Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KATHMANDU1576
2006-06-19 13:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

MAOISTS-PARTY AGREEMENT ON INTERIM GOVERNMENT

Tags:  PGOV PTER NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001576 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: MAOISTS-PARTY AGREEMENT ON INTERIM GOVERNMENT

REF: KATHMANDU 1563

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, Larry Schwartz. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001576

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: MAOISTS-PARTY AGREEMENT ON INTERIM GOVERNMENT

REF: KATHMANDU 1563

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, Larry Schwartz. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Just one day after a Government-Maoist announcement
that summit talks between Maoist leader Prachanda and Prime
Minister G.P. Koirala would happen soon (reftel),the two
leaders met and Maoist and Party negotiators announced an
eight-point agreement on June 16. While the eight points are
vague (full text in paragraph 13) the agreement calls for
drafting an interim constitution in 15 days, forming of an
interim government, the dissolution of the House of
Representatives and Maoist local governments, and inviting
the United Nations (UN) to manage and monitor the weapons of
the Nepal Army (NA) and Maoists' People's Liberation Army
(PLA). Party leaders and diplomatic colleagues alike are
concerned that the agreement called for the dissolution of
Parliament - the resurrection of which had been a key demand
of the pro-democracy movement -- and the formation of an
interim government before the Maoists agree to give up their
weapons. The UN Resident Representative to Nepal told the
Charge that he is working with the Government of Nepal (GON)
on a draft request for the UN monitoring, but resulting in an
announcement by Nepal's expectations for urgent action
regarding monitoring appear "unrealistic." End Summary.

MAOIST AND PARTY LEADERS REACH EIGHT-POINT AGREEMENT
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) After the Prime Minister and Maoist leader met, the
government and the Maoists held day-long negotiations in the
capital on June 16, resulting in an announcement by senior
Maoist and Party leaders of an "historic eight-point
agreement" that called for drafting an interim constitution
within 15 days, forming an interim government, the
dissolution of the House of Representatives and Maoist
"people's governments," and inviting of the United Nations
(UN) to manage and monitor the weapons of the Nepal Army (NA)
and Maoists' People's Liberation Army (PLA). In a subsequent
June 16 press conference, Maoist leader Prachanda stated "The
House and the Maoist local governments will be dissolved and
an interim government formed within a month. That's the

spirit of the eight-point agreement signed today." He said
that constituent assembly elections should be held by April
or May 2007. Prachanda hailed the agreement as an example
for the world, but lamented that "The U.S. did not trust us
and India could not understand us." CPN-UML General
Secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal said the agreement proved that

SIPDIS
the Nepali people could resolve armed rebellion through
dialogue.

PARTY LEADERS: AGREEMENT REACHED IN HASTE, CONCERNED ABOUT
DISSOLVING PARLIAMENT
-------------- --------------


3. (C) The hastiness with which the agreement was reached and
announced took almost all by surprise.
Jhalanath Khanal, Central Committee Member of the CPN-UML,
commented that because the agreement was reached in such a
hurry there could be obstacles in implementing it. He
suggested that Party leaders rushed to agreement due to the
combination of Maoist pressure and their urgent desire to
support peace and political stability in the country. Anil
Jha, Joint General Secretary of the Nepal Sadbhavana Party -
Ananda Devi (NSP-A) told us that the content of the
eight-point agreement was positive, but noted that the
negotiations happened in haste without consultation between
Party leaders and Central Committee Members. He was
displeased with the decision to dissolve Parliament. Soviet
Bahadur Adhikari, Kaski District President, Nepali
Congress-Democratic (NC-D),commented that the agreement was
positive but lamented the lack of transparency in the
negotiation process.


4. (C) Demonstrating their uneasiness with Maoist intentions,
several politicos commented on the need now to see how the
agreement was implemented. Dhawal Sumsher Rana, former mayor
of Nepalgunj (far western border town) and member of the
Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) explained that the ground
reality was that the agreement gave Maoists political
identity while they had weapons, which he said was not
acceptable to the Parties. He said that the managing of
Maoist weapons and the cessation of Maoist extortion should
take place "immediately." Som Nath Pyasi, Kaski District
(western Nepal) Secretary (CPN-UML),was curious to see how
the agreement was implemented and opined that a strong
interim body should be formed before Parliament was
dissolved. Dikendra Kandel, General Council Member Nepali
Congress (NC) said that while he was "astonished" about the
decision to dissolve Parliament, he thought the eight-point
agreement would help check the sincerity of the Maoists.

