Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL5864
2006-12-16 11:04:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PRT/SHARANA: GOA WEAKNESS IN THE FACE OF THE ENEMY

Tags:  PREL PGOV AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6974
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #5864/01 3501104
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161104Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4912
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3410
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 005864 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR, S/CT, SCA/PAB, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, AND POLAD
RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PRT/SHARANA: GOA WEAKNESS IN THE FACE OF THE ENEMY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 005864

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR, S/CT, SCA/PAB, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, AND POLAD
RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PRT/SHARANA: GOA WEAKNESS IN THE FACE OF THE ENEMY


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Naka district, a remote district in
Northeast Paktika province, came under control of
insurgent/Taliban forces in early summer 2006. Irregular
contract police forces recruited by Paktika,s Governor
Ekhpulwak regained control of the district later the same
month. To date, no regular Afghan National Police (ANP) or
Afghan government leadership have been permanently stationed
in the district. The inability and refusal of Afghan police
and government leaders to reoccupy Naka highlights the
weakness of the ANP in Paktika and the lack of competent and
determined leaders in the present provincial government. END
SUMMARY

--------------
GOA Presence Limited
--------------


2. (SBU) Naka, located in the wooded mountains of Paktika,s
extreme northeast, is a remote district in an area of strong
Taliban and Haqqani influence. Naka was lost to insurgents
on June 15. It was recovered in late June by former Taliban
and Haqqani supporter Mohammed Akbar and thirty of his
followers who had been deputized and were paid by Governor
Ekhpulwak for this operation. On October 10, American
military forces from Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)
Sharana and the State PRTOff visited Naka,s district center
in conjunction with Governor Ekhpulwak,s visit the same day.
The visit confirmed that Naka does not have any conventional
Afghan government forces in the district. Instead, another
old Mujahideen commander, Mohammed Jan Sidiqi, and 53 of his
loyal followers have been recruited from neighboring Khost
Province to serve as the district Commissioner and contract
police in Naka.

--------------
Lack of Safety Impedes Development
--------------


3. (SBU) Naka is a sparsely populated and mountainous
district which has historically seen little Afghan government
presence or influence under any Afghan government. Located
in the Zadran tribal homeland shared by neighboring districts
of Paktika, Paktia, and Khost Provinces, Naka was at one time
home to Jalaluddin Haqqani. That Taliban and Haqqani
elements are still active in the area was aptly demonstrated

on October 10, when the PRT ground convoy going to Naka was
attacked by small arms and RPG fire as it entered the
mountain pass leading to Naka from Zeruk. Governor Ekhpulwak
arrived later that day, at the district center, by U.S. Army
helicopter, addressed a crowd of some 300 local people, and
met with elements of the District Tribal Shura. Only five of
12 District Shura members attended the meeting with the
governor, and none of the district's famous and influential
religious leaders were present. Provincial Chief of Police
General Abdul Baqi Nuristani was also conspicuously absent.
The Governor explained that, unless the people of Naka could
guarantee the safety of contractors working for the coalition
and the Afghan government in Naka, the district would get no
development assistance. The Shura members present agreed and
the Governor departed, by air, after three hours on the
ground.


4. (SBU) Naka district has been one of Paktika,s most
difficult districts to secure. It was lost to insurgent
forces this year along with Dila district in the far
southwest of the province. Both were recovered this summer.
Dila now has official Afghan police and a District
Commissioner, and the District Tribal Shura has opened
dialogue with the Provincial government and the PRT. The
Head of the Dila Shura recently traveled to the PRT to
request projects and food aid for the district. The
difference between Dila and Naka is that the coalition has
established a military base in Dila. The fact that no Afghan
government civil administrator has been willing to take the
job as Naka District Commissioner and that no serving Afghan

KABUL 00005864 002 OF 002


police officer or patrolman has accepted assignment to serve
in Naka is telling of the poor state of discipline,
confidence, and leadership in the ANP and Afghan civil
administration in Paktika province. The performance of
Provincial Chief of Police Baqi, in refusing to send police
officers and men to Naka district, and thus ignoring the
security problem there -- and even refusing to travel to the
district under U.S. military guard -- is troubling. This is
unlikely to be reversed and Naka will likely remain a
difficult district with strong ties to insurgent forces until
the Afghan government or coalition forces garrison the
district with military forces.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------

5. (SBU) The failure of more than half of the district's
Shura members to attend the Governor's meeting and the
apparent refusal by the Naka religious community to heed the
Governor's invitation is indicative of the government's lack
of influence in the district. CSTC-A has an Afghan-led
program to identify, remove and replace Afghan police unit
commanders who have demonstrated the lack of will and ability
to lead. PRToff sees a need for a similar program applied to
Afghan provincial administrators, including the use of
embedded trainers at provincial and district levels.
NEUMANN