CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF SEEKS U.S. ASSISTANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001128

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2016
TAGS: MASS PGOV PTER MCAP NP
SUBJECT: CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF SEEKS U.S. ASSISTANCE

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1052


B. KATHMANDU 931

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Reasons, 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) In a May 2 meeting with SCA Assistant Secretary
Boucher, NSC Senior Director Millard and the Ambassador,
Chief of Army Staff General Pyar Jung Thapa stressed that the
Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) would welcome, and work with, a
civilian, democratically-elected government. General Thapa
said that Nepal still had to deal with the Maoists and that
U.S. assistance would be "critical." A/S Boucher stated that
we stood ready to provide assistance, when requested by the
civilian government. End Summary.

Accepting Civilian Control
--------------


2. (C) COAS Thapa assured SCA Assistant Secretary Richard
Boucher, NSC Senior Director Elisabeth Millard and the
Ambassador that the RNA would always act according to the
Constitution and in the larger interest of the nation. He
emphasized that the RNA "would welcome the civilian,
democratically-elected government." He explained that he had
given an unprecedented interview to CNN (ref A) to underscore
that point to allay concerns during the transition because
there was so much instability. A/S Boucher welcomed General
Thapa's position on a democratic government, adding that his
timely statements could help the RNA have a stabilizing role.
Noting that the King had said that sovereignty of the nation
lies with the people, Thapa said the problem of restoring
democracy had been addressed, but Nepal still needed to deal
with the Maoists. Thapa said he was glad the political
parties, including the CPN-UML, were insisting that the
Maoists had to hand in their weapons to join the political
mainstream.

Maoists Still a Problem, Militarily
--------------


3. (C) General Thapa said he felt the Maoists were "still a
danger." He stated that the Maoists had realized they cannot
defeat the RNA militarily, but that, according to the RNA's
information, the Maoists would not stop until they achieved
their ultimate goal of establishing a totalitarian state. He
noted that the Maoist aim had been for protests to continue
in order to provoke the RNA to kill more civilians; the
Maoists would have then formed a parallel government to unite
with the political parties against the RNA - the only force
capable of containing the Maoists. Thapa explained that the
RNA had lacked the air and firepower to defeat them during
recent attacks in the west, including at Butwal (Ref B),but
were able to prevent a Maoist victory. He noted that RNA
defensive positions were strong, but that the Maoists could
ambush security force patrols and also strike them with
improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The COAS acknowledged
that some of the RNA units were inexperienced and lacked
training.

COAS Thapa On RNA's Military Capabilities
--------------


4. (C) Thapa stressed that the RNA was in "genuine need."
The RNA had 10,000 troops without weapons. He added that
some of its other weapons were 40 years old. He lamented
that although the RNA had been able to conduct effective air
attacks, it did not have any more rockets for its
helicopters. He acknowledged that the RNA had difficulty
buying ammunition on the international market. He hoped that
the embargo on military assistance would stop. He explained
that China, the only source country not requiring Indian
overflight permission, had not supplied much due to its
sensitivities vis-a-vis India. In response to A/S Boucher's
question about Maoist supplies, Thapa replied that Maoist
arms came from India. A/S Boucher suggested that Nepal work
with India to try to stop shipments. Thapa said that Nepal
had had a security consultative group with India, which
stopped following the King's February 2005 takeover.

Need Military Assistance
--------------


5. (C) A/S Boucher told COAS Thapa that the U.S. looked
forward to cooperating with Nepal to see how we could help.
He explained that we were waiting for the civilian leadership
to tell us what we could do - economically, politically, and
militarily. Thapa said that he had met with PM Koirala on
May 1 to make a case for keeping the RNA intact as a force to
support democracy and to discuss the RNA receiving military
assistance. Thapa noted that Koirala seemed to realize the
new government needed to keep the RNA strong. A/S Boucher
said that the U.S. was willing to resume security assistance
upon the request of the civilian government. A/S Boucher
explained that we could probably resume training first and
later work the question of resuming supplies in Washington.
Thapa said that a U.S. statement in support of the RNA and
mentioning the possibility of resuming security assistance
could have a positive impact, psychologically. Thapa also
made a push for receiving the 3,600 M-16s in storage,
explaining that the Maoists had been unable to overrun any
RNA position armed with M-16s. A/S Boucher assured Thapa
that the U.S. would look at all of these issues as soon as we
received a request from the new government. The Ambassador
encouraged the COAS to continue to look at ways to improve
the RNA's human rights record.

Comment
--------------


6. (C) Thapa is ready to work with the new civilian
government. However, he remains worried about Maoist
intentions and capabilities, and the RNA's capacity to meet a
renewed threat. When the civilian government makes a request
for the U.S. to resume security assistance, we should be
ready to respond immediately. The Ambassador was joined by
DATT Lt.Col. Taylor and Political/Economic Chief Shelton.


7. (U) A/S Boucher and NSC Millard have cleared this cable.
MORIARTY