CIVIL SOCIETY EXPRESSES OPTIMISM AND DOUBT...
--------------


5. (C) Subodh Pyakurel, President of the human rights NGO the
Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC),explained that the
signing of the agreement had shown the Maoists commitment to
join the political mainstream. However, he too was "amazed"
about the decision to dissolve Parliament since the
re-instatement of Parliament was a prime mandate of the
people during the pro-democracy movement. Pyakurel commented
that the Party leaders failed to take a stand against the
Maoists during the June 16 negotiations. Jeevanta Wagle,
INSEC's Western Regional Coordinator, stressed that the main
issue would be the agreement's implementation. He noted that
Maoists continued to intimidate and extort people in the West
in violation of the Code of Conduct. Wagle stressed that the
Maoists should put down their weapons before the constituent
assembly process began. Narayan Subedi, INSEC's Bardiya (far
western Nepal) representative, separately worried to us about
the need to "sincerely implement" the agreement. He noted
that the people of Nepal wanted peace.

...AND LACK OF PLACE FOR WOMEN IN THE AGREEMENT
-------------- --


6. (C) Sapana Malla, President of the NGO Forum for Women,
Law, and Development, expressed her displeasure with the
eight-point agreement as there was no place for women in it.
She commented that the agreement revealed the lack of
sincerity by the government and the Maoists for inclusive
democracy. Malla criticized the government and Maoists for
not including any women on the committee that would draft the
interim constitution. She noted that women's groups held a
rally in Gularia (Bardiya District, Western Nepal) on June
18, demanding that women be given respect and places in the
various committees the government has formed in the past few
days.

INDIANS MYSTIFIED AT SPEED OF PARTY-MAOIST NEGOTIATIONS
-------------- --------------


7. (C) With the Indian Ambassador engaged in a provincial PD
event, Charge met June 19 with VP Haran, Indian Embassy DCM.
Haran says that his government is "astounded" by the
"remarkable and reckless speed" with which the Government of
Nepal (GON) is pursuing its negotiations with the Maoists.
He said that he and his Ambassador had spent the previous few
days meeting with party leaders, many of whom were "in shock"
by the June 16 agreement and had thought - even hoped - that
somehow the Government of India (GoI) was behind recent
developments. Haran recounted how the GoI had moved "heaven
and earth" to allow PM G.P. Koirala's visit to New Delhi to
take place with five days' notice and how, in addition to
other elements of their assistance package, the GoI had given
its first-ever grant-in-aid to another government to the
Nepalis. He told Charge that several GoI officials had
counseled PM Koirala that he was making too many quick
concessions to the Maoists who were not making concomitant
responses and that the GON urgently needed to come to an
agreement on Maoist arms before making any major
institutional changes, such as adjourning Parliament. The
GoI finds itself besieged by Nepali politicians and the press
asking whether the June 16 agreement was "Made In New Delhi"
as a way of seeking reassurance that some Grand Plan exists.

8. (C) According to Haran, in a meeting with the Indian
Ambassador June 15, the Prime Minister had made no mention of
the plans for the next day, leading the Indians to conclude
that "as in the past" Home Affairs Minister Krishna Prasad
Sitaula continues to negotiate with the Maoists without
keeping the PM entirely in the loop. Looking to the weeks
ahead, Haran indicated the GoI will be supporting a role for
the UN in arms management and human rights monitoring, but it
will be urging the PM to consult more broadly with his
Alliance and with the public. His government felt that
"setting a sober tone" with clear objectives based on
"democratic principles" could assure popular support for the
Government that would be essential if people were not to
conclude that the Maoists are assured of near-term control of
the government. But most importantly, according to Haran,
the GoI believes that reaching an agreement between the GON
and the Maoists on the decommissioning of Maoist weapons is
essential if a UN monitoring mission is to succeed and the
process is to go forward successfully. "But who knows what
they'll do next," he concluded.

UNITED NATIONS WAITING FOR LETTER
--------------


9. (C) Charge spoke with United Nations Resident
Representative Matthew Kahane June 19 about the much-heralded
letter from the GON to the UN to invite assistance with the
monitoring of human rights under the Code of Conduct and with
monitoring the decommissioning of weapons. Kahane told the
Charge that he has not yet received a letter of request;
however, he had been contacted by "every direction" about
getting UN support. He indicated that he has been working
informally with the Nepalis to get them to properly prepare
their request, but that the approaches have all proposed that
the UN take urgent action upon "unrealistic" timetables -
expecting the UN to be on the ground in "about a month."
Moreover, the GON vision of a role for UN "monitors" may be
more than the UN staff can realistically undertake.


10. (C) A second generation UN bureaucrat, Kahane outlined
the process toward getting UN observers on the ground in
Nepal. He speculated that although the UN bureaucracy was
already preoccupied with monitoring in Darfur and East Timor,
the Secretary General was likely to look with favor upon a
Nepali request for assistance. Upon receipt of the letter,
the Secretary General would likely send an "assessment
mission out fairly soon" to take a look at the challenge. If
an agreement was in place between the GON and the Maoists
regarding weapons, then the UN and the GON would negotiate a
Memorandum of Understanding that would permit the UN to
undertake monitoring operations in the country. Kahane
suggested that the UN observer team would not exceed "two
dozen and perhaps fewer" military officials drawn from
"outside this region." According to Kahane, it was unclear
how the UN would pay for these operations - the Sec Gen might
have to request that a voluntary fund be established to
underwrite the mission. Finally, Kahane pointed out that the
GON was "not asking advice and using its own expertise" on
the way forward. He pointed out that absent a military
agreement between the GON and the Maoists - something with
which the Nepal Army had substantial experience with, based
on Nepali participation in other UN missions worldwide - the
UN would be reluctant to take on a monitoring task that was
not based on "an element of trust between the parties."

