Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL662
2006-02-13 06:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PRT/KABUL: PROVINCIAL SECURITY ASSESSMENTS

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER ASEC SNAR KCRS AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBUL #0662/01 0440628
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 130628Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8311
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0107
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2240
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASH DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2450
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1088
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5539
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 000662 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/FO (AMB MQUINN),SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
OSD FOR BREZEZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF
TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC SNAR KCRS AF
SUBJECT: PRT/KABUL: PROVINCIAL SECURITY ASSESSMENTS
DESIGNED TO DISRUPT SPRING OFFENSIVE

KABUL 00000662 001.2 OF 005


Classified By: PRT DIRECTOR TOM PRASTER FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 000662

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/FO (AMB MQUINN),SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
OSD FOR BREZEZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF
TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC SNAR KCRS AF
SUBJECT: PRT/KABUL: PROVINCIAL SECURITY ASSESSMENTS
DESIGNED TO DISRUPT SPRING OFFENSIVE

KABUL 00000662 001.2 OF 005


Classified By: PRT DIRECTOR TOM PRASTER FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)


1. (SBU) Summary: A joint GOA - Coalition effort to
address key problems in Zabul, Paktika, and Helmand
Provinces could be a template for bringing greater stability
to the southeast and help preclude an effective spring
offensive by anti-government forces. In a series of meetings
starting in late December, the GOA's National Security
Council along with U.S., UN and others has developed a series
of short-term plans to replace ineffective district
officials, strengthen local security forces, improve the
transportation infrastructure and distribute assistance in
key areas. The hope is that such activity will undercut
Taliban efforts to portray the central government as detached
or ineffective and deny them a base among the local
population. The focus has been short range, geared as it is
to facing an expected tough Taliban spring offensive. Thus
the things that can be changed significantly are limited by
immediately available resources and GOA administrative
capacity. In Helmand, narcotics and security are intersecting
to pose a particular challenge. Whether the measures are
successful or not, the exercise itself has proven useful for
demonstrating GOA initiative and improving coordination
inside the government and with the international community.
End summary.


2. (C) In December, GOA National Directorate for Security
(NDS) Director Amarullah Saleh told the Ambassador and
Lieutenant General Eikenberry that the GOA has significant
intelligence on Taliban leaders and membership numbers in the

southeast. However, the central government's lack of
effective lines of authority and weak district governments
have prevented NDS from using that information to disrupt
Taliban activity. The Ambassador and CG suggested that the
GOA develop specific plans that identified key areas of
instability and how their problems might be addressed on a
province-by-province basis in the run up to an anticipated
Spring offensive. In the meantime, we promised to form an
interagency group (including ISAF) to examine the same
regions one by one, and determine how we might assist.


3. (SBU) As a result, we have attended a series of
interagency meetings chaired by National Security Council
Director Rassoul, and attended by NDS Director Saleh, Acting
Minister of Interior Zarar, Minister of Defense Wardak, and
Army Chief of Staff Bismullah Khan, or their representatives.
The international community has been represented by the
Ambassador or Charge, USAID Director or representative, CFC-A
Deputy Commander Air Vice Marshal Luker, ISAF Deputy
Commander Major General Lane, and ISAF Polad Batori or
Reconstruction Adviser Skye. OSC-A Deputy Director for
Police Fitzgerald, British Ambassador Marsden and UNAMA
Deputy Special Representative Alexander attended the meeting
on Helmand. Governor Arman of Zabol attended the second
meeting on that province, and Governors Mangel and Daud
attended the Paktika and Helmand meetings, respectively.


4. (SBU) The GOA wanted to focus each meeting on a province
of their choice, and we asked them to invite the governor to
attend and present an assessment. For our part, we and CFC-A
have coordinated with each other and the relevant PRT and
have prepared papers on the provinces in advance, but have
used them only to contribute ideas after the GOA has made
their assistance requests. For the most part, that has been

KABUL 00000662 002.2 OF 005


unnecessary, as the GOA side has presented detailed
intelligence assessments and generally reasonable requests.


5. (C) Throughout the process, the Embassy and CFC-A have
made the following points:

-- Actions need to be effective in the short term - the
point of the exercise is to improve the GOA/Coalition ability
to resist any spring offensive by anti-government forces.

-- As much as possible, the population should see the GOA
delivering these improvements.

