PRT KANDAHAR: ANAP IMPLEMENTATION SNAPSHOT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 005865

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT KANDAHAR: ANAP IMPLEMENTATION SNAPSHOT

Classified By: DCM Richard B. Norland for reasons 1.4 (a) and (b)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police
program (ANAP) is underway in Kandahar. Chief of Police
General Esmatullah Alizai, accompanied by Kandahar PRT(KPRT),
has convened three recruiting shuras. A large training class
of nearly 300 recruits just graduated from the RTC, and will
join the 281 ANAP already out in the districts; a new class
of 300 is now underway. While more training time would be
useful, trainers are satisfied with the curriculum and the
results under the circumstances. Rapid expansion of the ANAP
may pose significant command and control challenges given the
state of the ANP -- which is supposed to play a leadership
role over raw ANAP recruits. Panjwayi and Zharay are cited
as examples. Canada, buffeted by the security challenges in
Kandahar, wants the ANAP tashkils (approved manpower
allotments) for each of these two dangerous districts raised
to 250. END SUMMARY

Recruiting and Training
--------------


2. (SBU) Three shuras have been held in Kandahar Province to
recruit for the ANAP. Two of these have been at the
Provincial Council with elders from various districts and one
was in Panjwayi. Chief of Police General Esmatullah Alizai
led these shuras personally. KPRT Commander, Political
Director, and CIVPOL elements have attended as well. An
additional 1131 recruits have been vetted and registered for
training. The registration process is functioning well, but
questions remain about the effectiveness of the screening
process. There were serious concerns regarding the quality
of recruits for the first class. Only 75 out of more than
200 recruits graduated from the two week program. Many were
unprepared for a disciplined training approach and a
significant number were found to be in possession of hashish,
resulting in their dismissal from the class and
disqualification from the ANAP program. Training is now
proceeding more smoothly. Nearly 300 recruits are in the
current class.


3. (SBU) The Kandahar Regional Training Center (RTC) ANAP
training program represents a combined effort on the part of
the Ministry of Interior, Combined Security Transition
Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A),Afghanistan National Police
(ANP),Canadian CivPol and military police, as well as
DynCorp. The training emphasizes military policing tactics
and officer safety skills. The training familiarizes the
recruits with civilian policing concepts. Given the
illiteracy of the vast majority of the recruits, the training
is mainly hands-on rather than theoretical. The three
classroom days include introductions to: the Afghan
Constitution, Police Values and Ethics, Democratic Policing
-- Human Dignity, Chain-of-Command Authority, Crime Scene
Management, Use of Force -- Human Rights, and Personal
Hygiene. The seven days of hands-on training include units
on: police station security, first aid, individual movement
techniques, buddy team movement techniques, hand and arm
signals, unit movement, reaction to ambush, breaking contact,
road blocks, reconnaissance, high-risk take downs, weapons
familiarization, range safety, firearms training, building
searches, vehicle stops, mine/IED awareness, hasty defense,
danger crossing and intelligence gathering. Trainers are
mindful of the extremely short period of training for new
recruits but reasonably well satisfied with the course design
and results. This initial 10 days of training will be
followed by a week of additional training per quarter.
Additionally, it is important to note that this 10 days of
training is more training than most of the ANP have received.
Although there is an 8-week course for ANP personnel, many
of the ANP currently serving have not been allowed by their
chiefs to attend the training at the Regional Training
Centers (RTC). Police commanders contend they cannot spare
their ANP patrolmen for the RTC training course plus
associated travel time.

Recruitment and Deployment by the Numbers
--------------


4. (SBU) Deployment: As of early December, a total of 581

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ANAP have graduated from the RTC ANAP course. The following
table, which is current as of late November, is meant only to
suggest the district dispersal of allotments, recruits, RTC
graduates, and trainees in the districts and various ANP
commands outside Kandahar City or the nearby district of Dand:

Column 1: Tashkil (allotment)
Column 2: Registered/Vetted
Column 3: Graduated/Deployed
Column 4: Presently in Training

