Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL5902
2006-12-20 01:16:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

TERRORIST LISTS - AFGHANISTAN

Tags:  EFIN ETTC KTFN KVPR PREL PTER AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9424
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #5902/01 3540116
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 200116Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4969
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1722
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0253
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1360
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 4684
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC 0257
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3433
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 005902 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/RA, AND SCA/A
DEPT ALSO FOR EB/ESC/TFS:LEANNE CANNON,
S/CT:PATTY HILL, AND IO/PSC:JOHN SANDAGE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2016
TAGS: EFIN ETTC KTFN KVPR PREL PTER AF
SUBJECT: TERRORIST LISTS - AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. KABUL 5893

B. STATE 193615

KABUL 00005902 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 005902

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/RA, AND SCA/A
DEPT ALSO FOR EB/ESC/TFS:LEANNE CANNON,
S/CT:PATTY HILL, AND IO/PSC:JOHN SANDAGE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2016
TAGS: EFIN ETTC KTFN KVPR PREL PTER AF
SUBJECT: TERRORIST LISTS - AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. KABUL 5893

B. STATE 193615

KABUL 00005902 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

1.(S/NF) SUMMARY: The concept of developing a terrorist list
is new to the GOA. Some elements appear enthusiastic, while
others are more caustious. In meetings at the MFA and
Central Bank, Deputy Econ Counselor stressed the importance
of developing a GOA list and using it to freeze accounts of
Taliban, HIG, and other insurgent leaders. Since the Central
Bank Deputy Governor indicated the Central Bank has not yet
acted on the UNSCR 1267 list, Post intends to suggest this
list as a good starting point for the GOA. The Central Bank
is seeking USG assistance in advancing Afghanistan's
application for membership in the Egmont Group of financial
intelligence units (FIUs). END SUMMARY.

2.(S/NF) Following delivery of ref A demarche, Deputy Econ
Counselor asked both First Deputy Central Bank Governor
Ibrahimi and MFA Multilateral Affairs Director Andisha if
Afghanistan maintained a list of terrorist organizations (ref
B). Both stated that the GOA did not have a such a list.
However, Andisha immediately commented that developing such a
list and using it to freeze accounts of Taliban and HIG
leaders would be an advantageous tool in the war. He noted
that the MFA maintained a list of known criminals that were
barred from obtaining visas and/or passports and
enthusiastically suggested that it could be culled to form
the basis of a terrorist list. Thinking more broadly,
Andisha suggested that once complete, the list could be
passed to the UAE and Australia with a request that these
governments take action to freeze the accounts of individuals
and entities on the list. He cited the UAE because it is a
source of funding for the Taliban, while Australia is the

source of HIG fundraising. Gaining enthusiasm as the
conversation continued, Andisha said he would send a memo to
Foreign Minister Spanta with this recommendation.

3.(S/NF) On the other hand, Central Bank Deputy Governor
Ibrahimi was more cautious. He stressed that the Central
Bank had not yet utilized the power to freeze accounts
granted by the new Anti-Money Laundering law. In response to
a question, Ibrahimi stated that the Central Bank had not
acted to instruct its banks to identify and freeze accounts
of individuals and entities on the UNSCR 1267 list. Deputy
Econ Counselor suggested that the Central Bank's development
of a GOA terrorist list and the use of it to freeze accounts
of Taliban, HIG, and other insurgent leaders would send a
powerful message that the GOA had every intention of
prosecuting the war by every means available. Ibrahimi
listened carefully, made no commitments for action, and
commented that the Central Bank had just stood up its
Financial Intelligence Unit, which was now receiving hundreds
of bank reports per month. Deputy Econ Counselor applauded
this development, but stressed that intelligence collection
is only half the equation, the Central Bank now needed to
send a message that its regulatory enforcement arm was
prepared to act.

4.(S/NF) When Deputy Econ Counselor related the MFA's
enthusiasm for developing a list and delivering it to the
UAE, Ibrahimi noted that the UAE Central Bank had refused to
sign an intelligence-sharing MOU with Afghanistan's Financial
Intelligence Unit because Afghanistan is not yet a member of
the Egmont Group. He indicated that the Egmont Group had
accepted Afghanistan's application and is awaiting letters of
recommendation from the United States and Canada before
accepting the application. Deputy Econ Counselor indicated
that it might be good timing after Afghanistan becomes an
Egmont Group member to present the UAEG with a second request
to sign an FIU intel cooperation MOU and provide it with
Afghanistan's list of terrorist entities with a request for
action to identify and freeze accounts. Ibrahimi appeared to
acknowledge the merit of the idea.

KABUL 00005902 002.2 OF 002



5.(S/NF) COMMENT: Convincing the Central Bank to issue
instructions to banks to identify and freeze accounts of
known terrorist organizations and entities would send a
strong signal to the banking community that the GOA is
serious about combating money-laundering activities by the
insurgency. Since the UNSCR 1267 list specifically targets
Usama bin Ladin, Al-Qaida, and the Taliban, we intend to
suggest to the GOA that the 1267 list would be a good place
to start the development of its own list. As we cooperate on
these ideas, we note that the Central Bank's supervision
department is weak, but actual enforcement activity may
strengthen it. We will work closely with the MFA and Central
Bank to press for creation of a GOA list and look for
opportunities for action both within Afghanistan and abroad.
If the Afghans subsequently should agree to approach foreign
governments with the GOA list and request for action to
freeze accounts, it may prove useful for the U.S. either to
participate in such demarches or to follow up on GOA actions.
END COMMENT.
NEUMANN