-- Whenever possible, local populations should contribute
to the effort so they have a stake in the outcome.

-- We will not contribute additional resources to these
provinces if the GOA has its own resources to use and unless
necessary changes in provincial and district personnel, as
identified by the GOA, are made.

-- Additional resource allocations must be focused and
modest - although we are taking a province by province
approach, we have to keep an eye on the cumulative effect of
our changes.

-- Changes will be made within the context of our overall
strategic programs.


6. (C) Although we have asked the GOA to come to the
meetings with international partners after internal
discussions are complete and they have decided on a course of
action, we are often witnesses to prolonged debate on the GOA
side of the table. Also, the discussions occasionally stray
from the above points, especially from the governors, who are
new to the process. However, overall we believe the process
has resulted in a reasonable and doable set of remedies. The
recent thrust of Karzai's direction from SCF (that GOA must
take more responsibility itself, and not rely constantly on
the Coalition) has been evident throughout the process.


7. (SBU) The first three provinces discussed were Zabol, on
December 31 and again on January 3, Paktika on January 8, and
Helmand on January 19. On January 24, there was a follow-up
meeting to review the recommendations and actions taken to
date.

Zabol
--------------


8. (C) The government suggested concentrating on Shamulzai
District, on the Pakistan border, and Dai Chopan bordering
Uruzgan and a transit point for the Taliban. The following
actions were discussed, with actions taken to date:

-- Remove both district Chiefs of Police, as well as CoPs
in 3 other districts (GOA): MoI has made these changes. The
governor traveled to Dai Chopan and explained the reasons for
the changes.

-- Provide more trained ANP officers (This was originally
assigned to OSC-A, but OSC-A subsequently delivered its
police fielding plan to MOI; any reprioritization, OSC-A
suggested, should be done by MOI): MOI announced on 1/24

KABUL 00000662 003.2 OF 005


that it has assessed the province and no longer sees a need
for more police, just better equipment.

-- More logistical support (vehicles and ammunition) for
the Afghan National Police (ANP) in these districts: OSC-A
has said it is prepared to ensure current police forces have
full complement of basic equipment. List of supplemental
equipment (heavy weapons, motorbikes) under review; some
needs can be met but not all. AVM Luker also noted that MoI
needs to work with OSC-A on redistribution of equipment
because distribution is tied to new (not existing) units
under the strategic ANP fielding plan.

-- Accelerate completion of Qalat radio transmitter which
to reach the entire province, and distribute radios (CFC-A):
It was determined that the FM station in Qalat, even when
boosted, would not reach the target districts. Instead,
programming for the AM radio station in Kandahar, which does
reach, should carry programming of interest to the districts.
Additional portable radios have been made available by CFC-A
for distribution to selected districts.

-- Accelerate construction of Shinkay through Shamulzai
Road (USAID): CFC-A Engineers estimated hard top cost of $40
million, and gravel cost at $12 million, both beyond the
scope of this project. Instead, AID has begun preparing a
food or cash for work program to do road repairs throughout
the winter and spring.

-- Distribution of food stuffs (USAID): Food for Peace
has prepositioned emergency staples in the region that can be
issued after March 1 if there is no emergency in the interim.
CFC-A has agreed to bring more food to Qalat if necessary,
but AVM Luker suggested that, in accordance with President
Karzai's wish that this work have an "Afghan face," that the
GOA do final distribution. Minister Wardak said MOD can
provide trucks, and helicopters if OSC-A can provide fuel.
AVM Luker indicated that would be possible.

Paktika
--------------


9. (C) The government recommended a focus on Gomal
District, which is the largest district and borders Pakistan.
The following actions were discussed, with actions taken to
date:

-- General Bismullah Khan to call Pakistani Vice Chief of
Staff General Hyat about strengthening military-to-military
cooperation across the border (GOA). Call was placed through
his deputy for operations.

-- Follow-up Bismullah's call through diplomatic channels
(US Embassy): Ambassadors Neumann and Crocker, during a
February 11 visit, stressed to President Karzai the
importance we place on this initiative. Embassy Islamabad
will follow up with the Pakistanis.

-- More ANP forces (GOA in consult with OSC-A): MOI wants
to move in 100 new ANP, but has not yet identified a source.
OSC-A noted they will soon have police mentors in Sharana for
the ANP and ANBP.