Within Districts
Mianshin -------------- 150 -- 122 -- 29 -- 9
Panjwayi -------------- 140 -- 138 -- 52 -- 42
Zharay -------------- 100 -- 155 -- 14 -- 108
Arghandab -------------- 100 -- 70 --- 52 -- 14
Maruf -------------- 100 -- 22 --- 0 -- 20
Maywand -------------- 100 -- 118 -- 15 -- 0
Nesh -------------- 100 -- 29 --- 0 -- 29
Ghorak -------------- 80 --- 28 --- 15 -- 11
ShahWaliKot --- 70 --- 89 --- 19 -- 22
Reg -------------- 70 --- 0 -------------- 0 --- 0
Arghestan -------------- 70 --- 5 -------------- 0 --- 2
Shorabak -------------- 60 --- 80 --- 29 -- 5
Daman -------------- 60 --- 39 --- 16 -- 22
Khakrez -------------- 60 --- 36 --- 0 --- 19
Spin Boldak --- 40 --- 66 --- 13 -- 0

Within Kandahar City and Dand

Unit 888 (QRF) - 0 -------------- 35 --- 10 -------------- 0
Jananmama -------------- 0 -------------- 0 -------------- 7 -------------- 0
Abdul Rasheed -- 0 -------------- 9 -------------- 0 -------------- 0
Sub-Station 2 -- 0 -------------- 21 -------------- 5 -------------- 0
Niaz Mohammad -- 0 -------------- 0 -------------- 2 -------------- 0
Hazim Khan -------------- 0 -------------- 0 -------------- 3 -------------- 0
Mohammad Raza -- 0 -------------- 0 -------------- 9 -------------- 0
Turialai -------------- 0 -------------- 10 -------------- 0 -------------- 0
Haji Lal Jan --- 0 -------------- 45 -------------- 0 -------------- 0

H. Abdul Hadi -- 0 -------------- 12 -------------- 0 -------------- 0
Crime Branch --- 0 -------------- 2 -------------- 0 -------------- 0

Total -------------- 1300 -- 1131 -- 290 -- 303


5. (SBU) The numbers show that Kandahar authorities are
working to get the maximum numbers of ANAP into Panjwayi and
Zharay -- even above the levels of the official tashkil in
the case of Zharay. KPRT understands that Governor Khalid
has authorized the Chief of Police to increase these tashkils
to 250 even without blessing from Kabul. The second half of
the table, shows the absorption of newly minted ANAP into
units within the city (or in the nearby district of Dand).
None of these units are authorized ANAP but over 100 recruits
for these units are now registered for the training. These
unilateral provincial actions are generating pressure on the
Ministry of Interior to seek a raise in the authorized
personnel cap for auxiliary police beyond the 11,271
patrolmen agreed to by President Karzai. Ultimately, the GOA
will depend on the international community, through its
donations to the Law and Order Trust Fund-Afghanistan (LOFTA)
to pay the salaries for all auxiliary police.

Panjwayi and Zharay -- "Ghost Cops"
--------------


6. (SBU) According to the MOI Rep to KPRT, Colonel Mohammad
Hussein (protect),it is very common to use tashkils to scam
the ANP pay system. He cited Panjwayi and Zharay as two
relevant examples. The total number of properly trained and
registered ANP policemen in Panjwayi is 9 out of a tashkil of

104. In Zharay, the figure is an even smaller 3 out of a
tashkil of 45. The two districts have had problems with ANP
staffing throughout the post-Taliban period. A full tashkil
of names is submitted faithfully for payment but inevitably a
significant number of the persons whose names are submitted
are not even working as police. The extra wages are simply
pocketed according to some formula by the leadership.
(Comment: This "ghost cop" phenomenon is exactly the
situation the new direct pay plan is designed to stop. The
procedure now is: A list of personnel is transmitted to the

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MOI, the MOI verifies the list and sends this document to the
MOF, the MOF then directly deposits the money into a
commercial bank and the individual can either go to the bank
to be paid or a representative of the bank with a certifying
official and CSTC-A or IC mentor proceeds to pay the
policemen off of the list.)


