Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL5900
2006-12-19 14:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

NEW HELMAND GOVERNOR: SAYING THE RIGHT THINGS

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF UK 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #5900/01 3531431
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O 191431Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4966
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3431
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 005900 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC PASS TO AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF UK
SUBJECT: NEW HELMAND GOVERNOR: SAYING THE RIGHT THINGS

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 005900

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC PASS TO AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF UK
SUBJECT: NEW HELMAND GOVERNOR: SAYING THE RIGHT THINGS

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Assadulla Wafa was appointed as the new
Governor of Helmand Province on December 16. He is currently
in Kabul but plans to move to Lashkah Gar in the next few
days. Wafa was most recently Advisor, Minister, and Prime
Assistant to the Minister of Frontiers and Tribal Affairs and
has served as Governor in both Konar and Paktia provinces.


2. (C) During a December 11 meeting with Ambassador Neumann,
Wafa touched on the range of problems that would face him in
Helmand but seemed confident and ready to take on the
challenge. Wafa acknowledged that Helmand "was full of
problems". He said all the right things on security, Musa
Qala, relations with tribes, and his plans for Helmand. The
Ambassador assured Wafa that the U.S. would provide him with
whatever support we could, as would the UK. The Ambassador
pressed Wafa to work closely with the UK and Wafa agreed.
END SUMMARY

Kajaki Dam
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador Neumann briefed Wafa on the Kajaki dam
project and the discussions held the previous day at the UK
PRT. The Ambassador conveyed his decision to go ahead with
the USAID-funded project and asked for Wafa's support in
placing this as a top priority in his administration. He
said Wafa's help would be needed in obtaining both local
community/tribal support as well as support from neighboring
Sangin District, particularly on security. The Ambassador
promised to provide a USAID briefing to Wafa. Wafa welcomed
the opportunity and pledged his full support for the project.

Tackling Security in Helmand
--------------


4. (C) Wafa agreed security was the top priority and was
well aware of the security problems in the area -- "I'm from

Kandahar, I know these people". He said the Taliban were not
the only security concerns, as smugglers and drug traffickers
were there colluding with the Taliban. He described Helmand
as being full of "big fish" who lived openly, even meeting
with GOA officials. These people need to be arrested, he
said. Wafa pointed to Baram Cha, in far south Helmand on the
Pakistani border, which is a hub of trafficking and full of
Taliban networks and suggested we get serious about taking on
this area. The Ambassador said the UK would likely support
cleaning up Baram Cha but may not want to stay. Wafa agreed
to be supportive. Wafa explained that only 2-3 districts in
Helmand had GOA-appointed district governors. Most were
militia or Taliban affiliated, but could not be removed by
force. What needed to be done, Wafa suggested, is getting
the support of the tribes, as was done in Kunar. Only then
should the Taliban be confronted, he said. Wafa was well
informed on the tribal struggles involving former governor
Sher Mohammed. Wafa said Sher Mohammed had "lost 90 percent
of his support" but conceded that President Karzai was still
among the ten percent.

Opposed to Musa Qala
--------------


5. (C) Wafa has been opposed to Musa Qala from the beginning
and shared concerns that the area will become a Taliban
sanctuary. He said he prefers using the tribes to provide
security while having GOA authority present. The Ambassador
explained that the Musa Qala agreement in itself covered only
a small area but set a bad precedent. He conveyed UK
concerns that if fighting started up again, the UK would need
new resources they do not currently have. The Ambassador
stressed the need to test the agreement with outside forces.


6. (C) Wafa noted that other areas were trying to replicate
the agreement, such as Naw Zad, a northern district that saw

KABUL 00005900 002 OF 002


a lot of fighting over the summer. He advised Naw Zad
district leaders to present to Karzai their interest in
central government authority, permitting all ANSF/ISAF into
the district, appointing the District Governor from the GOA,
and not allowing the ANP to be affiliated with any militia or
a commander. Wafa said he did not see the potential spread
of Musa Qala-style agreements, but if such proposals arose he
would oppose them. When he gets to Helmand, he plans to
request ISAF and the U.S. to help with security so that all
the districts can be opened.

Strategy for Peace
--------------


7. (C) Wafa said his solutions to Helmand's problems would
focus on less fighting, squandering fewer resources, gaining
support from the tribes, and getting rid of corrupt
officials. He wants the province to be an area of peace,
with U.S. support. "As God is my witness, I will work to
respect the dignity of all Afghans, as well as the U.S.", he
declared. Wafa praised Karzai for keeping the calm in
Afghanistan. The Ambassador encouraged Wafa to develop a
close working relationship with the UK and to help them
understand the tribes. Ambassador Neumann explained that in
the UK press, there was no Afghanistan, only Helmand. He
assured Wafa that the US would continue to help as we shared
common goals. Wafa said he wanted to work closely with the
British. He asked that we help him set up a meeting with UK
Ambassador Evans, which subsequently occurred. Evans said
later that he found Wafa reasonable, with sound opinions.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Ambassador's Comment: I knew Wafa when he was
Governor in Konar and have seen him since. His problem in
Konar was that he was not sufficiently active in getting out
of his office and was sometimes short tempered. Helmand has
a different set of issues. Wafa has the background and
knowledge to do well, the age to engender respect, and enjoys
Karzai's confidence. Also, Wafa is a long-time GOA
administrator and this may help him. Wafa's answers to my
questions were honest and direct, showing some difference
from Karzai's views of the situation (and Wafa knew what he
was saying). My feeling is tht Wafa may do well, but that
the situation in Helmand is so complex and so
quintessentially "Afghan" that no foreigner can predict how
this appointment will work; President Karzai might even know
what he's doing.


NEUMANN