Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU1650
2006-06-22 11:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

SUPPORTING THE GOVERNMENT IN THE WEEKS AHEAD

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER EAID NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2038
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4161
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 9910
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 4764
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA IMMEDIATE 9877
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 4508
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 2750
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0954
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001650 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EAID NP
SUBJECT: SUPPORTING THE GOVERNMENT IN THE WEEKS AHEAD

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1576


B. KATHMANDU 1597

C. KATHMANDU 1617

D. KATHMANDU 1630

E. 05 KATHMANDU 2556

F. BEIJING 13004

G. KATHMANDU 1533

H. NEW DELHI 4169

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons, 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001650

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EAID NP
SUBJECT: SUPPORTING THE GOVERNMENT IN THE WEEKS AHEAD

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1576


B. KATHMANDU 1597

C. KATHMANDU 1617

D. KATHMANDU 1630

E. 05 KATHMANDU 2556

F. BEIJING 13004

G. KATHMANDU 1533

H. NEW DELHI 4169

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons, 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Since the signing of the June 16 eight-point agreement
with the Maoists, the government and seven-party alliance
appear to have realized that unilateral concessions could
ultimately result in a Maoist takeover and have since
returned to their previous bottom line: the Maoists must lay
down their weapons to enter into the political mainstream.
That said, the willingness of the government to sign the June
16 agreement, which fudged that bottom line, underscores the
importance of stiffening the government's spine with respect
to the Maoists. We need to remind the government of the
downsides of shoddy deals with the Maoists, while at the same
time focusing on increasing assistance to Nepal and making a
visible impact in the next four months. We need to
coordinate closely with India to keep the pressure on the GON
to do the right thing, and warn China against the temptations
of trying to make short-term gains by playing around with the
Maoists. End Summary.

Uh-Oh
--------------


2. (C) The June 16 eight-point agreement in theory sets out a
roadmap for moving toward a constitutional assembly: request
the United Nations to help manage the armies and weapons of
both sides, draft an interim constitution, form an interim
government, announce the date for constituent assembly
elections, and dissolve Parliament and all the Maoist
"People's Governments." In fact, however, it does not
resolve the areas of disagreement remaining from the November
2005 12-point understanding between the Maoists and the
seven-party alliance (ref E). Most fundamentally, the
agreement does not address whether or how the Maoists will
actually decommission their weapons. All the Embassy's
interlocutors stress that the democratic forces' bottom line

remains the same: the Maoists must give up arms before
entering government or holding elections. Otherwise, as one
source so aptly said, Nepal would be changing "one King for
another." The Maoists, meanwhile, continue to make clear
that they have no intention of giving up their weapons in the
foreseeable future.

Supporting the Political Parties
--------------


3. (C) Except among the most woolly-headed of journalists
and civil society activists, we have found virtually no
support for the proposition that the Maoists should be
allowed to enter the political mainstream without abandoning
the threat of violence. We have heard from authoritative
sources that the Prime Minister himself acknowledges that
failing to adequately address the issue of Maoist weapons in
the eight-point agreement was a major mistake. We need to
pile on hard, to reinforce the government's slowly dawning
realization that too many unilateral concessions could
ultimately lead to a Maoist victory. We are reminding the
government and the parties that the government has the
strength to stand up to the Maoists, if it has the will to do
so. We are also pointing out that the GON has the support of
the people for its position. We are also quietly spreading
the word, at the request of political party leaders and
Finance Minister Ram Sharan Mahat (Central Committee member
of the Nepali Congress party),that the USG would most
probably have to cut assistance to the GON if the Maoists
joined the government without giving up their weapons and
clearly breaking away from terrorism.


4. (C) The Ambassador will give a speech June 28 that
stresses publicly our support for the government's position
that the Maoists give up weapons before entering an interim
government. It will also publicly question Maoist actions
and call upon them to show good faith in implementing the
cease-fire and code of conduct to signal their intentions to
enter the mainstream. He does not plan to pull any punches
and we expect the speech will start a firestorm. The
Ambassador will basically say what the Parties want to say,
but cannot.

Working with Others in the International Community
-------------- --------------


5. (C) The events of the past week underscore the importance
of getting assistance in to Nepal quickly to shore up the
legitimacy of the government. We have obtained USD 12
million in enhanced assistance resources in the past two
months to support the government. We expect to hold a
signing ceremony to obligate most of our FY '06 money (USD
28.5 - 35 million) in the month of July, which should signal
US support for this government. We also need to press
Nepal's traditional donors to encourage them to provide
additional assistance to the new government. Some donors
suggest that we wait for the Maoists to be "brought on board"
before moving forward with additional assistance. We believe
that this is a formula that increases the legitimacy of the
Maoists and thus makes additional Maoist advances more,
rather than less, likely.


6. (C) Most importantly in terms of the international
community, we need to step up our efforts to keep both China
and India on track. The Chinese Foreign Ministry recently
indicated it was leaning toward according the Maoists more
legitimacy than we believe warranted (ref F). We fear that
the Maoist advances in recent months are encouraging Beijing
to consider how to pursue PRC interests by playing with the
Maoists (e.g., by seeing whether a Maoist-dominated
government would protect Chinese interests with respect to
Tibet). A/S Boucher's trip thus comes at an opportune time.
We believe that China still wants to work closely with us on
Nepal and will listen to him closely on how we can work
together to prevent regional instability. The key themes to
push with China, and others in the international community,
are that we have seen no signs that the Maoists intend to
give up their weapons and that we need to continue to support
the legitimate government. We encourage the Department to
send a demarche cable to the United Nations and European
capitals with a similar message.


7. (C) We see less of a challenge in coordinating with New
Delhi right now. From our perspective, Indian attitudes
toward Nepal appear to be changing. Indian Ambassador Shiv
Mukherjee told the Ambassador June 21 that New Delhi was
worried about the way things were going in Nepal. Mukherjee
said that he had also been pushing hard the need for the
Maoists to decommission their weapons before coming in to the
government. Mukherjee stressed that India was going ahead
with its economic program (refs G, H). That said, he noted
that he had also discussed with Finance Minister Mahat the
necessity of reviewing India's assistance should the Maoists
join the government while they still carried weapons.
According to Mukherjee, Mahat indicated that he understood
that "India would have to do what it has to do." In any
high-level discussions we have with the Indians in the coming
months, we must continue to raise Nepal in order to make sure
that we can coordinate our pressure on both the government
and the Maoists to do the right thing.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Prime Minister Koirala quickly realized that the
eight-point agreement was a mistake and could lead to
disaster. This suggests that the GON will retain the will to
withstand Maoist pressure, particularly if both we and the
Indians continue to lean on the seven parties not to do
anything stupid. Ultimately, if the GON stands up to the
Maoists, and begins to benefit from increasing external
support, it easily has the resources and strength necessary
to overcome its current difficulties and prevent a Maoist
takeover.
MORIARTY