7. (SBU) Hussein went on to describe the new police chief of
Zharay, Agha Ghulam Rasool, as Ahmad Wali Karzai's man. Both
he and the district leader are from Karzai's Popalzai tribe,
even though the Alizais are the biggest tribe in Zharay.
Seven months ago he was a policeman in Kandahar and fled to
Helmand to avoid arrest on charges of robbing people.
Hussein asserts that through Ahmad Wali Karzai's influence,
Ghulam Rasool was appointed Chief of Police in Garmser where
he was again accused of robbing the people he was charged to
protect. In October, he turned up as the new appointee as
Chief of Police in Zharay. Hussein suggested wryly that if
this man's reports of killed Taliban were accurate, then
there could no Taliban left in all of Kandahar.


8. (SBU) The link to the ANAP program is that this same
chief, with the help of only three trained and registered
ANP, will be controlling the brand new ANAP police force in
Zharay. The Colonel acknowledged that the new policemen are
supposed to be paid directly, but noted that this only occurs
in Kandahar City and perhaps Dand. Likewise, it is very
difficult to effectively vet district-level recruits to
ensure they will not become "ghost" police -- on a roster
only to generate income. The result, he claimed, is that the
majority of ANAP recruitment is done directly by district
police chiefs. According to information presented in the
table in paragraph 4, the ANAP tashkils are 100 (Zharay) and
140 (Panjwayi). Canada urges that these tashkils be raised
to 250 each to create a force able to hold ground following
upcoming operations. Provincial Police Chief Esmatullah
Alizai has promised to do his best to meet this need. Canada
seeks an increase in the total tashkil for the province from
1,300 to 2,000 in order to accommodate the needs of these two
troubled districts. Yet these auxiliary police might provide
few positives and significant negatives if Hussein is correct
about the command and control issues. This has been a major
Canadian concern since the program was conceived.


9. (SBU) A Canadian CIVPOL representaive visited with Zharay
district Chief of Police Agha Ghulam Rasool on December 4.
Not surprisingly, Rasool's account of the situation there
differs from that described above. He acknowledges that he
owes his position to Ahmed Wali Karzai and sayshe has a very
difficult relationship with Esmatullah Alizai, Kandahar
province chief of police. There are 13 checkpoints in the
district, of which his forces control 10. He claims that the
governor,s 05 Reserve Force also operates in the district
and that the individuals manning the other three checkpoints
do notrespond to his orders. He claims to have brought along
a force of 45 ANP registered in Helmand, but that they have
not been paid in eight months. He said an additional 55 ANP
(apparently unregistered) remained from the previous command.
He also said he was authorized 150 ANAP (vice 155 in the
table above). Ghulam Rasoool,s count then varied
dramatically from our provincial ANP HQ numbers; however, he
claimed that only 60 (vice 108) are currently in training at
the Regional Training Center (RTC) and the remaining 90 (vice
33) are waiting for training. Finally, when questioned about
tribal affiliations of his force, Ghualm Rasool countered
that the ANAP is a national force made up of Afghans and that
tribal balance is not required. This assertion is clearly
out of step with Afghanistan's international obligations
under the London Compact, which requires the fielding of an
ethnically balanced police force.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) While off to a good start, the ANAP program still
faces many challenges in Kandahar. The wide dispersal of
graduates makes it difficult to make generalizations, but we
have some reports that at least some of the new ANAP have not
been paid on time. (Note: The ANAP are not authorized to be
paid until they graduate from training. Additionally, there

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is a pre-established pay period in each province. The ANAP
may have to wait for up to 30 days to be paid in order for
the official authorization for payment to be transmitted to
the MOI and for the payment to be coordinated and paid to the
bank by the MOF.) It is also clear that provincial
authorities are using the program to normalize personnel
irregularities within the ANP. As long as large gray areas
in registration of personnel, irregularities in wage
payments, and use of the governor's operational funds persist
in the regular ANP program, then the ANAP will suffer from
spillover effects. KPRT will continue to cooperate with
CSTC-A, the ANP, and other actors to addressthese concerns
and answer additional key questions such as: whether tribal
affiliation is properly recorded during the registration
process, how big the discrepancies will be between district
and ANAP tribal balance; and the success of the recruiting
shuras. A strong and effective ANAP presence in Kandahar,
especially in Panjawyi and Zharay, is a key element if the
security situation is to improve. Timing is critical to have
the ANAP prepared to move into the two districts as part of
the sequencing of upcoming operations.
NEUMANN