuta. He was a better-than-average student
at India's Allahabad University. He is married with four
grown children, a son and three daughters. He enjoys reading
and gardening. In addition to his native Nepali, which he
prefers, Thapa can make himself well-understood in English
and Hindi.
MORIARTY