CHINA, UK CONCERNED ABOUT MANAGEMENT OF ARMS
--------------


11. (C) A colleague from the People's Republic of China
Embassy stressed that China was concerned that there was no
mention of management of arms or a time line as to whether
this would happen before elections or the Maoists joining an
interim government. He also remarked how quickly the
agreement had happened. A British Embassy colleague told us
that the U. K official reaction was that the new eight-point
agreement was fine, but the U.K. had strong concerns about
arms management. She noted the U.K. was also concerned about
the lack of international pressure on the arms management
issue.
COMMITTEE TO DRAFT INTERIM CONSTITUTION ANNOUNCED
-------------- --------------


12. (SBU) On June 16, the negotiating teams also announced
the members of a six-member interim constitution drafting
committee headed by former Supreme Court justice Laxman
Prasad Aryal. (Note: Aryal was also appointed June 15 to be
a member of the five-person observer team for the talks. End
Note.) The other five members are all lawyers: Harihar Dahal
(NC supporter),Shambhu Thapa (head of the Nepal Bar
Association),Mahadev Yadav (Nepali-Congress Democratic
(NC-D) supporter),Sindhu Nath Pyakurel (People's Front Nepal
supporter),and Khim Lal Devkota (Communist Party of
Nepal-Maoist).

TEXT OF AGREEMENT
--------------


13. (U) The text of the Party-Maoist eight-point agreement
follows (unofficial translation):

Begin Text.


1. Implementing firmly and honestly the 12-point
understanding reached between the seven political parties and
CPN (Maoist) on November 22, 2005 and the ceasefire code of
conduct made public by the government-Maoist negotiation
teams on May 26, 2006.


2. Expressing commitment to competitive multiparty governing
system, civil liberties, fundamental rights, human rights,
press freedom and democratic norms and values including the
concept of rule of law, (the seven parties and the Maoists)
will carry out their peaceful activities accordingly.


3. Requesting the United Nations to help manage the armies
and weapons of both sides and to monitor it in order to
ensure free and fair election for constituent assembly.


4. Framing an interim constitution by ensuring the democratic
rights acquired through the people's movement of 1990 and the
recent historic movement, and by making the foundation the
commitments expressed in the 12-point understanding and the
spirit of the preamble of the ceasefire code of conduct;
forming an interim government accordingly; announcing the
date of constituent assembly elections; dissolving the House
of Representatives by making alternative arrangements in
consensus; and dissolving all people's governments formed by
the CPN (Maoist).


5. Making decisions through consensus on issues of national
importance that have far-reaching implications.


6. Ensuring basic rights so that the Nepali people can
participate in the process of preparing the constitution by
participating in the constituent assembly elections in the
absence of any kind of fear, warnings, intimidation and
violence. Involving international observation and monitoring
as per the need during the election.


7. Restructuring the state in a progressive manner through
constituent assembly election so that it can resolve all
problems including those related to class, caste, region and
gender. Translating into permanent peace the ceasefire
between the Government of Nepal and CPN (Maoist) by keeping
at the center democracy, peace, prosperity, progress and the
country's freedom, sovereignty and self-respect; and
expressing commitment to resolve all problems through
dialogue.


8. The government-Maoist dialogue teams have been instructed
to carry out all works related to the above-mentioned issues.

End Text.

COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) The speed with which the eight-point agreement was
reached and announced was dizzying. Many in the capital were
swooning over Prachanda's press conference appearance -
perhaps in hopes that peace could truly be at hand. Yet the
complete lack of consultation and transparency in the
negotiations process demonstrated by PM Koirala and his
adviser both for their political party coalition and the
people of Nepal has many party leaders in shock. The
agreement appears to be yet another series of concessions to
the Maoists. We are surprised that the PM agreed to dissolve
Parliament. Agreeing to draft an interim constitution in
fifteen days and then form an interim government that would
involve the Maoists within thirty days undermines repeated
statements and private assurances that Maoist weapons would
need to be put beyond use before/before they could be
admitted to government.


15. (C) Whether this agreement could actually bring peace -
and democracy - is the ten million dollar question. Its
implementation and the monitoring of the Code of Conduct
continue to be critical. The negotiators have not consulted
the military or started work on a military agreement
necessary for effective UN monitoring - and it is unlikely
the UN can mobilize a monitoring team within thirty days.
The point in the agreement about the monitoring of weapons is
vague and even leaves open the possibility that Maoists could
only temporarily lay down their weapons for constituent
assembly elections. Stay tuned, this roller coaster ride
isn't over yet.
SCHWARTZ