-- Logistical support (vehicles and ammunition) for the

KABUL 00000662 004.2 OF 005


ANP (OSC-A): OSC-A will transfer basic-issue equipment after
redeployment of personnel. Additional equipment under
consideration.

-- Movement of a small ANA element into the district
(GOA): Minister Wardak promised to bring existing ANA units
to full strength throughout the province, and to bring in an
additional company dedicated to Gomal.

-- Increase NDS presence in the region (GOA): Awaiting
decision of NDS, which Saleh says will hinge on sufficient
support from ANP.

-- Food-for-Work initiatives (USAID): AID is in
discussions with UNAMA to determine if they can better
penetrate Gomal Province.

-- Increase emphasis on the PTS (amnesty for Taliban) in
the district (GOA): GOA will try to persuade a former
Taliban leader, who is now a member of the Meshrano Jirga, to
visit the district and try and contact recalcitrant IAG
leaders; however he is currently on the Haj.

Note: Sharana PRT Officer notes that the Gardez PTS head,
Habibullah Mangal, has been very successful in Paktia
Province and nominally covers Paktika as well. However, he
does not have the vehicles, security detail, or
communications equipment to travel to the area. We will
explore with the GOA how to provide him the support he needs.
End note.

Helmand
--------------


10. (C) The discussion on Helmand took a different turn,
with an emphasis on province-wide institutional problems:
the Highway Police and Border Police are actively involved in
drug smuggling, renegade police chiefs own or control the
police's vehicles and weapons (if they are fired the police
resources will also disappear),and the educational system is
breaking down under the weight of 100 plus students/class.
It was noted by several officials that the Taliban is not
strong in Helmand, but the GOA is particularly weak. The
following actions were discussed, with actions taken to date:

-- Deploying 100 additional police under direction of the
Governor (GOA): MOI has sent 100 police, and is in the
process of sending another 100, all from the quick reaction
unit in Kabul - this is a short-term solution. All need
equipment.

-- Assess AHP and decide whether to disband them within
the province (GOA): Hope to disband the AHP when have
sufficient force in ANP and ANA. In the meantime, will move
AHP HQ closer to Helmand so it can be monitored, and replace
the chief.

-- MOD to increase presence over the next three months
(GOA): Minister Wardak decided to move the ANA brigade from
Herat. In the interim he will ensure in-place units are at
full strength.

-- Ministries of Finance and Education to resolve
teachers' pay problems so they can expand hours to allow for

KABUL 00000662 005.2 OF 005


three shifts of classes a day instead of one (GOA): Decision
has been made to release the funds.

-- Food for Work to reconstruct schools (USAID): AID to
work with government to implement Food for Work to construct
security walls around schools and repair schools damaged by
anti-government forces.


11. (C) In Helmand the issue of security from the Taliban
is beginning to intersect with the need for security to
conduct poppy eradication. This situation is different from
that in other provinces. But if the Coalition/GOA can meet
the challenge they could score a significant strategic
victory.


12. (SBU) On February 4, the GOA convened another meeting
to discuss Konar Province, with Nuristan to be discussed
February 11. We will report on those meetings, and continue
to update progress on these first three provinces, in
subsequent cables.


13. (C) Comment: If the GOA continues to follow through,
and we can fulfill our part - mobilizing assistance resources
in the most dangerous districts, and redeploying or
re-equipping 300-400 police are not easy tasks - it will have
an effect on the spring offensive - although how great an
effect is uncertain. Efforts to intensify cooperation with
Pakistan on terrorist sanctuary and cross-border infiltration
will play an important role. There has been a clear learning
curve in the ministries concerned but the limited number of
qualified subordinates makes it harder for the relevant
ministries to keep up the pace of follow-up with every
province added. The constant need for police reinforcements
is unlikely to be met with trained personnel, as there is no
adequate reserve to continue drawing upon. More and more
untrained or partially trained recruits are likely to be used.


14. (SBU) What is certain is that the GOA has taken the
initiative to identify obstacles to stability, developed a
process to remove them, improved cooperation between crucial
ministries, and strengthened its coordination with the
international community - all things that will need to be
done with increasing effectiveness if we are to ever beat the
forces arrayed against us.


15. (U) Dushanbe minimize considered.
NEUMANN